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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
1.1 Expectations in Financial Markets
Expectations are one of the major driving forces of human behavior. Choices are made
under the expectation that they yield a certain result in the near or far future. Therefore,
expectations need to be formed on 1) the external conditions on the specic point of time
in the future, and, 2) the e¤ect that the individuals specic choice today will have in
that specic expected future environment. In this framework, individuals try to maximize
their total lifetime utility, as it is called in economics, based on expectations.
To give an example, think of a person who needs to decide upon her or his subject of
education. To begin with the expectations on the external conditions; it might be the case
that currently there is an excess supply of psychologists. Uncertain, however, is how this
excess supply is going to develop in the future. Are prospective students deciding to stay
away from a degree in psychology because of the limited job prospects? Will more people
be in need of a psychologist because of the ageing population? Expectations need to be
formed. Concerning the second part, the evaluation of the specic choice; how will you
perform as a psychologist within this future scenario? You are interested in the subject
today, but will you still be interested in the future? You performed relatively well in high
school, but how does this compare to other university students, and other psychologists?
Finally, how will these two layers of future conditions interact with eachother?
Economic theory is often based on forward looking agents as well. In other words,
economic actors are continuously forming expectations on future conditions. The most
widely used denition of economics by Robbins (1932) states that "[it] studies human
behavior as a relation between ends and scarce means which have alternative uses". In
other words, economics studies human beings in their choices to allocate scarce resources
in order to reach a certain goal. The allocation decision needs to be made at time zero;
the goal, however, lies at some point in the future. Hence, expectations need to be
1
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formed. A famous example in which expectations play a crucial roll and have direct
e¤ect on real economic outcomes, is the monetary policy literature1. Agents set prices
each period conditional on their expectations of future conditions, which is generally
the future price level. Think in this respect of employeeswage demands in relation
to their purchasing power, or companies deciding on prices for customers. The Central
Bank in the model, responsible for setting the price level, rst observes the expectations
of agents and then decides on the level of ination. In other words, the Central Bank
might, depending on its objectives, behave opportunisticly and maximize its own goal
taking the given expectations for granted. The fact that all agents in the model know
that the Central Bank has this incentive while it is promising to abide by low ination,
is called the time-inconsistency problem. When individuals in the economy observe that
the actual ination rate does not coincide with their expected ination rate, however,
they will take this into account the next period when forming expectations. In this way,
there are repercussions on the opportunistic Central Bank behavior. The morale of this
example is that expectations play a central role in all types of economic decisions, of
both individuals and institutions. Furthermore, expectations tend to be of higher order,
such that the expectations of agent one are conditional on those of agent two, which are
conditional on those of agent one, ad innitum.
Expectations are most prominently the driving factor in the (nancial) marketplace.
Stock prices are modelled as the present value of all expected future dividends. Long term
interest rates consist of expectations of future short term interest rates. Option prices
are the present value of the expected di¤erence between the price of the underlying asset
and the strike price at maturity. Foreign exchange rates are a function of expected future
exchange rates and macro-economic variables. All asset prices are, one way or the other,
based on expectations of future conditions which feed into the asset pricing function.
Asset prices move directly in accordance with expectations. If it is expected that the
asset price will increase a certain percentage in the future, this will be incorporated in
the price today in order to eliminate arbitrage opportunities. Therefore, prices will jump
today just enough such that the possible "free lunch" in the future is eliminated and
prices will grow with the market index towards the expected future higher level.
Although at the heart of price formation, the relation between expectations and ac-
tual prices is not one-to-one; the whole process takes a number of crucial intermediate
steps. First of all the question how expectations are formed. Which information is taken
into account, and which underlying model with which parameter set is applied? Second,
the relation between an expectation and an actual market order depends on a number of
issues. One being the utility function of the agent; are we dealing with a prot maximizer
in monetary terms, or with a broader denition of utility? The shape of the utility func-
tion is also of relevance, think for instance of prospect theory by Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), which states that the utility function is asymmetric in gains and losses. Also,
there is a number of external constraints; think in this respect of liquidity constraints,
or short-selling constraints. One can be convinced of the fact that the price of a certain
1The current example is based on the Barro-Gordon model of time inconsistency; see Barro and
Gordon (1983)
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stock will go down in the future, but if it is not possible to go short, the trader will not act
in accordance with expectations and her or his information will thus not be incorporated
into the market price. The nal step concerns the market microstructure. If a trader
actually does place an order in the market, it depends on the structure and organiza-
tion of the marketplace itself what is the e¤ect on the price formation process. Di¤erent
structures imply di¤erent dissemination of information across market participants.
Traditionally, economic literature assumes that agents form expectations rationally,
as suggested by Muth (1961). Rationality in forming expectations in its strictest form is
based on two pillars. Firstly, agents are assumed to have costless access to all relevant
information. That is, all variables that have an e¤ect on the variable of interest are
known to the economic agent who is forming an expectation; the expectation is based
on full information. The second pillar states that agents are also aware of the correct
model. This means that agents know what the e¤ect is of the complete information set
of the rst pillar on the variable of interest. In economic modelling terms this implies
that rational agents have knowledge of both the equations ánd the coe¢ cients of the true
underlying model2. As all agents are rational, all agents are also similar to each other
because there is only one rational expected value. Because of this homogeneity of agents,
the representative agent is an important feature of the rational expectations paradigm.
Within the domain of nancial markets the rational expectations hypothesis is known
as the e¢ cient market hypothesis, or EMH. The EMH states that all relevant informa-
tion is incorporated into market prices. Fama (1970) introduces three forms of market
e¢ ciency, namely weak, semi-strong, and strong. Weak implies that all information from
past prices is discounted in todays price; semi-strong states that all public information
is incorporated into prices, and strong implies that all information is incorporated into
prices. The implication of the EMH is that price changes cannot be predicted. Prices
follow a random walk such that the best prediction for tomorrows price is todays price.
Price changes can therefore only be induced by unexpected information in the market.
If there were arbitrage opportunities in the market, i.e. riskless prots, rational agents
would pick up on these and trade upon them. As a result, the "free lunch" would again
disappear.
Among the advantages of rational expectations are the intuitive nature, but also the
relative ease of (mathematical) modelling and, especially in empirical studies, the lack
of an alternative. Because of the unrealistic assumptions underlying the EMH, it has
been subject to debate and an object of study ever since its introduction. Milgrom
and Stokey (1982) cast doubt on the notion of rational expectations from a theoretical
viewpoint. Their no-trade theorem implies that there will be no trade between agents if
the market is in equilibrium because all agents are similar to each other. The homogeneity
of agents in the rational expectations hypothesis implies that all traders will have similar
expectations of the future price, and will therefore never exchange assets. If an individual
expects prices to increase and wishes to go long in a certain stock, she or he will not nd
2Note that a model, by denition, is always a simplied version of reality. Therefore, the true model
in a rational framework implies a model not consisting of all but only the relevant factors for the variable
of interest.
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a trading partner because everybody believes prices will rise and thus nobody will want
to sell. Price changes occur as a result of changes in expectations, but without actual
trade taking place. This theoretical result is hardly reconcilable with the actual volume
of trade taking place in nancial markets3. Most studies on the EMH, however, take an
empirical approach4.
There is a number of di¤erent approaches to study the empirical validity of the EMH.
First of all, at the micro-level, an approach to test the EMH is based on surveys among
traders in di¤erent types of nancial markets. In a series of papers, Allen and Taylor
(1990), Taylor and Allen (1992), Menkho¤ (1997), Lui and Mole (1998), and Cheung and
Chinn (2001) interview traders in di¤erent markets and report that expectations are not
only based on economic fundamental considerations, but also on technical analyses for
which there is no room within the EMH. The second line of research also considers survey
data, but in a more direct way in that they use price expectations of market participants.
Cavaglia et al. (1993, 1994) show that expectations of market participants are both biased
and not orthogonal to exogenous information, thus not rational. Individual rationality,
however, is not a necessary condition for market e¢ ciency. Biases at the trader level
might average out at the aggregate level, such that the EMH still holds.
The most well known approach to study the empirical validity of the EMH, however, is
the search for anomalies, so empirical regularities in price data that cannot be reconciled
with the EMH. There is a number of e¤ects that seems persistent in the literature. Among
others, calendar e¤ects are known, such as the January or turn-of-the-year e¤ect (Keim,
1983), day-of-the-week e¤ects introduced by Cross (1973), and the Halloween indicator,
see Bouman and Jacobsen (2002). Cross-sectionally the small-rm e¤ect is well known,
see Schwert (1983), and the value e¤ect by Basu (1977). Contrarian and momentum
strategies are shown to yield signicant excess return, see Jegadeesh and Titman (1993).
Next to these anomalies, there is a number of puzzles that cannot be explained by the
EMH. Excess volatility, demonstrated by Shiller (1981) for stock markets and Baxter
and Stockman (1989) for exchange rates; the disconnect puzzle, see Obstfeld and Rogo¤
(2000), and the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985) is a number examples
of puzzles. A particularly famous puzzle, the forward premium puzzle, which concerns
the fact that the forward rate is a biased predictor of future prices, is of specic relevance
in this respect as it is directly related to the rationality of market expectations, see Engel
(1996) for a review. Hence, a large body of literature is stating that individual market
participants are not rational, but also that individual irrationalities do not cancel out
on the aggregate level. The largest blow to the eld of international nance came from
Meese and Rogo¤ (1983), who showed that the random walk is still the best forecaster
for exchange rates, despite severe information disadvantages versus the classical rational
expectations models.
3Daily volume in the foreign exchange market, for example, is $ 3200 billion, see BIS (2007).
4Fama (1991) correctly notes that empirical tests on the validity of the EMH cannot distinguish
between the equilibrium asset pricing model and informational e¢ ciency per se. Within our denition
of rationality of expectations, however, both pillars are necessary conditions.
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1.2 An Alternative Approach
Guided by this evidence, which was di¢ cult to rationalize in existing asset pricing models,
solutions were sought in both empirical and theoretical directions. In terms of empirical
research, papers continued to test traditional models using renewed data (longer series,
and disaggregated data) and modern econometric techniques (long horizon, cointegration,
TAR), and by taking into account the fact that the relation between fundamentals and
the exchange rate might be conditional on the exchange rate regime; see for instance De
Jong (1997) and Berben and De Jong (1999). In the theoretical corner, roughly three
di¤erent modeling approaches have emerged. One is specic to the foreign exchange
literature, uses the Obstfeld-Rogo¤ (1995, 1996) REDUX framework of dynamic utility
optimization of a representative agent. These micro-founded macro models assume ratio-
nal expectations, but are more thorough in the micro foundation compared to the former
exchange rate models, see Lane (2001) for an overview. A second approach highlights the
importance of the market microstructure in explaining the complex short-term behavior
of the exchange rate, see Lyons (2001), Evans and Lyons (2002). In other words, the focus
of this literature shifts from the expectation formation itself, to the e¤ect trades have on
the price formation process. Using order ow as a proximate determinant, they develop
a model that is strikingly successful in accounting for realized exchange rate changes.
In their analyses, they show that the order ow conveys dispersed information and that
the distribution of information is an important determinant of short-run exchange rate
movements. Moreover, the large volumes in the exchange rate market are explanatory
for short-term movements and an indication that agents have di¤erent information or
process information di¤erently. As shown by Fan and Lyons (2001), informative trades
are mixed with uninformative trades, indicating that market e¢ ciency crucially depends
on how markets accomplish the di¢ cult task of aggregating dispersed information.
Finally, a third approach focusses on the expectation formation process of market
participants, and embeds this within the behavioral economics literature. Behavioral
economics, basically introduced by Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), steps away from the
rationally maximizing homo economicus and introduces a more realistic concept of man
in economic decision making. Kahnemann and Tversky (1979), two psychologists, intro-
duced the prospect theory to describe decision making under uncertainty of non-rational
agents. Behaviorists accept the neoclassical framework, but perceive it as a normative
theory; if people were fully rational they would have to behave as such. Actual human
behavior, however, is not rational. Agents within the behavioral economics literature
have limited cognitive capabilities relative to fully rational agents such that they cannot
comprehend the full information set or model. Also, decisions are made subject to psy-
chological inuences and emotions. As such, behavioral economics is a positive theory.
The behavioral economics literature is, among things, engaged with describing biases and
heuristics. For example, Festinger (1957) considers cognitive dissonance; Kahneman et
al. (1982) describe various judgmental heuristics and biases, such as representativeness,
availability, anchoring, framing, etc.
Behavioral nance, as introduced by De Bondt and Thaler (1985), applies the same
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concept as behavioral economics to nancial market participants and studies the subse-
quent e¤ect it has on market characteristics. Trading behavior is, in the end, all about
deciding under uncertainty as well and therefore prone to behavioral heuristics. Also
within the behavioral nance literature, studies are focused on anomalies, see Froot and
Thaler (1990). Trader behavior within behavioral nance ranges from fully rational to
fully irrational5. Rational agents trade according to the proper model using the com-
plete and correct information set while irrational agents exhibit purely random trading
behavior. Everything in between these extremes is characterized as boundedly rational
behavior, as rst coined by Herbert Simon (1957). Agents acting boundedly rational do
pursue some kind of maximization process, but using inaccurate models and/or incom-
plete information sets.
Taking the step towards boundedly rational behavior also paves the way for intro-
ducing heterogeneous behavior. The rational expectations hypothesis rests on the notion
of the representative agent. This is a direct consequence of rationality because there is
obviously only one rational decision per given situation. Bounded rationality, however,
can have innitely many di¤erent shapes. The spectrum between rational and random
behavior is a broad one. To be more specic, there is only one correct equilibrium model,
while the number of errors that can be made in both the equations and the coe¢ cients is
endless. There is only one full information set, while there are innitely many di¤erent
sub sets of the full information set. Also, di¤erent traders may have di¤erent utility
functions and be more or less susceptible to di¤erent psychological and emotional factors
when making buy or sell decisions. As such, it is safe to make the assumption that mar-
ket participants are heterogeneous in forming expectations and subsequently executing
orders.
The heterogeneous agents literature formally models the behavior of boundedly ratio-
nal agents and their interaction in forming the asset price. This approach was initiated by
Frankel and Froot (1987) and further developed in the context of nancial asset pricing.
For instance, Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998) model trader-heterogeneity in a dynamic
heterogeneous agents model with trader interaction and switching believes. This litera-
ture incorporates a number of behavioral characteristics. First of all, the market com-
prises of several groups (usually two) of di¤erent types of traders. In Brock and Hommes
(1997) there is a group of naive traders who perceive the market as a random walk and
a group of fully rational traders. Usually, however, both groups are modelled as being
boundedly rational, using di¤erent expectation formation functions (see e.g. De Grauwe
and Grimaldi, 2005, 2006). Interestingly, agents are assumed to be able to switch between
the two groups; based on a measure of cognitive dissonance that takes status quo bias
into account, agents can change the way they form expectations. As all groups use rela-
tively simple expectation formation rules without using any specic data or knowledge,
switching can be done quickly and costlessly. Each period agents evaluate the extent to
which their cognition (i.e. expectation) is consistent (i.e. close to the realization). The
larger this dissonance, the less comfortable the agent and so the more eager she or he
5Other characterizations of irrational traders are zero-intelligence traders (Gode and Sunder, 1993),
noise traders (DeLong et al., 1990), or liquidity traders.
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will be to change beliefs in order to eliminate the cognitive dissonance (i.e. switch to the
other group). Agents are also subject to status quo bias, however, such that they will
not change groups immediately but will do so with a certain delay.
As such, the market consists of two groups of interacting traders, but the relative size
of the groups is conditional on their relative performance. Changing relative sizes induces
market conditions to change accordingly. The investor sentiment literature, see Barberis
et al. (1998), models the loading of risk factors to be conditional on the current sentiment
of the traders. The switching function from the heterogeneous agents literature serves the
same purpose, but incorporates more structure in the form of previous performance. The
heterogeneous agents model therefore embeds both the micro- and the macro-level and
introduces interaction between the di¤erent abstraction levels. At the micro level trader
behavior is modelled; the combination of all traders forms the macro level, the market as
a whole. The market itself then feeds back into the behavior of individual traders in the
next period.
Trader heterogeneity is operationalized by introducing di¤ering expectation formation
functions per group of traders. Frankel and Froot (1987) introduce a number of alterna-
tive expectation formation rules which are not rational, such as extrapolative, adaptive,
and regressive expectations. Extrapolative expectations are based on the previous pe-
riods actual price change, which is extrapolated into the future. Adaptive expectations
are formed by looking at previous periods forecasting error. Regressive expectations are
based on the notion of mean reversion towards a certain long-run value. The norm within
the heterogeneous agents literature is to classify traders in two groups, namely fundamen-
talists and chartists as proposed by Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990). Fundamentalists are
traders who expect mean reversion towards the fundamental price. In other words, they
form expectations by comparing the current spot price with what they perceive to be the
fundamental price and choose a point in between; as such, they serve as a stabilizing force
in the market. This is comparable to the regressive expectations introduced by Frankel
and Froot (1987). Chartists, on the other hand, are destabilizing. Chartists, or technical
analysts, deduct their expectation from previously observed prices and price changes. In
the most simple form, the most recent price change is (partly) extrapolated. Combined,
the two groups form a globally stable system with locally stable and unstable periods,
conditional on which group is dominant in the market. The distinction between chartists
and fundamentalists can be motivated by the existence of technical analysts. Rational ex-
pectations nance would assume that all traders are fundamentalists. Frankel and Froot
(1987) show, however, that there are large and long deviations from the fundamental
price. In the long-run, though, there always is mean-reversion. The existence of technical
analysts in the market is by now rmly established. Allen and Taylor (1990), Taylor
and Allen (1992), Menkho¤ (1997), Lui and Mole (1998), and Cheung and Chinn (2001)
conduct surveys amongst market participants and report that their trading behavior is
based on a mixture between economic fundamental and technical analyses.
The heterogeneous expectations literature is roughly focused on three issues. The rst
topic comprises of the dynamic properties of the nonlinear models; given the nonlinear
setup, the behavior of the model depends heavily on the magnitude of the coe¢ cients and
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the starting values in a simulation setup. Chiarella et al. (2002) and Chiarella and He
(2002) characterize the parameter space of the models according to the local stability or
instability of the equilibrium. The second topic is the replication of stylized facts known
from nancial markets. By using simulations combined with time-series techniques, Lux
(1998), LeBaron et al. (1999) and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) show that
models with heterogeneous interacting agents are capable of replicating the stylized facts
of nancial markets (i.e., extreme values, volatility clustering, disconnection from the
fundamental, excess volatility). The third topic comprehends the estimation of models
with heterogeneous interacting agents. This is a relatively new and unexplored topic
since the estimation of the non-linear switching mechanism proofed to be di¢ cult. Vig-
fusson (1997) and Ahrens and Reitz (2005) have circumvented the problem of estimating
the non-linear switching mechanism by replacing it with a Markov regime-switching ap-
proach. Baak (1999) and Chavas (2000) employ ltering techniques for similar reasons.
Winker and Gilli (2001, 2004) estimate a heterogeneous agents model by minimizing a
loss function consisting of the kurtosis and ARCH-estimates of the simulated data by
adjusting the coe¢ cients of the model. Reitz and Westerho¤ (2003, 2005, 2006) directly
estimate a model of chartists and fundamentalists with switching mechanism for daily
exchange rates from 1980 to 1996. Boswijk et al. (2007) rewrite the model of Brock and
Hommes (1997) and estimate it directly for the S&P500 using a non-linear least squares
technique. Alfarano et al. (2005, 2006) derive and estimate the cumulative distribution
function of the returns generated by a heterogeneous agents model which is a function
of the distribution of agents across groups. All these papers nd evidence in favor of the
heterogeneous agents models; both trader heterogeneity and switching believes are found.
Because of the relative novelty of the heterogeneous agents literature, there are ample
possibilities of extending it. In our view the literature would especially gain from more
empirical studies since the majority of the studies is simulation based. By doing so,
it also becomes possible to introduce more economic and behavioral intuition into the
literature. Because of the simulation focus, there is scope for theoretical development as
well; moving towards empirical applications allows integration and combination with a
broader set of economic issues. Also, as yet the literature appears to be concentrated in
the nance literature; we believe the general framework is applicable in a much broader
spectrum. The switching mechanism provides a very intuitive and parsimonious method
to introduce time variation in coe¢ cients, for example.
1.3 This Dissertation
Broadly speaking, this thesis progresses along the lines of the literature as sketched above.
The general underlying motivation is always to explain market dynamics; the approach,
however, evolves through the chapters parallel to the evolution of the literature. As
such, we try to explain market dynamics from a traditional macro-economic viewpoint, a
survey-based angle, a simulation based heterogeneous agents approach, and nally using a
purely empirical heterogeneous agents based methodology. These approaches are applied
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to three of the largest types of nancial markets currently active, i.e., exchange rate
markets, equity markets, and stock options markets.
Chapter 2 starts of from the traditional macro-economic approach to exchange rate
determination. The monetary model, introduced by Frenkel (1976) and Mussa (1976),
poses that exchange rate changes are induced by changes in either the relative money
supply, income levels, or interest rates. The exchange rate disconnect puzzle, as intro-
duced by Flood and Rose (1995), states, however, that there is a disconnection between
these macroeconomic variables and the exchange rate. Chapter 2 studies whether this
disconnect puzzle also holds for the higher moments. It is well known that exchange rate
returns, as all returns from nancial markets, show some particular statistical stylized
facts, such as volatility clustering and extreme values. As the monetary model forecasts
that changes in the level of the right hand side variables induce the left hand side variable
to change, this should also hold for the variance and the extreme values. In other words,
high uncertainty in macro-economic variables should be translated into high uncertainty
in the exchange rate. Chapter 2 rst studies whether macro-economic variables have the
same statistical properties as exchange rate returns, and subsequently looks into the re-
lationship between fundamentals and exchange rates while controlling for inuences from
monetary policy.
The third chapter is the rst to step away from the notion of rational expectations
and a representative agent, and looks into the question whether the heterogeneous agents
approach is a viable alternative. We do this by applying an empirical survey based
investigation into the di¤erences between individual expectations of (relevant) market
participants. One of the big advantages of using a survey of individual expectations, is
that it yields directly observable expectations. Since this particular survey is held under
large nancial institutions in London, the expectations are also very informative and
representative in the sense that they are used as an input for large investment decisions6.
First of all, we test whether professional individual expectations on the future7 exchange
rate are statistically and economically dispersed by applying extreme value theory on
the distribution of di¤erences in beliefs. Second, we attempt to explain these di¤erences
in expectations by testing whether di¤erent individuals put di¤erent, and time-varying,
weights on either (macro-) economic fundamentals or technical analysis when forming
expectations. As such, the dichotomy between fundamentalists and chartists is introduced
in the thesis. The nal part of the chapter looks into the question whether the dispersion
of beliefs actually has an e¤ect on market conditions, or whether market conditions a¤ect
the dispersion of beliefs. Market conditions, in this case, are dened as the magnitude of
conditional volatility and conditional kurtosis.
The insights from Chapters 2 and 3 are combined in Chapter 4. Chapter 4 formal-
izes the idea of dispersion of beliefs, or heterogeneous expectations, in a dynamic asset
pricing model. The expectation formation processes of fundamentalists and chartists are
combined into a weighted average of expectations, i.e., the market expectation. The
6More than 40% of the daily activity on FOREX markets consists of trade between nancial institu-
tions, BIS (2007).
7Future is operationalized as the three- and twelve-months forecasting horizon.
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distribution of market participants over fundamentalists and chartists is time varying,
and conditional on previous relative protability of the two forecasting rules. Funda-
mentalists form their expectations by comparing the fundamental exchange rate with the
market rate; therefore, as in the monetary model, there is a direct connection between
the macro-economic fundamentals and the exchange rate. This relation is mitigated by
the inuence of chartists in the market, who do not incorporate the fundamental rate
into their expectation formation process. In a Monte Carlo simulation framework we
investigate to what extent the dynamics in the fundamental rate, which are generated by
a GARCH-process, spill over into the market exchange rate, which is generated by the
total heterogeneous agents model.
Chapter 5 di¤ers from Chapter 4 in terms of methodology. It is still based on a het-
erogeneous agents model, but estimates the model directly on exchange rate data instead
of simulating data and comparing the outcomes with observed data. The advantage of
using simulations is that it gives the researcher total control over the model. The mecha-
nisms of the model can be laid bare under strict application of the famous ceteris paribus
clause. The drawback of simulating data, however, is that it is an indirect way of testing
the model empirically. It might very well be the case that a certain model simulates data
with exactly similar characteristics as empirically observed data, but this is no guaran-
tee that the modelled mechanisms are similar to those at work in reality. When using
estimation techniques, the researcher does confront the model directly with empirically
observed data. Disadvantage compared to simulations is, of course, loss of control. The
second issue, which is specic for the case of heterogeneous agents models, is that the
model needs to be simplied to a certain extent in order to be able to estimate it. Because
of the highly non-linear nature of the model, most studies use simulation techniques. In
the model we apply, adding one specic assumption, i.e. homogeneous risk across agents,
simplies the model considerably in mathematical sense, such that it can be estimated.
The basic structure of di¤erent types of agents with switching between the two, however,
remains intact. In Chapter 5 we estimate a heterogeneous agents model for eight Euro-
pean Monetary System (EMS) exchange rates versus the US Dollar. Also, the forecasting
power of the model is compared to that of traditional models, and the stability of the
model under the estimated coe¢ cient sets is investigated.
There are three directions in which Chapter 6 is an extension to Chapter 5. First of
all, Chapter 6 does not look into the foreign exchange market, but broadens the scope
of heterogeneous agents models and focuses on equity indices. Both the Hang Seng
index of Hong Kong and the Bangkok S.E.T. of Thailand are subject of investigation.
Second, we introduce a model of a boundedly rational representative fund manager, who
has the ability to condition expectations on three sources of information, and switch
between them. This is the opposite of Chapter 5, where the market was populated by
three di¤erent agents with single information sources. The third novelty in Chapter 6 is
that two markets are modelled as one interdependent system. To be more specic, the
specication of the heterogeneous agents model as in Chapter 5 is extended with a third
type of information, namely international (next to fundamental and technical), which
focuses on relevant foreign markets. Moreover, we place two systems of individual markets
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next to each other, which become linked by the existence of the international linkage.
Since the relative weight put on this third source changes through time, the correlation
between the two markets also changes through time. This framework is estimated for two
markets, Hang Seng and S.E.T. for a period surrounding the Asian crisis. The changing
importance attached to the di¤erent information sources is used to explain the extreme
movements in the markets during the crisis, i.e. the build-up of a bubble, the subsequent
crash, and the contagion of the crash to foreign markets.
Chapter 7 illustrates how broad the general framework of switching beliefs can be
applied. The chapter starts by introducing the notion of volatility traders. Financial
engineering has created numerous products that depend solely on the volatility of a
certain underlying asset. Think in this respect of options, the VIX index, etc. Put in this
light, market participants trading such products do not necessarily form expectations on
price, but on the underlying volatility. Therefore, they trade in volatility. When acting
upon their expectations, volatility traders a¤ect the price of the designated nancial
products, and thus the (implied) volatility. On this foundation, we introduce two groups
of agents who have di¤erent views on the future level of volatility. The rst group,
again labelled fundamentalists, expect volatility to return to the unconditional volatility.
The second group, chartists, focusses on (unexpected) shocks from the underlying asset.
Agents are again capable of changing their belief based on the relative forecasting error
the two groups make. We show that the model is basically a standardGARCH with time-
varying coe¢ cients. The time variation in the coe¢ cients is introduced by the behavioral
underpinning of the model, i.e. the switching of agents. As such, switching based on
forecasting errors is a very intuitive and parsimonious way of introducing time variation
in coe¢ cients, which is broadly applicable also outside the nancial markets literature.
The behavioral volatility traders model is tested using two very distinct methodologies.
First of all, it is applied in a pure time-series setting on the thirty individual Dow Jones
Industrial Average stocks. Results are compared to those of a standard (static) GARCH.
Second, the model is used to price German DAX30 options. The GARCH-option pricing
methodology of Duan (1995) is adjusted such that it embeds the behavioral volatility
trading model.
The nal chapter, number 8, provides individual conclusions per chapter, and more
broad insights gained from the research on heterogeneous agents throughout this thesis.
We nish by providing our view on the direction future research might be going.
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CHAPTER 2
Foreign Exchange Market Dynamics: Fundamentals and
Realignments
2.1 Introduction
It is widely recognized in the nancial-economic literature that returns from nancial mar-
kets display a number of distinct characteristics. Well-known examples are the heavy-tail
phenomenon, lepto-kurtosis and volatility clustering (see De Vries (1994) for an overview
of stylized facts of exchange rate returns). The most striking observation is that the
behavior of returns is extremely similar across nancial markets. Whether looking at
bond, stock or exchange rate markets, the dynamics are very similar (Lux, 1998, Longin,
1996). These statistical regularities combined with the exchange-rate disconnect puz-
zle, so the observation that the exchange rate does not move in line with its underlying
fundamentals, are (partly) the reason of the dismissal of the exchange rate models from
the seventies.
Despite the fact that the non-normality in exchange rates is well documented and that
models from the classical PPP to the modern new open macro literature are based on
macro-economic fundamentals, only a handful of studies have looked into the statistical
properties of macro economic fundamentals themselves. The conclusions of these studies
are strong, though. Volatility clustering in the fundamentals has already been demon-
strated by Engle himself when introducing the celebrated ARCH methodology, see Engle
(1982) for UK ination and Engel (1983) for US ination. Hodrick (1989) sets up a model
with fundamental uncertainty, and shows that conditional fundamental (that is, money
0This chapter is based on Zwinkels, R.C.J. (2007). Foreign Exchange Market Dynamics: Fundamentals
and Realignments, in: K. Kuttner (eds.) Money and Finance, Lisbon: Escolar Editora. Part of this
chapter was written while staying at the K.U. Leuven. It has beneted highly from inputs of Paul de
Grauwe and Kenneth Kuttner, whose comments are greatly acknowledged.
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supply and production) volatility exists, but is not a determinant of exchange rate re-
turns. Bekaert (1996) also proposes a model with fundamental uncertainty, and shows in
calibrating his coe¢ cients that a wide range of fundamental variables has unstable vari-
ance. Cumperayot (2005) extends and corroborates the exercise of Hodrick (1989), and
Cumperayot et al. (2002) show that fundamental conditional volatility exists, but is not
a determinant of exchange rate volatility. Cumperayot and De Vries (2002) demonstrate
that fundamentals have heavy-tailed distributions, next to volatility clustering.
Another determinant of exchange rate dynamics, is (changes in) the exchange rate
regime. Flood and Rose (1999) demonstrate that the variance of the exchange rate is
considerably lower in a managed exchange rate regime compared to a fully oating rate
regime, while the underlying fundamentals are equally volatile. Koedijk and Kool (1994)
and Koedijk, Stork and De Vries (1992) demonstrate that the statistical features of ex-
change rate returns under xed rate regimes di¤er signicantly from oating rate regimes
by comparing countries under di¤erent regimes. The e¤ect of changes in fundamentals on
the exchange rate is also dependent on the exchange rate regime, as originally proposed
by Krugman (1991). The e¤ect of the regime on third markets has not yet been examined
to our best knowledge. Given triangular arbitrage, a realignment in a xed rate regime,
for example, should give a similar reaction in the third market as in the pegged exchange
rate if the two foreign rates remain relatively stable.
This chapter examines the statistical properties of macro-economic fundamentals, tur-
moil in the exchange rate regime, and their combination, in order to develop a deeper
understanding of the determinants of exchange rate dynamics of European countries vis-
à-vis the US Dollar during the Snake on the lakeand the EMS regimes. The dependency
of transmission of fundamental shocks to the exchange rate on the latters position in the
target zone, as shown in Krugman (1991), is the reason why we combine EMS realign-
ments and fundamentals in the study. Furthermore, the oating rates vis-à-vis the US
Dollar are inuenced by the monetary authorities defending the EMS peg, and by specu-
lative traders testing the stability of the EMS; see Zurlinden (1993). The e¤ects of these
mechanisms blur the impact of fundamental shocks in the data. Insights into the sources
of dynamics and thus into the sources of risk, prospers trade, nancial cooperation and
growth.
The analyses are done in three steps. In the rst part, we examine the dynamics1 of
the exchange rate returns of European countries vis-à-vis the US Dollar while controlling
for realignments and turmoil in "the Snake" and the EMS. Individual macro-economic
fundamentals are examined on dynamics in the second part, controlling for exchange
rate regime issues, and compared with the statistical properties of exchange rate returns.
We control for exchange rate regime issues in testing the fundamentals, as the regime
could have a direct e¤ect on macro-variables. Think of tools of the monetary authority,
like the money supply (interventions) and the (short-term) interest rate in this respect.
The third part of the chapter tests whether there is transmission of dynamics from the
fundamentals to the exchange rate. Again, we control for regime e¤ects because the e¤ect
1Throughout the chapter, we use the word dynamicsas the combination of volatility clusters and
extreme values.
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of fundamentals on the exchange rate could be regime-dependent.
The current study complements previous studies and makes several new contributions.
First of all, we focus on the e¤ect of third markets in xed exchange rate regimes. The
tests we apply are inspired by Cumperayot et al. (2002), Cumperayot, and De Vries
(2002). In contrast to their seasonally adjusted data, however, we use non-seasonally
adjusted data. The main reason for this is that non-seasonally adjusted data are closer to
the fundamental information arriving at the market. Furthermore, we extend the analyses
of Cumperayot and De Vries (2002) by connecting the extreme values of fundamentals to
the extreme values of exchange rate returns, next to testing for the heavy tail property
of the fundamentals. Also, adding the e¤ect of the exchange rate regime is a novelty.
The test results suggest that EMS events a¤ect the US Dollar exchange rate returns in
either the level or the variance. Concerning the fundamentals, EMS events only have an
e¤ect on the dynamics of M1 money supply, induced by the interventions of central banks.
We nd strong evidence that the statistical features of fundamentals and exchange rate
returns are similar. However, there is only weak evidence of a relation between dynamics
of the fundamentals and the dynamics of the exchange rate. This relation is conditional
on the EMS events. Therefore, we conclude there is also a disconnect puzzle in the higher
moments next to the disconnect puzzle in the level.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 considers the method-
ology, consisting of the analyses and data we employ in the study. In Section 2.3 we
present the results of US Dollar exchange rate returns, the e¤ect of the EMS on these
properties, and the statistical properties of the fundamentals. In Section 2.4 we investi-
gate the transmission of dynamics from the fundamentals to the exchange rate. Section
2.5 concludes and discusses the results.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Empirical Tests
Before looking into the statistical properties of the variables, we rst apply the following
transformations to the data. Inspired by the monetary model, the raw (macro-economic)
data are transformed into relative log-variables; that is, log(xt)   log(x), with xt the
fundamental of the European country and x the American fundamental. Next, we take
rst di¤erences, because of the non-stationarity of the majority of relative log-values 2.
In quantifying the statistical properties of the exchange rate returns and the macro-
economic variables, we use the following tests. Standard skewness and kurtosis are deter-
mined in order to examine the symmetry and peakedness of the distribution of the data.
The kurtosis also gives a rst impression of the shape of the limit distribution of the data.
In the second phase of the analysis, we test whether the data contain volatility clusters.
In order to do so, we rst perform an ARMA(p; q) analysis on the data to remove po-
2The data are checked on unit roots by the Augmented Dickey Fueller test. We do not take logs in
the case of the interest rates, as interest rate data is already denoted in percentages. Exchange rate
returns are formed by taking log-di¤erences of the level of the exchange rate.
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tentially disturbing level-e¤ects. Next we perform an ARCH   lm test on the residuals
of the ARMA(p; q) estimation to test for ARCH-e¤ects. All regressions are run with a
White heteroskedasticity and serial correlation correction; the 95% signicance level is
used throughout the chapter.
Next, we check the distribution of the data on heavy tails. The tail index of the
distributions is estimated with the DEdH-estimator, by Dekkers, Einmahl and De Haan
(1989)3. The extreme value tests are done two-sided; we add the left and the right tail
of the distributions because of the relatively low number of observations (the period over
which we analyze the data runs from January 1974 to December 1998, which are 300
observations). Note that this implies assuming that the left and the right tail of the
distribution have the same tail index. However, since the symmetry of the distribution of
exchange rate returns is also a "stylized fact", it is a safe assumption for the exchange rate
data. Concerning the fundamentals, 60% of the series have a non-signicant skewness
such that the assumption is also relatively safe in this case.
The input data of the DEdH estimator needs to be i.i.d. for it to yield unbiased esti-
mates. However, the raw fundamental data are serially correlated, as there are signicant
AR or MA terms, and the data are not homoskedastic as there are volatility clusters in
the data. Although the results of the Extreme Value Theory are generalized for linear
dependent data, the non-constant variance gives an unknown bias in the DEdH estimate.
This can be resolved by normalizing the data. We do this by using the residuals from
an ARMA-GARCH-estimation4 in estimating the tail index. The ARMA terms remove
the serial correlation in the level of the data, while the GARCH terms remove the serial
correlation in the conditional variance of the data.
Table 2.1 provides the exchange rate regime events that occurred during the sample
period. We create two dummies for each country; a dummy that is equal to one in
the month of a positive shock and a dummy that is equal to one in the month of a
negative shock. Furthermore, September 1992 is added as a negative shock in each
country, covering the volatile period surrounding the exit of the UK from the EMS. We
perform the tests described above on both the total sample and a sub-sample excluding
the periods with EMS events, so periods in which either one of the dummies is equal
to one, in order to control for the EMS events. For the exchange rate returns, we also
estimate an augmented GARCH-equation in order to quantify the e¤ect of the EMS
turmoil. The augmentation lies in the fact that we add the positive and negative shock
dummies in both the level and the variance equation.
Macro-economic data are published monthly, but the exchange rate is traded contin-
uously. Information concerning realignments can be incorporated in seconds, while we
have a monthly snapshot of the exchange rate covering all news published that month.
However, as realignments or regime shifts are relatively large events, we assume that the
3We have chosen to use the DEdH estimator instead of the more commonly used Hill (1975) estimator,
as the Hill estimator only gives unbiased estimates when the distribution of data is heavy tailed; this is
not known this ex-ante.
4The GARCH(1; 1) setup proved to remove all signicant autocorrelations from the second moment
of the residuals.
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Table 2.1: Events in Exchange Rate Regimes
Denmark Germany Netherlands Norway Spain UK
01/01/74 Snake Snake Snake Snake Peg dollar Float
21/01/74 Float
17/10/76 -4.0% +2.0% -1.0%
01/04/77 -3.0% -3.0%
28/08/77 -5.0% -5.0%
13/02/78 -8.0%
17/10/78 +4.0% +2.0%
12/12/78 Fixed basket*
13/03/79 ERM ERM ERM
24/09/79 -3.0% +2.0%
30/11/79 -4.8%
05/10/81 +5.5% +5.5%
22/02/82 -3.0%
14/06/82 +4.25% +4.25%
15/08/82 -3.5%
15/09/82 -3.09%
22/03/83 +2.5% +5.5% +3.5%
15/07/84 -2.0%
22/07/85 +2.0% +2.0% +2.0%
07/04/86 +1.0% +3.0% +3.0%
15/05/86 -12.0%
12/01/87 +3.0% +3.0%
18/06/89 ERM
08/10/90 ERM
19/04/92 +3.5% +3.5% +3.5% +3.5% +3.5%
17/09/92 -5.0% Float
22/11/92 -6.0%
10/12/92 Float
14/05/93 -8.0%
02/08/93 ERM band** ERM band ERM band ERM band
06-03-95 -7.0%
01/01/99 ERM II Euro Euro Euro
Notes: Table presents events in the European Monetary System.
A "+" represents an appreciation. * The basket consisted mainly
of the ECU. ** The band around the central rate increased from
2.5 to 15%. See Apel (1998).
market reaction should still be visible at monthly frequency; furthermore, other shocks
are bounded in magnitude by the target zone.
Another issue in judging exchange rate regimes is the "fear of oating" observation of
Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2002). They show that countries
de facto exchange rate regimes are not necessarily equal to the de jure regimes. When
comparing the de jure regimes from Table 2.1 with the de facto regimes as presented in
Reinhart and Rogo¤ (2002), we nd two conicting periods. Norway is shown to have
a managed oat regime from July 1982 to June 1987 while it was o¢ cially pegging to
a basket of currencies. Given the fact that the Norwegian Krone was de facto pegged
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to the Deutsche Mark right before and after this period and the fact that we observe
four realignments in this period that cause signicant reactions in the exchange rate
returns, it is safe to assume that the Norwegian Krone was also pegged to the DM in
this intermediate period. The Spanish Peseta was de facto pegged to the US Dollar until
1981, so we truncate the sample for Spain such that it begins in January 1981.
2.2.2 Data
In contrast with the seasonally adjusted data used in Cumperayot (2002), we use non-
seasonally adjusted macro-economic data. There are several problems with the seasonal
adjustment. First, the seasonal adjustment process changes the properties of the data;
second, the non-seasonally adjusted data are closer to the information that arrives at
the market. Moreover, when a dynamic deseasonalisation method is used, the seasonally
adjusted data will be updated after the rst publication, as seasonal weights change
through time. This implies that even if agents in the market react to seasonally adjusted
data, it is not the same data as we nd in the databases today. Furthermore, di¤erent
methods of deseasonalisation are being used.
The countries under study are Denmark, Germany, The Netherlands, Norway, Spain
and the UK. We have chosen this set of countries, as they are open countries with rela-
tively high exchange rate exposure, and all countries are a member of the EMS and/or
Snake at some point in the sample. We are able to construct a complete sample for these
countries.
The fundamentals under study are variables common for macroeconomic models. The
series are monthly, end of period money supply (M1, M2 and M3), output (industrial
production), short interest rate (call money), long interest rate (government bond yield),
and the price level (consumer price index). The money supply and industrial production
data are taken from several databases, which are specied in Table A1 in the appendix.
The remaining series are taken from the IFS CD-ROM (September 2003). We use monthly
data, as this is the highest available frequency for the macro-economic data; the exchange
rate data are the end-of-month value, denoted in local currency per US dollar.
The period over which we analyze all data is January 1974 to December 1998 for
countries in the Euro-area and January 1974 to June 2003 for non-Euro countries. We
use this starting date, as it is the end of the "Snake in the tunnel" and begin of "Snake
on the Lake" period, such that the currencies are oating vis-à-vis the Dollar, but pegged
vis-à-vis each other, and the ECU from 1979. This allows us to observe the e¤ect of
realignments in a xed rate regime on third-country exchange rate dynamics. We expect
that there is a stronger link between the exchange rate and the fundamentals during a
oating rate period compared to a xed rate periods, as there are not much external
intervention; the market has a (relatively) free hand. This implies that the fundamental
dynamics have a higher probability of having an e¤ect on exchange rate dynamics during
a oating period compared to a x period. For the sake of comparability, the period over
which we analyze the exchange rate data is equal to the period over which we analyze
the fundamental series.
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2.3 Results
2.3.1 Exchange Rate Returns
We rst analyze the exchange rate returns with the tools described in Section 2.2 in
order to get a benchmark against which we can compare the results of the analyses of
the fundamentals. The results are presented in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Results Analyses Exchange Rate Returns
De Ge Nl No Sp UK
Skewness w 0.01 0.23 0.13 0.34* 0.45* 0.09
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13)
wo 0.07 0.43* 0.38* 0.23 0.45* -0.01
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13)
Kurtosis w 3.66* 3.96* 4.10* 4.46* 3.88* 4.74*
(0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.34) (0.26)
wo 3.67* 3.87* 3.85* 4.26* 4.04* 4.66*
(0.26) (0.29) (0.29) (0.26) (0.34) (0.26)
J-B w 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
wo 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ARCH w 0.00* 0.18 0.01* 0.01* 0.09 0.01*
wo 0.00* 0.29 0.29 0.01* 0.93 0.89
DEdH w 0.09* 0.21* 0.05* 0.21* 0.26* 0.23*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
wo 0.13* 0.11* 0.21* 0.21* 0.27* 0.25*
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.07) (0.05)
Notes: J-B is the probability of normality according to the Jarque-
Bera test; ARCH represents the probability of volatility clustering
(ARCH-lm test with 2 lags) and DEdH is the inverse tail index
estimated by the Dekkers-Einmahl-de Haan estimator. wis the
sample with EMS events, wowithout. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. * denotes rejection at 5 percent level.
In general, the results reect the stylized facts from exchange rate returns. Skewness
is zero, representing a symmetrical distribution; kurtosis is above three, representing a
peaked distribution and heavy tails; the ARCH-test indicates volatility clustering5; and
the tail indices indicate a heavy-tailed distribution with a tail index of around four6. The
results using the sample without realignments yield several changes; in general, the styl-
ized facts are somewhat stronger present in the sample with EMS events. The signicance
5Even at our monthly frequency.
6The values for the tail index that are reported in the literature range from 3 to 5, see De Vries (1994),
Lux (1998), while our estimates range from 4 to 11. A possible explanation is the monthly frequency.
Volatility clustering is smaller in monthly data compared to daily data (see Lux (1998)), which implies
that the probability mass in the tails will also be less; see de Haan et al. (1998).
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of these di¤erences is not strong. Overall, the skewness is somewhat higher, reecting the
addition to the distribution of the (large) returns caused by the realignments7; the same
argument holds for the kurtosis. Volatility clusters are triggered by EMS-turmoil given
the lower p-values for the ARCH-test in the sample with EMS events. The tail index is
in general lower for the sample with events; this implies that realignments in the EMS
are directly transmitted to the Dollar market and cause extreme shocks.
The test results in Table 2.2 indicate that EMS realignments have inuence on the
US Dollar market dynamics. It does not say anything about the magnitude of the e¤ect,
though. Therefore, we estimate an extended GARCH equation by adding the positive
and negative event dummies in both the level and the variance equation, such that we can
distinguish level from second moment e¤ects. Table 2.3 presents the estimation results.
Table 2.3: Results Estimations
Denmark Netherlands Norway UK
Level
Positive -0.0381* -0.0299 n.a. -0.0289*
(0.01686) (0.170) n.a. (0.0088)
Negative 0.0067 n.a. 0.0367* 0.1051*
(0.0151) n.a. (0.0083) (0.0020)
Variance
"2t 1 0.1424* 0.0775 0.1876* 0.1061*
(0.0214) (0.0581) (0.0752) (0.0020)
2t 1 -0.6896* 0.2156 -0.0858 0.5944
(0.1015) (0.2562) (0.1230) (0.1941)
Positive 0.0002 0.0024* n.a. -0.0007*
(0.0007) (0.0009) n.a. (0.0001)
Negative 0.0011* n.a. -8.57E-05 0.0071
(0.0002) n.a. (0.0003) (0.0081)
Notes: Table presents the estimation results of the extended
GARCH equation. Postive (Negative) represent the dummies
with positive (negative) EMS events. Spain and Portugal have
been omitted due to data limitations. Standard errors in paren-
theses. * denotes signicance at the 5 % level.
We observe that the e¤ect of the dummy is either signicant in the level or in the
variance equation. The results imply that events in the EMS have signicant "contagion"
e¤ects on either the level or the variance of the US Dollar markets. Furthermore, the co-
e¢ cients predominantly have the correct sign. The results from the augmented GARCH
7Realignments are usually positive, such that all the EMS events are situated on the right side of the
distribution.
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estimation are stronger than the results in Table 2.2; the reason might be that although
the variance e¤ect is signicant, the coe¢ cients are relatively small.
The coe¢ cients of the level equation all have the correct sign. For positive shocks,
we expect a negative value for the dummy, since the exchange rate is denoted in local
currency per US Dollar such that a revaluation implies a smaller value for the local/USD
rate. Next to a correct sign, we nd signicant level e¤ects for all countries but the
Netherlands for the positive or the negative shock dummy (both for the UK). For the
variance equation, we mainly nd positive coe¢ cients. This is what we would expect,
since the pegged rates in the EMS were often faced with large speculative pressure (see
Zurlinden, 1993) inducing higher volatility; furthermore, volatility is obviously a strictly
positive variable. For three out of four countries, not for Norway, we nd a signicant
variance e¤ect for either the positive or negative shock dummy.
2.3.2 Macro-Economic Fundamentals
In the previous section, we have seen that EMS events have an e¤ect on the US Dollar
market. However, the largest part of the dynamics remains unexplained. Therefore, the
next step is to analyze whether dynamics of macro-economic fundamentals inuence the
dynamics of the exchange rate. We begin by examining the dynamics of the fundamentals
themselves. We perform the same tests on the fundamentals as on the exchange rate
returns. We control for EMS events, since actions of the monetary authority can a¤ect
macro-economic variables directly. Details on data sources, periods, and ARMA(p; q)
settings can be found in the Appendix.
Money Supply
Table 2.4 presents the results of the analyses of the change in non-seasonally adjusted
relative M1. Overall, we observe similar results for M1 as for the exchange rate returns
concerning skewness, kurtosis, and heavy tails, but not concerning volatility clustering.
For four out of six countries the skewness is not signicantly di¤erent from zero and the
kurtosis is above three for four cases, but signicantly so for three countries. There is
signicant evidence of volatility clustering in two cases. The distribution is signicantly
heavy tailed for three countries. Especially the distribution of Norwegian M1 shows a
low tail index, lower than the tail index of the distribution of exchange rate returns (not
signicantly).
Removing the EMS events from the sample induces some mixed alterations to the re-
sults. There are no large changes concerning skewness and kurtosis, volatility clustering
drops and heavy tails increase. The volatility clustering for Norway and the UK disap-
pears, and the tail index signicantly changes for the Netherlands (negative), Germany
and Spain (both positive). Table 2.5 presents the results for M2 money supply.
The results for the change in relative M2 money supply are comparable to the results
for M1; zero skewness, excess kurtosis, no volatility clustering, and heavy tails. The
skewness is signicantly di¤erent from zero for two cases and the kurtosis is signicantly
above three for ve cases. There is signicant evidence of volatility clustering in two
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Table 2.4: Results Analyses Changes in Relative log M1
De Ge Nl No Sp UK
Skewness w 0.20 -0.12 1.34* 1.05* -0.28 -0.21
(0.22) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.13)
wo n.a. -0.16 1.34 1.06* -0.31 -0.22
n.a. (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.13)
Kurtosis w 2.47 3.78* 5.73* 6.96* 2.89 3.48
(0.45) (0.28) (0.28) (0.35) (0.34) (0.26)
wo n.a. 3.77* 5.62* 7.23* 2.90 3.46
n.a. (0.28) (0.26) (0.35) (0.34) (0.26)
J-B w 0.33 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.24 0.05
wo n.a. 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.19 0.06
ARCH w 0.71 0.73 0.26 0.00* 0.55 0.02*
wo n.a. 0.71 0.28 0.32 0.74 0.07
DEdH w -0.02 -0.04 0.14* 0.39* -0.04 0.14*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) (0.01) (0.02)
wo n.a. 0.07* 0.02 0.44* 0.14* 0.14*
n.a. (0.01) (0.01) (0.10) (0.03) (0.04)
Notes: J-B is the probability of normality according to the Jarque-
Bera test; ARCH represents the probability of volatility clustering
(ARCH-lm test with 2 lags) and DEdH is the inverse tail index
estimated by the Dekkers-Einmahl-de Haan estimator. wis the
sample with EMS events, wowithout. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. * denotes signicance at 5 percent level. Due to data limi-
tations, the sample for Denmark starts in 1993, thus excluding all
realignments.
cases. The DEdH estimate is above zero for ve cases. Especially the distribution of
Danish, British and Norwegian M2 has a low tail index.
Overall we observe that the tail index is lower for the sample with EMS events (i.e.,
tails are heavier with EMS events). This can be explained by the fact that the money
supply changes as the central bank intervenes around realignments. We did not observe
this for M1 because foreign currency is not included in M1, while it is in M2. The results
for the change in relative M3 are presented in Table 2.68.
Results for M3 are mixed. The skewness is signicantly above zero for two countries
and the kurtosis is signicantly above normal for the Netherlands. The ARCH-lm test
indicates signicant volatility clustering for the Netherlands. The tail index is high, but
positive in three cases. Removing the EMS events causes the Spanish and British tail
index to decrease signicantly. The fact that we do not observe the e¤ect of interventions
in M3 might result from the fact that the denition is broader, such that more e¤ects
play a role.
8Norwegian non-seasonally adjusted M3 data is not available.
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Table 2.5: Results Analyses Changes in Relative log M2
De Ge Nl No Sp UK
Skewness w -0.21 -0.40* 0.27 0.53* 0.01 -0.22
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16)
wo -0.21 -0.47 0.28 0.51 -0.00 -0.24
(0.13) (0.14) (0.15) (0.13) (0.17) (0.16)
Kurtosis w 3.88* 4.30* 4.98* 3.62* 3.54* 3.46
(0.26) (0.28) (0.29) (0.26) (0.34) (0.32)
wo 3.85* 4.42* 5.09* 3.63* 3.51* 3.46
(0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.34) (0.31)
J-B w 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.27 0.13
wo 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.32 0.12
ARCH w 0.01* 0.45 0.00* 0.21 0.43 0.22
wo 0.01* 0.43 0.00* 0.21 0.83 0.32
DEdH w 0.21* -0.17 0.01 0.30* 0.13* 0.33*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.02) (0.09)
wo 0.14* 0.11* 0.04* 0.19* 0.09* 0.20*
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04)
Notes: J-B is the probability of normality according to the Jarque-
Bera test; ARCH represents the probability of volatility clustering
(ARCH-lm test with 2 lags) and DEdH is the inverse tail index
estimated by the Dekkers-Einmahl-de Haan estimator. wis the
sample with EMS events, wowithout. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. * denotes signicance at 5 percent level.
Industrial Production
Table 2.7 shows the results for the industrial production. The statistical properties are
much like those of the exchange rate returns; symmetrical, peaked distributions with
heavy tails and volatility clustering. The skewness is signicantly di¤erent from zero on
two occasions and the kurtosis is signicantly above three for three cases. The kurtosis of
the UK is signicantly lower than three, which results in a negative tail estimate. There
is signicant evidence of volatility clustering for all countries, except for the Netherlands
and the UK. The tail index is positive in four cases. Remarkable is the fact that the
tail index of the industrial production is lower than the tail index of the exchange rate
returns in three cases (signicant for Norway). Removing the EMS events does not have
large consequences; the volatility clusters for Spain disappear and the tail indices of the
UK and Spain decrease.
Interest Rates
The results for the long interest rates are presented in Table 2.8. Overall, there is
very strong evidence of similar statistical properties as returns; excess kurtosis, volatility
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Table 2.6: Results Analyses Changes in Relative log M3
De Ge Nl Sp UK
Skewness w 0.56* 0.67* 0.21 -0.07 0.06
(0.22) (0.14) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16)
wo n.a. 0.68* 0.23 -0.05 0.06
n.a. (0.15) (0.14) (0.17) (0.16)
Kurtosis w 2.40 3.02 4.49* 3.34 3.29
(0.45) (0.28) (0.28) (0.34) (0.31)
wo n.a. 3.05 4.62* 3.31 3.26
n.a. (0.29) (0.28) (0.34) (0.31)
J-B w 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.55 0.61
wo n.a. 0.00* 0.00* 0.63 0.66
ARCH w 0.21 0.57 0.00* 0.64 0.06
wo n.a. 0.62 0.00* 0.74 0.15
DEdH w 0.08* 0.08* 0.11* -0.08 -0.31
(0.02) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.06)
wo n.a. 0.08* 0.05* 0.10* -0.07
n.a. (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01)
Notes: M3 data for Norway is not available to our knowledge. J-B
is the probability of normality according to the Jarque-Bera test;
ARCH represents the probability of volatility clustering (ARCH-
lm test with 2 lags) and DEdH is the inverse tail index estimated
by the Dekkers-Einmahl-de Haan estimator. w is the sample
with EMS events, wowithout. Standard errors in parenthesis. *
denotes signicance at 5 percent level.
clustering and heavy tails. There are small but signicant deviations from the normal
skewness for three countries. The kurtosis is signicantly above three for all countries;
especially Denmark shows a high kurtosis. The long interest rates are signicantly het-
eroskedastic for all countries but Spain. All tail indices are signicantly positive, but
the probability mass in the tail of the distributions varies across countries. Denmark,
Germany, and the Netherlands show a low tail index; Norway, Spain and the UK a high
tail index.
Removing EMS events from the sample does not a¤ect the results in general; the
tail index of Norway increases signicantly. The e¤ect of removing the EMS events is
smaller than expected for the long interest rates. The expectation is based on the fact
that the monetary authority can use the interest rate tool, next to the intervention tool,
in conducting monetary policy. However, because this is the long interest rate, the e¤ect
of the overnight rate set by the central banks could be levelled out by expected future
developments. Whether this is the case can be seen in Table 2.9, the results for the short
interest rate.
On average, we nd again very strong non-normal dynamics for the short interest rates,
as we have seen for the long term interest rates. Remarkable for the short term interest
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Table 2.7: Results Analyses Changes in Relative log Industrial Production
De Ge Nl No Sp UK
Skewness w -0.37* 0.43* 0.09 -0.25 -0.31 0.03
(0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13)
wo -0.33 0.44* 0.11 -0.57* -0.31 0.03
(0.17) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13)
Kurtosis w 4.78* 2.82 2.63 9.58* 5.60* 2.43*
(0.33) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.34) (0.26)
wo 40.89 2.86 2.62 10.12* 5.72* 2.45*
(0.33) (0.29) (0.29) (0.27) (0.34) (0.26)
J-B w 0.00* 0.01* 0.35 0.00* 0.00* 0.09
wo 0.00* 0.01* 0.32 0.00* 0.00* 0.11
ARCH w 0.00* 0.00* 0.73 0.00* 0.00* 0.34
wo 0.00* 0.02* 0.68 0.00* 0.27 0.35
DEdH w 0.22* 0.26* 0.30* 0.17* -0.09 -0.17
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
wo 0.23* 0.12* 0.17 0.21* 0.16* 0.04*
(0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01)
Notes: J-B is the probability of normality according to the Jarque-
Bera test; ARCH represents the probability of volatility clustering
(ARCH-lm test with 2 lags) and DEdH is the inverse tail index
estimated by the Dekkers-Einmahl-de Haan estimator. wis the
sample with EMS events, wowithout. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. * denotes signicance at 5 percent level.
rate is the excess skewness for four countries, especially in the case of the Netherlands.
Given the sign of the skewness, The Netherlands has had periods with very restrictive
monetary policy compared to the US. These large uctuations occurred during the second
half of the seventies. The kurtosis is very high for all countries9. There is a period with
large uctuations in the beginning of the sample period for all cases. We can accept the
null of no volatility clustering for Norway. The distributions of the short term interest
rates are all in the domain of attraction of the Fréchet distribution (except Norway). The
tail indices are higher (not signicantly) than the indices we found for the exchange rate
returns, except for Norway. The short term interest rate is not a¤ected by events in the
EMS, which is evidence that the central banks did not use the interest rate in defending
the exchange rate peg.
Price Level
Table 2.10 depicts the results for the nal group of fundamentals, the relative ination
rates. Also for this variable, we nd very similar statistical properties as for the exchange
9Note that this could indicate that the fourth moment does not exist. This is conrmed by the tail
index which is smaller than four for all but Denmark and Norway.
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Table 2.8: Results Analyses Changes in Relative Long Interest
De Ge Nl No Sp UK
Skewness w -0.50* 0.16 0.14 0.38* 0.14 -0.30*
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13)
wo -0.51 0.13 0.13 0.38* 0.28 -0.30*
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13)
Kurtosis w 15.86* 4.98* 5.25* 5.33* 4.34* 4.94*
(0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.34) (0.26)
wo 16.19* 4.94* 5.16* 5.51* 4.62* 4.90*
(0.27) (0.29) (0.29) (0.26) (0.34) (0.26)
J-B w 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
wo 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
ARCH w 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.03* 0.14 0.00*
wo 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.03* 0.13 0.00*
DEdH w 0.43* 0.29* 0.21* 0.11* 0.22* 0.06*
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.01)
wo 0.23* 0.25* 0.24* -0.12 0.20* 0.13*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
Notes: J-B is the probability of normality according to the Jarque-
Bera test; ARCH represents the probability of volatility clustering
(ARCH-lm test with 2 lags) and DEdH is the inverse tail index
estimated by the Dekkers-Einmahl-de Haan estimator. wis the
sample with EMS events, wowithout. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. * denotes signicance at 5 percent level.
rate returns. The skewness is normal for Germany and the Netherlands; given the sign
of the skewness, the ination in these countries was high for several periods compared to
the ination in the US. These large di¤erences appear around 1975, what could be the
result of the oil crises. All series show again signicant excess kurtosis. Two countries
show signicant volatility clustering; the tail index is well above zero for all, but the
Netherlands. The tail index of the price level is signicantly smaller than the one of the
exchange rate returns for Denmark.
The price level could theoretically be a¤ected by changes in the import-prices and
shifts in ination expectations as a result of large innovations to the money supply.
However, the EMS events only a¤ect the German kurtosis10 and the Dutch tail index.
Apparently, the e¤ects of the oil crises are larger than the e¤ects of the EMS.
Fundamental Exchange Rate
Both the exchange rate returns and individual fundamentals have similar statistical char-
acteristics. In this section, we combine the two by estimating a log-linear exchange rate
10German kurtosis increases after removing the EMS-events. This indicates that the observations are
taken from the middle part of the distribution.
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Table 2.9: Results Analyses Changes in Relative Short Interest
De Ge Nl No Sp UK
Skewness w -0.14 0.16 1.89* 0.80* 0.69* -0.49*
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.13)
wo -0.18 0.14 1.61* 0.80* 0.69* -0.49*
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.13)
Kurtosis w 11.21* 26.72* 18.53* 6.84* 11.83* 11.95*
(0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.35) (0.34) (0.26)
wo 11.80* 26.14* 18.90* 6.82* 11.65* 11.90*
(0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.35) (0.34) (0.26)
J-B w 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
wo 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
ARCH w 0.00* 0.01* 0.00* 0.89 0.00* 0.00*
wo 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.89 0.00* 0.00*
DEdH w 0.19* 0.35* 0.36* 0.11* 0.29* 0.35*
(0.05) (0.09) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05)
wo 0.18* 0.44* 0.36* 0.26* 0.24* 0.11*
(0.05) (0.13) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.03)
Notes: J-B is the probability of normality according to the Jarque-
Bera test; ARCH represents the probability of volatility clustering
(ARCH-lm test with 2 lags) and DEdH is the inverse tail index
estimated by the Dekkers-Einmahl-de Haan estimator. wis the
sample with EMS events, wowithout. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. * denotes signicance at 5 percent level.
model. With this model, a fundamental exchange rate is constructed and we investigate
whether the returns of this fundamental exchange rate also exhibit the stylized facts.
The model we use in estimating the fundamental exchange rate is the sticky-price
version of the monetary model. Instead of assuming PPP, as in the standard exible
price monetary model, the Phillips curve equation is substituted. M1 money supply and
the long interest rate are used; other setups of the model or other variable denitions do
not change the results signicantly. Since not all series are non-stationary (the industrial
production is stationary for all countries), we estimate the model in rst di¤erences. The
estimated coe¢ cients are in Table A3 in the Appendix. Table 2.11 reports the results of
the analyses of returns of the fundamental exchange rate.
The tendency for most fundamental currencies is to behave considerably more normal
than the individual fundamentals or the market exchange rate returns. The fundamental
exchange rate shows less signs of non-normal dynamics than the market exchange rate.
There is less evidence of volatility clustering and the tails of the distribution of returns of
the fundamental exchange rate are thinner. Furthermore, the properties of the individual
fundamentals are not transmitted to the estimated fundamental exchange rate.
The skewness is signicant for three countries; kurtosis is signicantly di¤erent from
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Table 2.10: Results Analyses Changes in Relative log Prices
De Ge Nl No Sp UK
Skewness w 1.44* -0.17 0.04 1.03* 1.38* 2.05*
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13)
wo 1.30* -0.19 0.29* 1.01* 1.37* 2.06*
(0.13) (0.15) (0.14) (0.13) (0.17) (0.13)
Kurtosis w 16.11* 3.87* 4.29* 6.27* 6.75* 10.47*
(0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.28) (0.26)
wo 16.59* 6.91* 3.93* 6.18* 6.62* 10.60*
(0.27) (0.28) (0.29) (0.26) (0.29) (0.26)
J-B w 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
wo 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00*
ARCH w 0.65 0.45 0.78 0.01* 0.88 0.03*
wo 0.90 0.77 0.79 0.00 0.83 0.03*
DEdH w 0.46* 0.31* 0.01 0.25* 0.27* 0.33*
(0.09) (0.06) (0.01) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05)
wo 0.47* 0.29* -0.08 0.26* 0.23* 0.31*
(0.10) (0.09) (0.02) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Notes: J-B is the probability of normality according to the Jarque-
Bera test; ARCH represents the probability of volatility clustering
(ARCH-lm test with 2 lags) and DEdH is the inverse tail index
estimated by the Dekkers-Einmahl-de Haan estimator. wis the
sample with EMS events, wowithout. Standard errors in paren-
thesis. * denotes signicance at 5 percent level.
three for half of the countries. Volatility clustering is found for Germany; the tail index
is positive for four countries and ranges roughly between 4 and 10. The tail index of the
UK is signicantly altered when using the sample without EMS events. This e¤ect is
smaller than expected, because both the exchange rate and M1 money supply are used in
estimating the fundamental exchange rate, both for which we nd signicant sensitivity
to EMS events. The e¤ect of other variables in the fundamental exchange rate appears
to be larger.
2.4 Linking the Exchange Rate to the Fundamentals
The previous sections presented evidence that volatility clusters and extreme values exist
in both the exchange rate returns and the changes in relative fundamentals. The next step
is to study whether the dynamics in the fundamentals coincide with (and maybe cause)
the dynamics in the exchange rate (or vice versa). We do this on two levels; rst, we
examine whether the conditional variance of the fundamentals, which we have constructed
from an ARMA-GARCH estimation, is signicantly linked to or causes the conditional
variance of the exchange rate returns. Second, we focus on the extreme values. If we
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Table 2.11: Results Analyses Fundamental Exchange Rate Returns
De Ge Nl No Sp UK
Skewness w 0.33 0.00 -0.01 0.39* -0.39* -0.27*
(0.22) (0.14) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.13)
wo n.a. 0.01 -0.06 0.40* -0.39* -0.27*
n.a. (0.15) (0.14) (0.18) (0.17) (0.13)
Kurtosis w 3.24 3.54 3.73* 4.35* 4.28* 3.25
(0.45) (0.28) (0.28) (0.35) (0.34) (0.26)
wo n.a. 3.50 3.80* 4.42* 4.53* 3.28
n.a. (0.29) (0.29) (0.35) (0.34) (0.26)
J-B w 0.29 0.16 0.03* 0.00* 0.00* 0.08
wo n.a. 0.23 0.02* 0.00* 0.00* 0.08
ARCH w 0.48 0.00* 0.59 0.12 0.41 0.98
wo n.a. 0.00* 0.95 0.16 0.39 0.90
DEdH w -0.05 0.21* 0.11* 0.20* 0.24* -0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.08) (0.01)
wo n.a. 0.15* 0.16* 0.30* 0.16* -0.14
n.a. (0.03) (0.03) (0.10) (0.05) (0.02)
Notes: Fundamental exchange rate estimated with sticky price
version of the monetary model. J-B is the probability of nor-
mality according to the Jarque-Bera test; ARCH represents the
probability of volatility clustering (ARCH-lm test with 2 lags) and
DEdH is the inverse tail index estimated by the Dekkers-Einmahl-
de Haan estimator. wis the sample with EMS events, wowith-
out. Standard errors in parenthesis. * denotes signicance at 5
percent level.
follow the log-linear exchange rate models, extreme values in the exchange rate returns
arise in the same period as extreme values in the fundamentals. Note that according
to the rational expectations hypothesis this is only the case when the shocks are not
temporary. When agents perceive that a shock to a certain fundamental is temporary,
there is no reaction to the exchange rate, and certainly no extreme value.
We discriminate between the total sample and the sample without EMS events in all
tests. The exchange rate is near the boundary of the target zone surrounding periods of
realignment. Following the S-shape model of Krugman, this implies that the fundamental
elasticity of the exchange rate is small compared to periods in which the exchange rate is
in the centre of the band. This e¤ect can eliminate the link between the fundamentals and
the exchange rate. Despite the fact that the model is set up for countries participating
in a target zone regime, this e¤ect can also be relevant for the third-country foreign
exchange markets we are focusing on. The e¤ect for the third country, the US, will be
smaller compared to the countries in the EMS, since the central bank is not exchanging
local currency for US Dollars when intervening, but the supply of local currency is still
being altered. Also, interventions usually did not take place in the bilateral market, but
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in the US Dollar market; the relation is therefore very direct. Furthermore, speculator
activity is highest when the exchange rate is at the border of the target zone, inducing
large shifts in positions.
2.4.1 Links in Conditional Variance
We perform two tests on the transmission of volatility from the fundamentals to the
exchange rate returns. First, we examine the correlations between the rst di¤erence of
the conditional variance of the exchange rate and the rst di¤erence of the conditional
variance of the fundamentals. We control for the possibility that the reaction of the
exchange rate occurs with a lead or lag. First di¤erences of the conditional variances
are taken, as some series contain a unit root according to the ADF-test11. Second, we
run a Granger-causality test with the conditional volatility of the exchange rates and the
conditional volatility of the fundamentals. Germany and Spain are excluded from these
tests, as their exchange rate does not provide signicant statistical evidence for volatility
clustering. The same argument goes for some other individual fundamentals.
Correlations
Table 2.12 presents the correlations between the change in the conditional variance of the
exchange rate returns and of the fundamentals.
Table 2.12: Correlations Exchange Rate and Fundamental Volatility
Denmark Netherlands Norway UK
w wo w wo w wo w wo
M1 n.a. n.a. -0.04 -0.04 0.02 0.09* 0.01 0.01
M2 0.05 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
M3 n.a. n.a. 0.01 -0.00 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Y 0.02 0.16* n.a. n.a. -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.02
SI 0.05 0.05 0.09* 0.09* n.a. n.a. -0.07 -0.07
LI 0.09* 0.09* 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.03
P n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.02
Notes: Germany and Spain are omitted because the exchange
rates did not have signicant volatility clustering. The same holds
for fundamentals with n.a. cells. * denotes signicance at 5 per-
cent level.
Overall, we observe that the correlations are low and not signicant. Not all correla-
tions are positive for the total sample. Theoretically, this cannot be the case because a
negative correlation implies that a variable can have a negative variance. The correlations
11The conditional variance of the exchange rate returns is non-stationary in the cases of Spain and the
UK. We check whether the returns are cointegrated with the non-stationary fundamental series. This
is not the case for the UK, but it is for Spain (exchange rate, long interest rate, price and production).
The resulting cointegration equation provides signicant coe¢ cients for the long interest rate and the
price level.
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range between 0.00 and 0.16 in absolute value, which is weak evidence in favour of a rela-
tion between the volatilities. Two correlations are signicantly di¤erent from zero in the
total sample. Removing the EMS events gives two extra positive signicant correlations,
while the previous ones remain signicant. This is an indication that the realignments
induce a bias in the estimation of the relation between the exchange rate and the funda-
mentals. Another way of interpreting this result is the mechanism proposed by Krugman
(1991). Given that the exchange rate is close to the borders of the target zone in periods
of realignment, a fundamental shock does not result in a shock to the exchange rate, as
agents expect the monetary authority to intervene. Comparable results are found when
examining correlations between leads and lags of the variance of the fundamentals and
the variance of the exchange rate12.
Granger Causality
It is impossible to say anything about causality when looking solely at the correlation
coe¢ cients. Therefore, we run Granger causality tests in order to study whether the
change in variance of the fundamentals Granger-causes the change in variance of the
exchange rate returns.
Table 2.13 reports the results of the Granger Causality tests. We run the test with
12 lags, as we are working with monthly data. The upper number depicts the P-value
of the test on whether the conditional variance of the fundamental Granger-causes the
conditional variance of the exchange rate and the bottom number vice versa (H0: no
Granger-causing).
Overall, we nd again that there is no causal relation between the volatility of the
exchange rate and of the fundamentals. The null of no Granger causing is rejected in
four cases if we examine the upper probability for the total sample (the fundamental
causing the exchange rate). Short and long interest rates are signicant for Denmark,
M1 is signicant for the Dutch exchange rate and the British short interest is signicant.
In one case, we nd signicant evidence that the volatility in the exchange rate Granger
causes the volatility in the fundamental. This is poor evidence in favour of the hypothesis
that there is a causal relation between the variance of the exchange rate and of the
fundamentals.
Removing the EMS events gives six new signicant cases, at the cost of one signicant
case. However, we nd causality running from the exchange rate to the fundamental in
half of the new signicant cases. This is again evidence that the exchange rate reacts
di¤erently to fundamental shocks when the exchange rate is close to the edge of the target
zone.
When examining the correlations between leads and lags of the exchange rate and
fundamentals, we observe several negative numbers. Following the log-linear exchange
rate model, there should be a positive relation between the variance of the fundamentals
and the variance of the exchange rate; we cannot conclude from the Granger causality
test whether there is a positive or negative relation, only whether there is a causal relation
12Results not shown in this study.
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Table 2.13: Probability Granger Causality
Denmark Netherlands Norway UK
w wo w wo w wo w wo
M1 f!e n.a. n.a. 0.02* 0.01* 0.81 0.82 0.06 0.00*
e!f n.a. n.a. 0.72 0.90 0.00* 0.91 0.38 0.12
M2 f!e 0.98 0.57 0.64 0.97 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
e!f 0.92 0.94 0.99 0.17 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
M3 f!e n.a. n.a. 0.46 0.46 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
e!f n.a. n.a. 0.68 0.65 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Y f!e 0.85 0.39 n.a. n.a. 0.12 0.31 0.69 0.01*
e!f 0.12 0.15 n.a. n.a. 0.49 0.69 0.41 0.28
SI f!e 0.02* 0.00* 0.74 0.86 n.a. n.a. 0.01* 0.00*
e!f 0.81 0.00* 0.36 0.62 n.a. n.a. 0.93 1.00
LI f!e 0.00* 0.00* 0.99 0.70 0.64 0.87 0.49 0.05*
e!f 0.15 0.13 0.63 0.00* 0.75 0.47 0.91 0.89
P f!e n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.22 0.33 0.74 0.47
e!f n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.59 0.03* 0.72 0.91
Notes: Probability of signicant Granger causality between the
conditional volatilites of the exchange rate and the fundamentals,
using 12 lags. H0: No Granger causality. Upper number depicts
causality from fundamental to exchange rate (f! e); bottom num-
ber vice versa (e ! f). wis the sample with EMS events, wo
without. Germany and Spain are omitted because the exchange
rates did not have signicant volatility clustering. The same holds
for fundamentals with n.a. cells. * denotes signicance at 5 per-
cent level.
or not. The reason behind these large negative correlations could be that at that certain
lag, the clusters of volatility are exactly opposed to each other. In this way, a period of
high volatility on one side coincides with a period of low volatility in the other.
2.4.2 Linking Extreme Values
Next to the volatility, we can link the extreme values of the exchange rate and the
fundamentals. In the previous sections, we have seen that practically all variables have
distributions of which the limit distribution is in the domain of attraction of the Fréchet
distribution. This implies that there are observations relatively far away from the mean
for all series. Following macro-based exchange rate models, a large shock on the right
hand side should also give a large shock on the left hand side. An extreme value in
(one of the) fundamentals should coincide with an extreme value in the exchange rate
returns. Note, that the monetary model treats all shocks equally, which might not always
be appropriate. For example, if agents know that a shock to a fundamental is temporary,
the exchange rate still reacts according to the monetary model. This is not the case if
we follow the logic of the Rational Expectations Hypothesis.
We check the proposition of transmission of extremes by the following test. Firstly, a
set of dummy variables is constructed. The rst dummy is equal to one if the exchange
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rate return is more than two standard deviations larger or smaller than the mean return,
and zero otherwise. Second, we construct a dummy for each fundamental, which is equal
to one if the innovation to the fundamental is more than two standard deviations larger or
smaller than the mean innovation, and zero otherwise. This is done for positive, negative,
and absolute extremes. We add the individual dummies of the fundamentals to a new
dummy, such that a measure of aggregate fundamental extreme shocks13 is created. We
do this because the source of the extreme value in the exchange rate return can be either
one of the fundamentals. Therefore, in a cross-plot with a single fundamental extreme
dummy, we would put all extreme shocks of the exchange rate versus one potential source
of those shocks14. The probability of rejecting dependence would be positively biased.
Putting the dummy of the exchange rate returns in a cross-plot with the dummy
of the fundamentals gives an impression of their relation. The dummies are tested on
independence with the Pearson 2 test statistic. Note that the distribution of the test
statistic may di¤er from the asymptotic 2 distribution, if the expected value for a single
cell is less than ve. This occurs several times in the analyses, but the results are clear
enough not to cast any doubts on the conclusions. Table 2.14 presents the P-values of
the Pearson 2 test on independence between the exchange rate extremes dummy and
combined fundamentals extremes dummy.
Table 2.14: P-values Pearson Test
Absolute Positive Negative
w wo w wo w wo
Denmark 0.6342 0.6325 n.a.** n.a.** 0.7621 0.7610
Germany 0.0529 0.0337* 0.0255* 0.0293* 0.8887 0.9822
Netherlands 0.2123 0.9623 0.0369* 0.0403* 0.5392 0.8639
Norway 0.0360* 0.0308* 0.2370 0.2108 0.1447 0.1470
Spain 0.4014 0.8066 0.8193 0.8250 0.3281 0.3905
UK 0.7415 0.8389 0.7976 0.6032 0.7618 0.7704
Notes: Probability of independence between extreme dummies
Pearson Chi-square test. H0: Independence. * denotes signi-
cance at 5 % level; ** No positive extremes in the Danish exchange
rate return.
The general conclusion from the Pearson tests is that there is no solid relation be-
tween the fundamental- and exchange rate extremes. The null of independence cannot
be rejected at the 5% level for three countries. Germany, Netherlands and Norway show
marginally signicant results in subsamples. For Norway this is not consistent over the
columns. Adjusting the threshold of two standard deviations, or including leads or lags
does not inuence the results. This is weak evidence in favour of the proposition of
transmission of extreme values from the fundamental to the exchange rate, or vice versa.
13Note that for the sum of the dummy series of positive (negative) extreme values, we take the negative
(positive) extremes for the production, since production enters the monetary model with a minus sign.
14We have included all three denitions of money supply, and both the short and the long interest
rates. The extremes in the money or interest denitions do not occur on the same date, implying that
di¤erent shocks are hitting the variables.
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In total, an extreme in the exchange rate is 43 times accompanied by an extreme
in either one of the fundamentals. In nine cases, this is the long interest rate, in eight
cases the industrial production, in seven cases the short interest rate, in six cases M2, in
ve cases M3 and price, and in three cases M1. The interest rates and the production
therefore coincide more often with the exchange rate in the extremes than the other
variables. These are also the variables with the strongest evidence of volatility clustering
and heavy tails.
In contrast to the analyses of the link in variances, excluding the EMS events does
not improve the results of the test. In one case, the exclusion pushes a P-value from just
above ve percent to just below ve percent. In four cases (one for Norway, two for Spain
and one for the UK), an extreme exchange rate return coincides with an EMS event. This
means that EMS events do have an e¤ect on the US Dollar market dynamics, but do not
cause the largest shocks in the markets.
2.5 Conclusions and Discussion
This chapter has explored two possible explanations for the stylized facts in FOREX
returns, in particular in the US Dollar market during the EMS period. We have inves-
tigated how the dynamics of exchange rate returns of EMS countries vis-à-vis the US
Dollar are inuenced by dynamics of the fundamentals on the one hand, and by events
in the EMS on the other. Given the fact that the US Dollar was not in the EMS, we
get important insights in the contagione¤ects from a xed exchange rate market to a
oating rate market with a third country. First, we have quantied the properties and
dynamics of the exchange rate returns and explored the e¤ects of shocks in the EMS on
these properties. Second, we have examined the properties of macro-economic fundamen-
tals, again taking into account the e¤ects of EMS events. Finally, we linked the dynamics
of the exchange rate returns to the dynamics of the fundamentals.
The results indicate that there are important contagione¤ects from EMS events to
the dynamics of US Dollar exchange market. Removing periods of EMS turmoil from
the sample inuences the statistical properties of exchange rates of EMS countries vis-
à-vis the US Dollar signicantly. Shocks in the EMS either have a level or a variance
e¤ect on the US Dollar exchange rate returns. Concerning the second part, we nd
that macro-economic fundamentals have similar dynamics as the ones that are present
in nancial market returns. Excess kurtosis, volatility clustering and heavy tails are
signicant in macro-economic variables. Although the magnitude and extend of the
properties in the fundamentals is somewhat smaller compared to the exchange rate, they
are statistically signicant. We nd signicant sensitivity to EMS turmoil for M2 money
supply. Removing the EMS events from the sample removes the volatility clustering from
the M2 data and decreases the tail fatness. This is a consequence of the interventions of
central banks defending the central parity, which inuences M2 money supply directly.
The conclusion of the third part of the chapter is that although volatility clustering
and extreme values appear in both the exchange rate and the fundamentals, there is
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only weak evidence of transmission of volatility from the fundamentals to the exchange
rate, or vice versa. Controlling for the dynamics induced by the EMS turmoil, however,
improves the results somewhat. The reason is that there could be a missing variable bias
or a regime-dependent e¤ect of fundamentals on the exchange rate. Extreme values in
the exchange rate do not coincide with extreme values in the fundamentals. The periods
in which they coincide, are that seldom that we can conclude that the extremes are
independent. Controlling for the EMS events does not inuence the results in this case.
One could say there is a disconnect puzzle in higher momentsnext to the disconnect
puzzle in levels. The results concerning the fundamentals are in line with the ndings of
Hodrick (1989), Cumperayot et al. (2002) and Cumperayot and De Vries (2002).
The results are not dependent on the non-seasonally adjusted data. Doing the tests
with seasonally adjusted data (results not shown in the chapter), yields evidence of even
stronger statistical properties than in the NSA data. However, also in the case of the
seasonally adjusted data all tests reject the hypothesis of a signicant link between the
conditional volatility of the fundamental and the conditional volatility of the exchange
rate. In addition, the link between extremes is not found.
Another possible source of the results concerning the fundamentals is the informational
mismatch; the fact that foreign currency is traded on a daily basis, while information on
macro economic fundamentals is published monthly. The exchange rate reacts immedi-
ately to news about a certain macro economic fundamental becomes common knowledge,
which can thus be seen in the return of that particular day. Since we are using monthly
data, the exchange rate return incorporates other shocks besides the news concerning the
fundamental we are looking at. The shock in daily returns caused by the fundamental
can be levelled out. However, because we still nd the stylized facts in monthly exchange
rate returns, it is acceptable to use this data.
Within the same rational expectations monetary model view, there is still room for
further research in several directions in order to see whether the fundamentals are the
source of the stylized facts in FOREX returns. We are thinking of using developing
countries and emerging markets instead of the European countries we have used in this
chapter. There is more empirical evidence supporting macro-economic theories in more
volatile economies, or countries with relatively simple nancial systems. In both cases,
there is more room for real mechanisms. Furthermore, we are thinking of using other fun-
damentals, because the variables used here are relatively broad. Think of using variables
like (foreign direct) investment, consumption and a distinction between tradeables and
non-tradeables. We expect that these variables are stronger linked to exchange rate than
the ones we have used so far. Another avenue that could be explored is to distinguish
temporal from permanent shocks. As mentioned before, the monetary model treats all
shocks the same, while agents in the market look forward and anticipate on their expec-
tation on the duration of the shock. One could also use MIDAS techniques, see Ghysels
et al. (2004), or study the impact of the arrival of macroeconomic news on the level and
volatility of the exchange rate in order to resolve the informational mismatch.
Remaining within the classical monetary view, however, is not the only possible di-
rection of future research. The current chapter adds to the large number of studies that
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question the (empirical) validity of purely fundamental-based models to explain exchange
rate movements, or dynamics in nancial markets in general. Therefore, a novel approach
is granted. A number of new approaches has been proposed in the literature. The het-
erogeneous agents view, which is embedded in the behavioral nance literature, will be
explored in the next chapters. In Chapter 3 we will rst study whether the notion of
heterogeneity of market participants is valid. Chapter 4 subsequently takes the insights
from the third chapter, (i.e. dispersion of beliefs), to nd an explanation for the results
of the current chapter (disconnect puzzle in higher moments).
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2.A Appendix to Chapter 2
2.A.1 Data Sources
The non-seasonally adjusted data are taken from several sources and di¤er in length.
M1 M2 M3 Prod
US OECD OECD OECD OECD
De OECD IFS OECD Datastream
01/93-01/03 01/74-01/03 02/93-01/03 01/85-05/03
Ge OECD OECD OECD OECD
01/74-12/98 01/74-12/98 01/74-12/98 01/74-12/98
Nl OECD IFS OECD OECD
01/74-12/98 01/74-12/97 01/74-12/98 01/74-12/98
No Datastream OECD n.a. OECD
01/87-01/03 01/74-01/03 n.a. 01/74-12/02
Sp OECD IFS OECD OECD
01/74-12/98 01/74-12/98 01/74-12/98 01/74-12/98
UK IFS(M0) OECD OECD(M4) OECD
01/74-12/03 01/83-12/02 07/82-12/02 01/74-12/02
2.A.2 ARMA - settings
The following tables depict the ARMA(p; q) settings of the data used in the analyses.
M1 M2 M3
De (3, [12,24]) (3, [12,18,24,36]) (3, [12])
Ge (0, [12,24,36,48]) (0, [12,24,36,48,60]) (2, [12,24,36,48])
Nl (0, [12,24,36]) (0, [7,12,24,36,48,60]) (0, [3,12,24,36,48,60])
No (0, 1 [12,24,36,48,60]) (1, [12,24,36,48]) n.a.
Sp (1, [3,12,24,36,48]) (1, [3,12,24,36,48,60]) (0, [12,24,36,48,60])
UK (1, [12,24,36,48]) (3, [12,24,48,60]) ([2,3], [12,24,36,48,60,72])
For the Netherlands, we have deleted a trend shift, which was caused by adding two
denitions. (1982 - 11).
SI LI P Y
De (3,3) (1,0) (0,[5,6,12]) ([4],1 [12,13,24,36,48,60,72])
Ge (2,2) (0,1) (2,[12,24]) (0,1 [4,12,24,36,48,60,72])
Nl (3,3 [14]) (0,1) ([6],2 [12,24,36,48,60]) (0,1 [12,24,36,48,60,72])
No (1,0) (0,1) (1,2 [12,24,36,48,60]) (2,1 [12,24,36,48,60])
Sp (3,3) (0,1) (1,[8,12,24,36]) (3,[12,24,36,48,60,72,84,96])
UK (1,1) (0,1 [3]) (0,2 [12,24,36]) ([12,24,36,48,60,72],1 [3,4])
The Danish short and long interest rates series had a gap from 1 - 2001 to 3 - 2001.
We have lled this by linear extrapolation.
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Fund Exch NSA (p; q)
Denmark (0, 0)
Germany (1, 1 [7,12,24,36])
Netherlands (1, [12,24,36,48])
Norway (0, 0)
Spain (0, 1)
UK (0, [12,24,36,48,63])
2.A.3 Estimated Coe¢ cients
The following table presents the coe¢ cients and t-statistics of the estimated sticky price
version of the monetary model.
De Ge Nl No Sp UK
c 2.76E-06 -0.0017 -0.0023 -0.0004 0.0027 0.0015
(0.001) (0.835) (1.241) (0.192) (1.178) (0.896)
M1 0.0386 -0.0121 0.1220 -0.0082 -0.0330 -0.0859
(0.474) (0.201) (2.333) (0.172) (0.538) (1.165)
Y 0.0252 -0.0461 -0.0778 0.0055 0.0045 0.0163
(1.239) (1.664) (2.814) (0.172) (0.620) (0.654)
LI -0.0187 -0.0155 -0.0191 -0.0145 -0.0145 -0.0007
(2.336) (2.523) (3.155) (2.512) (3.605) (0.180)
P -0.7580 0.1263 -0.3446 -0.5441 -0.2437 -0.2240
(0.882) (0.254) (0.709) (0.824) (0.559) (0.916)
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Dispersion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange
3.1 Introduction
The rejection of the monetary model in the previous chapter is only one example from a
long list of rejections, led by Meese and Rogo¤ (1983). As already signalled in Chapter 1,
this rejection has led to a surge in alternative explanations for exchange rate movements,
and nancial markets in general. The alternatives range from very elaborate macro-
economic models (i.e., REDUX), to the market microstructure. In this chapter we do
not consider the macro-economic environment or the institutional framework, but focus
on the behavior of individual traders. To be more precise, the validity of the assumption
of rationality in expectations and the subsequent homogeneity of behavior is questioned.
As the debate regarding rational expectations that assumes homogeneous expecta-
tions continues to be an issue of central concern, many economists have become more
interested in directly measuring the expectations of market participants. The impor-
tance of direct measures of expectations for the analysis of the e¤ect of expectations on
economic behavior has long been recognized in the literature. For early contributions see
Klein (1954), Modiglia and Sauerlender (1958), and Katona (1958). By analyzing survey
data for some of the major currencies, the rationality of agentsexpectations have been
tested extensively  see Cavaglia et al. (1993, 1994), Frankel and Froot (1987), Froot
(1989), and Ito (1990) for instance, and MacDonald (2000) for a survey. Motivated by a
growing body of empirical evidence against the rationality of exchange rate expectations
there is considerable interest in empirically tractable theories of alternative expectations
mechanisms.
The majority of the surveys that were investigated have had only their median re-
0This chapter is based on Jongen, R., W.F.C. Verschoor, C.C.P. Wol¤, and R.C.J. Zwinkels (2008)
Disperion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange, CEPR Discussion Paper 6738.
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sponses reported and assumes homogeneous expectations across investors. However, if
market participants di¤er in the forecasting characteristics without common beliefs and
information, then focusing on the median would insu¢ ciently describe the market in
terms of forecasts. The notion that market participants hold di¤erent (heterogeneous)
beliefs about future behavior of economic variables, however, avoids such problems. In
this sense, new insights on heterogeneous expectations and their role in determining for-
eign exchange market dynamics are warranted.
In this chapter, we use the survey data conducted by Consensus Economics in Lon-
don, which allows us to investigate the dispersion of belief in the foreign exchange market.
When the expectations of market participants di¤er we state that their beliefs are dis-
persed. Dispersion of beliefstherefore explicitly refers to the di¤erence in expectations
that the various market participants have with respect to the future state of the mar-
ket. In the academic literature it is agreed upon that the di¤erential belief of market
participants can arrive from various sources.
One strand of the literature argues that dispersion of beliefs arises because of infor-
mation asymmetries. Di¤erent market participants are assumed to hold di¤erent sets
of information, whereby part of the information is common for all participants whereas
the other part is private. Even when market participants use the same techniques in
forming expectations and try to make the best forecast conditional on the information
they have, their expectations will inherently be di¤erent due to the fact that all of them
have di¤erent information sets. This asymmetry in information may arise because of
several reasons. First, when the concept of asymmetric information was introduced in
the New Classical Theory of the macro economy, the key reason why economic agents
were assumed to be unable to obtain information that is public in other parts of the
economy was that the transmission of public information was rigid. A second source
of asymmetric information is the natural informational advantage that some economic
agents have over others. For example, Peiers (1997) reports on how central banks regu-
larly execute their interventionary transactions through selected large commercial, often
domestic banks instead of going through the brokersmarket. The central bank can thus
benet from the strong market presence and liquidity from its key intermediary, and the
intermediary commercial bank has privileged information regarding the central banks ac-
tivities. Information asymmetry is therefore caused by the fact that central bank activity
is revealed in multiple stages. Covrig and Melvin (2002) furthermore attribute part of
the private information in the foreign exchange market to the customer order ow: large
domestic banks will receive the foreign exchange business of large domestic corporations
and this confers a temporary informational advantage on large domestic banks. The costs
of asymmetric information to market participants can even today still be substantial. By
analyzing trades and quotes in the Deutschemark - U.S. Dollar market, Payne (2003)
shows that asymmetric information can account for around 60 percent of the average
bid-ask spread.
Another strand of the literature assumes that all market participants hold di¤erent
beliefs about economic variables even when there is no di¤erence in the information that is
available to them. The di¤erence in beliefs arises because economic agents disagree about
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how they should interpret information. A popular approach in the discussion about why
agents interpret information di¤erently is the rational beliefs theory due to Kurz (1994);
the disagreement in expectations is caused by the fact that economic agents do not know
the structural relationships of the economy, such as demand and supply functions. Agents
only have informationor empirical knowledge, which is readily observable from the
economy, usually in the form of a large amount of data concerning the past performance
of an asset or economy in general. They form their probability beliefs about the future
by using the empirical distribution that is derived from the relative frequency of events in
the past. Their own experience and success in forming accurate forecasts will likely play
a role in selecting and valuing information. Given a set of identical data, di¤erent agents
will then add di¤erent weights to the various elements of the data, to express the relative
importance which they think the various elements have when forming an expectation
about the future.
A third explanation for why market participants hold di¤erent beliefs about the future
may be related to the existence of fundamentally di¤erent types of market participants.
In the nancial economics literature there have been several attempts to present models
with di¤erent types of investors who in essence all have the same information. For
instance, DeLong et al. (1990) present a model where noise traders, with no access to
inside information, act irrationally on noise as if it were information that would give them
an advantage over rational arbitrageurs. These noise traders can earn higher expected
returns, because of their own destabilizing inuence and not because they bear more of
the fundamental risk. Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990) popularize the view that the foreign
exchange market is dominated by two types of market participants fundamentalists and
chartists - who di¤er in which information they use in forming their beliefs. On the one
hand, fundamentalists think of the exchange rate as the output of an economic model,
while on the other hand chartists predominantly use the exchange rates own history
as input in their expectations formation process. They show that the increased use of
technical analysis (chartist behavior) in the late 1980s could well explain why the U.S.
dollar was so far above its long-run equilibrium at that time, or why the volume of
trade in foreign currency has grown so tremendously. Furthermore, Allen and Taylor
(1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992) were among the rst to demonstrate that at least
90 percent of market participants place some weight on technical advice, although this
is used predominantly for relatively short-term forecasts, and that the use of technical
forecasting rules has increased over the past decades.
The realization that the presence of fundamentally di¤erent interacting market partic-
ipants can shed new light on some of the anomalies in the nancial economics literature
has resulted in enduring interest on how to model these heterogeneous agents see, for in-
stance Hommes (2006) for an overview of this literature. Two important observations are
made in this literature. First, a single agent cannot be characterized as purely chartist
or fundamentalist. In a series of surveys conducted among market participants Allen
and Taylor (1990), Taylor and Allen (1992), Menkho¤ (1997), Lui and Mole (1998), and
Cheung and Chinn (2001) nd that most agents use a combination of chartist and fun-
damentalist techniques when forming a belief about future exchange rates. Second, the
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weight that agents attach to a particular forecasting technique is not constant through
time. Yet, there is very little known about the way agents choose among the various
forecasting techniques. The heterogeneous agent literature assumes, for instance, that
agents switch between forecasting techniques according to the relative past performance
of the techniques (see, e.g. De Grauwe and Grimaldi, 2005, 2006 and Hommes, 2006).
It has furthermore been documented that when the exchange rate deviates further away
from its fundamentalvalue, market expectations are mean-reverting towards this fun-
damental value; see Berben (2000) for empirical evidence. However, there is not known
much about how the beliefs of individual market participants are a¤ected in times of high
market volatility, or even pre-crisis periods.
This chapter extends the existing literature in several important ways. We investigate
whether market participants di¤er in their exchange rate forecasts, whether the di¤er-
ences are caused by the use of private information, or by the disagreement about the
interpretation of information, or by the use of di¤erent forecasting rules, and whether
market volatility is related to the di¤erential beliefs of market participants. The results
are easily summarized. By using several measures for dispersion of beliefs we nd that
there are distinct periods of high and low dispersion where market participants disagree
as to what will happen to the future level of the exchange rates. Furthermore, the tail
index estimates suggest that the frequency at which extremist di¤erences in expectations
among market participants occurs, is higher than that what would occur under normality.
We also study the sources of the di¤erential beliefs of market participants by using sev-
eral formulations for exchange rate expectations. Importantly, the ndings suggest that
dispersion arises because of a combined e¤ect of market participants holding individual
information and attach di¤erent weights to some elements of the common information set.
In addition to these two e¤ects, we also document evidence of the existence of di¤erent
types of agents (fundamentalists and chartists) and nd that chartist rules are predomi-
nantly used at the shorter spectrum of the forecast horizon and fundamentalist rules are
predominantly used at the longer spectrum of the forecast horizon. Moreover, the results
indicate that market participants switch between di¤erent forecast techniques, depending
upon the position of the exchange rate compared to its fundamental value. Finally, our
evidence suggests that the relationship between market volatility and trader dispersion
tends to be signicant and positive for di¤erent measures of both trader heterogeneity
and market volatility.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the exchange rate survey
data and presents some simple but enlightening summary statistics from the surveys. In
Section 3.3, we formally examine whether expectations are dispersed. In Section 3.4, we
investigate the sources of the di¤erential beliefs of market participants by using several
formulations for exchange rate expectations. Section 3.5 then investigates the relative
importance of fundamentally di¤erent types of market participants considered in Section
3.4. In Section 3.6 we examine the question whether market volatility is related to the
di¤erential beliefs of market participants, and Section 3.7 gives our conclusions.
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3.2 The Survey Data
To investigate the behavioral aspects of the beliefs of market participants, and in particu-
lar the dispersion thereof between participants, we use a unique database of survey-based
exchange rate forecasts. The individual forecasts are obtained from a survey conducted
by Consensus Economics of London on a monthly basis among the leading market par-
ticipants in the foreign exchange market, investment banks, and professional forecasting
agencies. Examples of panelist companies are Morgan Stanley, Oxford Economic Fore-
casting, Deutsche Bank Research, and BNP Paribas. The panelistscompanies are located
worldwide, although they are all from developed economies. The forecasts are point fore-
casts for a large set of currencies against the U.S. Dollar or the Deutschemark (later the
Euro) and are available for horizons of 3 and 12 months ahead. The names of the panelist
companies are revealed.
Although survey participants have a few days time to return their forecasts, anecdotal
evidence from Consensus Economics suggests that the vast majority sends their responses
by E-mail on the Friday before the publication day (usually the second Monday of the
month). We consider this Friday to be the day on which their beliefs are formed and
assume that their beliefs are translated one-to-one in a point forecast. There may be
reasons for panelists not to reveal their true beliefs, though. One motive may be that
agents do not want to expose their (private) information to other market participants.
This e¤ect can be mitigated by the reputation e¤ect that surveys can have. When the
names of the forecasters are given in the survey publication (as is the case with the data),
agents have an incentive to perform well in order to attract customers.
For the Friday on which the beliefs are thought to be formed, we obtain spot exchange
rate series, to match with the survey data. All spot rate series are obtained through
Datastream. To verify that the information sets of market participants are not too
diverse, all of the analyses throughout this study are re-estimated using spot data from
various days surrounding this Friday, yet the overall results remain virtually unchanged.
For the sample, we obtain the forecasts for the U.K. Pound, Japanese Yen and Euro
against the U.S. Dollar for the period of October 1989 through December 20041. This
period is of particular interest since it contains several nancial crises, the introduction
of a single monetary currency unit, and several large changes in the level of the exchange
rates. The panel is unbalanced since the response rate of the individual market par-
ticipants is less than 100 percent and since market participants left the panel and were
replaced by others2.
For the fundamental forecasting models, we furthermore obtain data on various macro-
economic variables. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Developments
(OECD) Main Economic Indicators data set is the source for seasonally adjusted3 money
1Prior to January 1999 we use forecasts on the Deutschemark versus the U.S. Dollar. We transform
these forecasts into Euro / U.S. Dollar forecasts using the o¢ cial conversion rate.
2Due to data unavailability we have to split the sample in two periods: October 1989 through February
1995 (Sample 1) and November 1995 through December 2004 (Sample 2).
3The reason that we use data with seasonal adjustment in this chapter is that we are currently
interested in a long-run fundamental value. Short run uctuations induced by seasonal variations are
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supply, mt (M4 for the United Kingdom and M1 for the other countries, all in current
prices)4 and for the non-seasonally adjusted consumer price index, pt. The International
Monetary Funds (IMF) International Financial Statistics data set is the source for the
seasonally adjusted gross domestic production5 as a proxy for output yt. Interest rates
are three-months Euro-rates, it, obtained from Datastream. All macroeconomic and spot
variables are obtained for the period of January 1975 through December 2004, except for
the Japanese Euro-rate, which starts in August 1978. Natural logarithms are taken from
all variables, except from the interest rates.
Table 3.1: Data Summary
U.K. Pound Japanese Yen Euro
a) Period 1989:10 1995:2
Survey frequency Monthly Monthly Monthly
Minimum # panelists 89 94 99
Maximum # panelists 112 120 127
Median # panelists 99 108 112
b) Period 1995:11 2004:12
Survey frequency Bimonthly Monthly Monthly
Minimum # panelists 70 82 85
Maximum # panelists 108 123 128
Median # panelists 89 103 102
Notes: Table presents the number of responses in the survey;
medians are rounded.
Table 3.1 provides an overview of the survey data set that is used and gives an
indication of how many responses are obtained from the panelists per time period. The
median number of responding participants is over 100 per month for the Japanese Yen
and Euro forecasts, while slightly less than 100 per month for U.K. Pound forecasts.
The number of methods to measure or quantify dispersion of beliefs is small because
of the relatively scarcity of data on individual (survey) forecasts. We therefore follow the
formal approach proposed by Shalen (1993), who claims that the theoretical relationship
between market volatility, volume, and the dispersion of beliefs should be based on a
squared function of the di¤erence between the individual belief and the average belief
about a particular asset. We therefore take the cross-sectional standard deviation of
the individual survey-based forecasts, et . We then divide the cross-sectional standard
therefore not relevant.
4For German money supply we use data from the OECD until December 1998 and use the German
Contribution to M1 series from the Bundesbank from 1999 onwards. Both series are seasonally adjusted.
Furthermore, prior to January 1980 data on the monthly money supply of the United Kingdom are
only available on a quarterly basis. We generate monthly series for this period by tting a cubic spline
function trough the quarterly observations. We feel that this is appropriate to do because the seasonally
adjusted money supply series are already smooth.
5Because GDP is reported only for a quarter, we create monthly series from this using a local quadratic
frequency conversion function that distributes the quarterly GDP over each of the three months within
that quarter.
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deviation by the cross-sectional average, which gives us a dimensionless statistic that
allows the comparison of the variability of populations that have a di¤erent mean, such
as comparing two exchange rates6. This statistic is often called the coe¢ cient of variation.
If we dene the individual survey-based forecast of a particular individual as sei;t and the
cross-sectional average as set ,
7 then the resulting dispersion statistic is dened as:
ht =
et
set
(3.1)
where
et =
vuut 1
n
nX
i=1
(di;t)
2 =
vuut 1
n
nX
i=1
 
sei;t   set
2
(3.2)
Figure 3.1 presents this coe¢ cient of variation along two forecast horizons for the three
currencies. In addition, high-low spreads are presented as a robustness check8. Several
ndings are noteworthy. First of all, the spread and coe¢ cient of variation reveal similar
patterns. This ensures us that both measures seem to be capable of capturing dispersion
in beliefs, in other words, the variation in the spreads is not caused by the extremist
expectations of outliers.
Second, the dispersion in beliefs increases with the forecast horizon. When one would
see dispersion of beliefs as a sign of uncertainty, this would indicate that the market
agrees more about what will happen in the nearby future than in the distant future.
Third, dispersion of beliefs is not constant over time, but seems to be high in some
periods of considerable length, while low in others. In particular for the U.K. Pound
and for the Euro dispersion of beliefs was obviously higher in the period of early 1990 to
late 1993 than in the subsequent period. Similarly, for the Japanese Yen beliefs became
increasingly dispersed from early 1998 onwards until the end of 2001. This period is in
the aftermath of the Asian crisis starting in mid-1997, which would lead us to believe that
market instability is a driving factor of dispersion in beliefs. This would be an interesting
argument, for it would suggest that a dramatic event such as the Asian crisis may have
an e¤ect on the expectations of market participants even two year after date.
6We check to what extent our measure of dispersion is driven by either the cross-sectional standard
deviation or the cross-sectional average. The correlation with the former is typically between 85 and 97
percent for all currency and forecast horizon combinations. The correlation with the latter is never more
than 56 percent. Thus, the variation in our measure of dispersion is primarily driven by the volatility of
the individual forecasts.
7In our notation we suppress a subscript that would indicate the forecast horizon to keep the algebra
tractable.
8Using the spread as a measure of dispersion may be subject to one severe problem. Since the spread
only depends on two contemporaneous observations, non-representative market participant who produce
extreme (outlier) forecast directly inuence the measure of dispersion. Therefore, we only use the spread
as a robustness check.
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Figure 3.1: Coe¢ cients of Variation and High-Low Spreads
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Notes: Figure displays the dispersion of beliefs measured by the
coe¢ cient of variation (left) and range (right) of the three curren-
cies for the three and twelve months horizon.
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3.3 Are the Beliefs of Foreign Exchange Forecasters
Dispersed?
One question that naturally arises is what one can learn from the distribution of the
di¤erences between individual forecasts and the cross-sectional average. Under the null
hypothesis that beliefs are not dispersed, the di¤erences between the individual forecasts
and the cross-sectional average, di;t, are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.).
This assumption is directly testable by examining the distributional properties of these
di¤erences. Of particular interest is the tail behavior of the distribution, since under
the null hypothesis of no dispersed beliefs extreme di¤erences should not occur at a rate
higher than normal. Furthermore, the average di¤erence between forecasters should be
zero, and there should not be any form of autocorrelation.
We proceed by examining formally whether beliefs are dispersed. To do so, we follow
the methodology due to Ito (1990), who introduces a framework on how individual agents
form their beliefs about future exchange rates. Suppose individual i provides a forecast9
about the k-period ahead level of a particular exchange rate and that this forecast consists
of a common structural part based on public information f (
) and an individual e¤ect
gi. The individual forecast sei;t can then be written as
sei;t = f (
) + gi + "i;t (3.3)
where "i;t is a purely random disturbance term (with respect to i and t) that can, for
instance, be the result of measurement errors. In a similar way can we dene the cross-
sectional average of a set of market participantsforecasts as
sei;t = f (
) + g + "t (3.4)
Normalizing g = 0, subtracting the cross-sectional average from the individual fore-
cast, and using Equation 3.2 then yields
di;t = gi + ("i;t   "t) (3.5)
In this case it is not necessary to know the exact structure of f (
), as long as it is
common for all agents. Table 3.2 presents summary statistics of the distribution of di;t,
which gives us information about the individual e¤ect gi. The statistics are generated
from the sample of pooled data.
Several observations are noteworthy. Both the high-low spread (maximum minus min-
imum forecast) and standard deviation increase as the forecast horizon increases. This
indicates an increase in dispersion of beliefs as the forecast horizon lengthens, as we have
seen in Figure 3.1. Furthermore, the deviations are signicantly and positively auto-
correlated and the pattern of autocorrelation is stronger for longer forecast horizons and
9Recall that we made the assumption that the survey-based forecast is as close as we can get to the
true, yet unknown belief of the agent.
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Table 3.2: Distributional Statistics
3-month horizon 12-month horizon
UK Pound Jap. Yen Euro UK Pound Jap Yen Euro
a) Period 1989:10 1995:2
Maximum 0.1481 0.2127 0.1710 0.2563 0.2574 0.3239
Minimum -0.1934 -0.1693 -0.1695 -0.3487 -0.3044 -0.2457
St. deviation 0.0319 0.0317 0.0308 0.0536 0.0604 0.0536
Skewness -0.2143 0.1208 0.1573 -0.0533 0.0927 0.2159
Kurtosis 5.6855 4.9181 4.5204 4.2819 3.5607 3.9239
Jarque-Bera 1961*** 1072*** 718.1*** 443.1*** 101.1*** 313.5***
Autocorr. 0.454*** 0.467*** 0.446*** 0.610*** 0.657*** 0.613***
b) Period 1995:11 2004:12
Maximum 0.1037 0.2287 0.1540 0.1399 0.3630 0.1371
Minimum -0.1098 -0.1646 -0.1471 -0.1553 -0.2346 -0.3290
St deviation 0.0255 0.0378 0.0322 0.0400 0.0732 0.0554
Skewness -0.0286 -0.0504 0.0072 -0.2962 0.4178 -0.5962
Kurtosis 4.5418 4.3235 4.4025 4.1308 3.7645 3.8750
Jarque-Bera 109.7*** 162.6*** 180.9*** 74.96*** 118.2*** 200.9***
Autocorr. 0.303*** 0.506*** 0.541*** 0.563*** 0.738*** 0.717***
Notes: Numbers are in natural logarithms. *, **, and *** indi-
cates a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10, 5, and 1 percent
signicant level, respectively.
for the second sample period10. This correlation can be explained by the overlapping
pattern of the survey forecasts: Hansen (1982) and Hansen and Hodrick (1980) demon-
strate that when the forecast horizon is longer than the observational frequency, the error
term in Equation (3.3) will be serially correlated up to a moving average process of order
k   111.
Although the individual forecasts do not appear to be skewed in a particular direction,
the distributions are consistently leptokurtic. While high kurtosis is not analogous to fat
tail behavior, we may state that an excessive number of forecasts are at su¢ cient distance
from the consensus forecast that they render the distribution non-normal. Jarque-Bera
statistics for normality of the individual expectations are included and corroborate the
rejection of the normality assumptions under high levels of signicance.
A formal analysis of the tail behavior of the distribution of individual deviations can
be done by examining a measure for the tail index. Hill (1975) denes a tail index estimate
by looking at the order statistics of a series. Suppose that the survey-based forecasts for
a particular exchange rate are i.i.d. we then dene D as the set of all di;t for all i and t.
Dene dn m to be the (n m)th ascending order (or in other words, the m-th smallest
expected change) from the set of individual expectations di;t. The Hill estimator can then
10Except for the U.K. Pound, but this is due to the fact that forecasts are given two-monthly in the
second set.
11In our case, the autocorrelation pattern does not extend beyond the rst lag (not reported).
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be dened as
b = " 1
m
mX
j=1
ln

dn j+1
dn m
# 1
(3.6)
where m is the number of tail observations used for estimating the tail index. The
estimate can be interpreted as the highest moment that exists from the sample. So when
the tail estimates are su¢ ciently low, we can doubt the existence of higher moments of
the distribution and tails appear fat. As cuto¤ point m we use the rst, fth and tenth
percentile of the observations in D.
Table 3.3 provides tail index estimates for the tails of the distribution. Estimates
for both upper (right) and lower (left) tails are included separately to detect any tail
asymmetries. The number of tail observations m that is used to estimate the tail indices
is reported above the estimates. It can be seen that the distribution is fat-tailed, with
indices, roughly, either just above or below four, depending on the percentile. This
indicates that extreme expectations occur more often than would be normal; in other
words, the number of expected changes that is signicantly deviating from the mean
expectation is such that we can state that market participantsbeliefs are signicantly
dispersed and the assumption of a representative agent can be rejected.
A question that appears naturally is whether for a particular currency the proportion
of extreme upward expectations is equal to the proportion of extreme downward expecta-
tions. For instance, when a su¢ ciently large number of extreme expected upward changes
occur relative to expected downward changes, then the right tail of the distribution should
be signicantly bigger than the left tail. Using a two-sided T -test we formally test for
equality of the left and right tail index estimates and nd that we can only consistently
reject the null hypothesis of equal tails for the 12-month-ahead forecasts of the Euro. For
most other series do the tail indices look similar and hence may we assume that tails are
symmetric here. The tail indices are in general also larger for the longer-term forecast
horizons. In the next section we go a step further and question what the source of this
dispersion is.
3.4 Sources of Dispersion among Panelists
It remains a matter of debate whether dispersion of beliefs arises because market partici-
pants hold di¤erent information sets whereby part of the information is private, whether
they attach di¤erent weights to some elements of the common information set, whether
they use inherently di¤erent types of forecasting techniques, or a combination. To deal
with this question we should ideally look at evidence of dispersed beliefs for each market
participant separately. Reconsider equation (3.5):
di;t = gi + ("i;t   "t)
Here it is assumed that the public information set 
t is common for all market par-
ticipants. For this reason, it is unnecessary to know the exact structure of f(
t) Since
49
Chapter 3. Dispersion of Beliefs in Foreign Exchange
Table 3.3: Hill Estimates
3-month horizon 12-month horizon
UK Pnd Jap Yen Euro UK Pnd Jap Yen Euro
a) Period 1989:10 1995:2
6364 obs. 6881 obs. 7150 obs. 6427 obs. 6955 obs. 7235 obs.
1th percentile m = 63 m = 68 m = 71 m = 64 m = 69 m = 71
l 3.682 5.981 4.917 4.846 6.383 5.460
r 5.430 4.521 5.085 4.981 5.557 16.147
T: l = r 2.115* -1.605 0.208 0.156 -0.810 5.283*
5th percentile m = 318 m = 344 m = 357 m = 321 m = 347 m = 357
l 3.173 3.280 3.429 3.846 4.197 3.806
r 3.372 3.368 3.274 4.138 3.823 5.168
T: l = r 0.768 0.348 -0.618 0.925 -1.226 4.009*
10th percentile m = 636 m = 688 m = 715 m = 642 m = 695 m = 715
l 2.403 2.837 2.719 2.908 3.393 3.136
r 2.436 2.648 2.865 2.913 2.984 3.486
T: l = r 0.244 -1.277 0.989 0.033 -2.388 1.994
b) Period 1995:11 2004:12
1106 obs. 2215 obs. 2207 obs. 1104 obs. 2212 obs. 2204 obs.
1th percentile m = 11 m = 22 m = 22 m = 11 m = 22 m = 22
l 4.325 6.728 4.300 4.932 8.789 4.843
r 3.858 5.989 6.271 6.557 3.048 8.794
T: l = r -0.268 -0.385 1.216 0.657 -2.894* 1.846*
5th percentile m = 55 m = 110 m = 110 m = 55 m = 110 m = 110
l 3.428 3.487 3.435 2.958 5.390 3.992
r 3.497 3.173 3.474 4.240 4.186 5.996
T: l = r 0.106 -0.696 0.085 1.839* -1.850* 2.917*
10th percentile m = 110 m = 221 m = 220 m = 110 m = 221 m = 220
l 2.568 2.744 2.949 2.658 3.270 3.041
r 2.606 2.856 2.612 2.888 3.495 4.002
T: l = r 0.119 0.420 -1.267 0.615 0.698 2.835*
Notes: Table gives the tail index estimates for the 1, 5, and 10th
percentile of the tails of the distribution of the individual expecta-
tions in excess of the cross-sectional average. The T-statistic is for
the equality of tails. A *, **, or *** refers to rejection of the null
hypothesis that the tail index estimates are equal at a 10, 5, or 1
percent signicance level, respectively. m refers to the number of
tail observations that are included for the Hill estimates, l and
r refer to the left and right tail index, respectively.
the random disturbance terms both have expected value equal to zero, the individual
e¤ect gi can be estimated from a regression of the individual forecasts in excess of the
cross-sectional average on a constant. The signicance of the gi term indicates whether
50
3.4. Sources of Dispersion among Panelists
individual e¤ects are present for agent i, or in other words that this agent bases his
forecasts on an information set that is unique for this agent12. In addition to holding
private information, it is reasonable to assume that although the remaining information
may be common to all market participants, they interpret this information di¤erently and
hence attach di¤erent weight to its various elements. In other words, di¤erent market
participants use di¤erent models. We call the di¤erent weights idiosyncratic e¤ects. Ito
(1990) and MacDonald and Marsh (1996), for instance, regress the di¤erence between the
forecasts of agents on a set of variables that is possibly used in forming expectations, such
that the di¤erence in weight attached to a certain variable in the expectation formation
model is estimated directly.
We consider two models that may explain how market participants form their fore-
casts. First, we assume that agents follow a simple autoregressive forecasting rule, where
they extrapolate the most recent trend in the exchange rate into the future. In essence
this is a technical (or chartist) tool. Second, we assume that agents use an uncovered
interest parity approach, where the expected change in the level of the exchange rate is
related to the relative interest rate level of the domestic and the foreign country. If the t
of a certain model of expectation formation is better for one agent compared to the other,
this is not only a direct proof of dispersion of beliefs, but it also lays bare the source of
the dispersion, namely on which variables the agents put di¤erent weights. Audretsch
and Stadtmann (2005) determine the optimal model for each agent by comparing the R2
of these types of regressions. These statistics are informative in that they reveal to what
extent the forecast is based on observable information. The remaining variance is then
caused by other variables, such as psychological, experience, etc.
If market participants form forecasts in an extrapolative way, then
sei;t   st = gi +
LX
l=1
l;i(st l   st l 1) + "i;t (3.7)
where L is the number of lags that is used in the forecast. In this framework we have
basically imposed a structure for the unknown f(
t). Following the same procedure as
in Equations (3.3) to (3.5) we nd that
di;t = gi   g +
LX
l=1
(l;i   l)(st l   st l 1) + "i;t   "t (3.8)
In other words, the structural part of the information set and the values of the
regressors are the same for all market participants, yet the coe¢ cients (or weights) di¤er.
The analysis is continued by questioning whether market participants have idiosyn-
cratic beliefs as to the importance in the relative level of interest rates. Uncovered interest
parity (UIP) assumes that the change in the level of the exchange rate over a period k is
12In addition, if the di¤erence between the individual e¤ects of two individuals (say i and j) is to be
estimated, a similar method can be used. However, the estimation results are virtually identical to those
of Equation (3.5). Results not shown in the thesis.
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related to the level of the k-period domestic interest rate relative to its foreign counter-
part, such that
sei;t   st = gi + i(rt   rt ) + "i;t (3.9)
where rt is the k-period domestic interest rate and rt the k-period foreign interest rate.
Following the same line of reasoning as under Equations (3.3) to (3.5), we can rewrite
Equation (3.9) as
di;t = gi   g + (i   )(rt   rt ) + "i;t   "t (3.10)
We measure rt and rt as the domestic and foreign interbank rates, respectively, using
the 3- and 12-month interbank rates for the two forecasting horizons. Since it is likely
that agents use various models when forming a belief about the future instead of just
using one technique, the estimation of the models in Equations (3.8) and (3.10) on an
individual basis would lead to a missing variable bias. In order to obviate this missing
variable bias, the models are combined into
di;t = gi   g +
LX
l=1
(l;i   l)(st l   st l 1) + (i   )(rt   rt ) + "i;t   "t (3.11)
We use only two lags for l to preserve model parsimony, while still capturing most
of the dynamics. Equation (3.11) is estimated using a least squares regression for each
market participant13. Estimation results for this equation are displayed in Table 3.4. In
this table we present the percentages of market participants for which we nd individual
e¤ects, idiosyncratic e¤ects with respect to an extrapolating model, and idiosyncratic
e¤ects with respect to uncovered interest parity, and combinations of these. Results
are for Wald tests on the signicance of the parameters or combinations thereof as to
discriminate between the various e¤ects.
For up to 39 percent of the individual market participants we nd evidence of indi-
vidual e¤ects gi g 6= 0 on the short forecast horizon. When the forecast horizon extends
to one year, this percentage increases to around 44 percent. In the second sample period
the percentages are comparable up to around 35 percent for the short horizon, and 51
percent for the long horizon. The interpretation of these ndings is that up to half of
the market participants use information in forecasting future exchange rates that only
they use and that the use of this privateinformation is more intensive when forecasting
further ahead into the future.
Furthermore, in addition to these individual e¤ects, there is evidence that a large
group of market participants attaches di¤erent weights to the information that is in the
most recent history of the exchange rates (extrapolation). For on average 20 percent
13Since the forecast horizon is longer than the observational frequency, the error component in Equation
(5) will be serially correlated up to a moving average process of order k   1. This leads to biased least
squares standard errors. Therefore, we apply a Newey-West correction. This correction will also be
applied to all variations of this equation further on in the chapter.
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Table 3.4: Market Participants with Individual and Idiosyncratic E¤ects
3-month horizon 12-month horizon
UK Pnd Jap Yen Euro UK Pnd Jap Yen Euro
a) Period 1989:10 1995:2
Individual E¤ect
gi g 6= 0 33.33 39.61 34.91 43.42 44.03 40.00
Idiosyncratic e¤ect due to extrapolation
l;i l 6= 0 25.33 14.29 20.12 36.84 22.64 32.57
l;i   l; gi   g 6= 0 11.33 3.90 11.84 15.79 16.37 18.85
Idiosyncratic e¤ect due to UIP
i  6= 0 27.33 29.22 29.59 38.16 40.88 45.71
i   ; gi   g 6= 0 22.00 16.24 14.20 25.66 23.27 20.57
Combination of e¤ects
i   ; l;i   l 6= 0 10.66 4.55 8.88 14.48 12.58 20.00
gi   g; i   ; l;i   l 6= 0 9.33 2.60 6.51 9.87 10.69 13.71
b) Period 1995:11 2004:12
Individual E¤ect
gi g 6= 0 17.24 29.03 35.48 31.03 41.94 51.61
Idiosyncratic e¤ect due to extrapolation
l;i l 6= 0 27.59 9.68 12.90 37.93 38.71 32.26
l;i   l 6= 0 ^ gi   g 6= 0 10.35 3.23 0.00 13.79 19.35 16.13
Idiosyncratic e¤ect due to UIP
i  6= 0 34.48 29.03 38.71 27.59 48.39 32.26
i   ; gi   g 6= 0 6.90 19.35 25.81 10.35 35.48 19.36
Combination of e¤ects
i   ; l;i   l 6= 0 13.80 0.00 3.23 10.35 25.80 19.36
gi   g; i   ; l;i   l 6= 0 6.90 0.00 0.00 3.45 19.35 16.13
Notes: Table presents the percentage of respondents for which
we nd signicant individual and/or idiosyncratic e¤ects, i.e. the
percentage of respondents for which we nd signicant coe¢ cients
from estimating Equation (3.11).
of the market participants we nd evidence of these idiosyncratic e¤ects with respect
to extrapolation, so l;i   l 6= 0 in the short run for the rst sample period14. In the
second sample period these percentages are similar or slightly lower. This e¤ect is more
pronounced at the longer forecast horizon, for both sample periods and all exchange rates,
with percentages of up to 36 (38) percent in the rst (second) sample period, indicating
that market participants disagree more as how past information of the exchange rates
should be used for forecasting foreign exchange.
The percentage of respondents that exhibit both individual and idiosyncratic extrap-
olation e¤ects, so the ones for which gi g 6= 0 and l;i l 6= 0 is in general considerably
14Note that two lags are used in the specication of the extrapolation model. For the remainder of
the chapter, we therefore mean a vector of the rst and second lag.
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lower. Still, up to 20 percent of market participants use a combination of unique infor-
mation and attach di¤erent weight to common information when forecasting 12-months
ahead exchange rates.
The percentage of respondents with signicant idiosyncratic UIP e¤ects is consider-
ably larger than extrapolation e¤ects, implying that respondentsbeliefs about the e¤ect
of the interest rate di¤erential on the exchange rate, are highly dispersed. Specically,
for the rst period, we nd that around 29 (35) percent of the respondents exhibit signif-
icant UIP e¤ects for the short (long) horizon. For the second period, these percentages
increase up to 45 (48) percent for the short (long) horizon. Contrary to the case of the
idiosyncratic extrapolation e¤ects, we nd that the majority of respondents for which we
nd idiosyncratic UIP e¤ects we also nd individual e¤ects: the percentage of agents for
which gi   g 6= 0 and i    6= 0 is still between 15 to 25 percent (with a maximum of
up to 35 percent), also for the shorter forecast horizon. Finally, we look at the number
of market participants for which we can nd individual e¤ects and who attach a unique
weight to both the most recent exchange rate and the interest rate di¤erential. This
percentage is very low for the short forecast horizon, but is still up to almost 20 percent
at the longer forecast horizon.
From the above ndings we can draw some general conclusions. First of all, the
individual e¤ect is by far the most important source of dispersion, followed by the idio-
syncratic UIP e¤ect and, third, the idiosyncratic extrapolative e¤ect. This can be derived
from the percentages for individual e¤ects which are usually among the highest. This
conclusion holds particularly for the rst period, but can also be distilled for the sec-
ond. Second, respondents who do combine two e¤ects, combine the individual with the
idiosyncratic UIP e¤ect, or to a lesser extent combine all three e¤ects.
Next to the fact that these results point in the direction of a combination of private
information (individual e¤ect) and interpretation di¤erences (idiosyncratic e¤ect), we can
already say something about the third source of dispersion, as introduced in Section 3.2,
namely the existence of di¤erent types of agents. The two specications of idiosyncratic
e¤ects can be directly interpretable as two simplied forms of fundamentalist and chartist
techniques. In other words, a higher individual weight on the extrapolation rule implies a
higher degree of chartism. On the other hand, a larger coe¢ cient on UIP means a higher
degree of fundamentalism (both relative to the mean).
The distribution of e¤ects in Table 3.4 also makes clear that respondents in the survey
are either fundamentalist or chartist. This is the case because the percentage of respon-
dents who have both a signicant coe¢ cient on extrapolation and a signicant coe¢ cient
on UIP is the lowest of all combinations. The highest percentages can be found in combi-
nations of individual e¤ects with chartist e¤ects or individual e¤ects with fundamentalist
e¤ects. Stated di¤erently, agents use either a chartist idiosyncratic rule or a fundamen-
talist idiosyncratic rule (and perhaps even switch between these rules), but rarely use a
combination of both at one point in time. This indicates that individuals can be marked
as being either fundamentalist or chartist. Therefore, next to evidence of the existence
of individual and idiosyncratic e¤ects, we also nd evidence of the existence of di¤erent
types of agents (fundamentalists and chartists).
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Two drawbacks of this approach should be mentioned. First is the matter of variable
selection. The exact set of variables that is commonly used to form beliefs is not known.
Second, some of the variables used in forming beliefs are inherently unobservable, such
as the state of mind of the agent during the expectation formation process, or even the
weather condition at that particular time. Furthermore, the weight agents put on a
certain variable might change through time. If beliefs are dispersed by denition, the
adjustment of the weight given to a certain variable in the expectation formation process
does not change simultaneously or equally among agents. Especially in these regression-
based approaches this e¤ect could lead to biased results, since it assumes a permanent
di¤erence in weight through time. Therefore, the question of whether beliefs are dispersed
and if so, what the source of this dispersion is, should ideally be approached from various
angles.
In this section we have examined the question of what the source of dispersion of
beliefs is. Using various techniques we showed that the dispersion of beliefs arises due
to the existence of individual e¤ects, idiosyncratic e¤ects, and the existence of di¤ering
types of agents. In the next section we attempt to tackle some of the drawbacks of
the analysis in this section, namely we will look into the time-variation of the weights
put on the various strategies. Furthermore, we extend the set of expectation formation
strategies.
3.5 Chartists and Fundamentalists
In this section we attempt to investigate the relative importance of the role of both
chartist- and fundamentalist-based forecasting techniques. In particular, we would like
to know what exactly the rules are that forecasters use, and whether the weight agents
attach to a certain forecasting tool changes over time and why this change occurs. We
continue with the framework introduced in Equation (3.3). In changes, this gives
sei;t   st = f(
)  st + gi + "i;t (3.12)
Observe that in this specication the information set is common for all market par-
ticipants. Equation (3.12) states that market participants interpret the information set
that is common to them in a similar way and that the di¤erence in their expectations is
caused solely by the agent-specic individual e¤ect, which is usually attributable to an
informational asymmetry (for instance, private information). From the previous section
we know that di¤erences in expectations may not only be due to informational asym-
metries, but also due to the di¤erent weight that agents attach to individual elements
from this common information set, or by the presence of fundamentally di¤erent market
participants.
To investigate the latter possibility, assume that an agent has a set of forecasting
rules from which he chooses to form his expectations about the future change in the
exchange rate. An agent may use only one specic rule from that set, in which case he
attaches all weight to the forecast of that rule, or multiple rules at the same time, in
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which case the nal forecast will be a weighted average of the forecasts of the multiple
rules. Although we cannot determine the exact set of rules a particular agent uses at
a certain point in time, we can measure whether an agent uses a particular rule in the
process of forming his expectations when his expectation is related to the forecast of a
particular rule. Furthermore, we can observe whether the weight that the agent attaches
to that rule changes over time. If we denote the outcome of a particular forecast rule fj;t,
then the individual forecast of agent i is determined as
sei;t   st = !0i;tfj;t (3.13)
where !i;t = (!1i;t; !
2
i;t; !
3
i;t:::) is a vector of individual weights and fj;t = (f
1
j;t; f
2
j;t; f
3
j;t:::)
is a vector of the forecasts of the various forecast rules. The list of techniques is virtually
endless and therefore we focus on a few approaches that have been used in the literature
regularly. We distinguish between fundamentals-based forecast rules and chartist (or
technical) rules. The former uses a set of macroeconomic variables in one way or the
other, while the latter uses exclusively the history of the exchange rate as the input in
the forecasting process. As fundamentals-based rules we use two very common exchange
rate models, namely a purchasing power parity-based technique and a version of the
monetary model. As for the chartist rules, we use, inspired by Brock et al. (1992), an
extrapolative rule and a moving average rule.
3.5.1 Fundamentalist Forecast Rules
We assume that fundamentalists form their expectations by comparing the current ex-
change rate to the fundamental exchange rate and expect that the exchange rate will
eventually revert back to its fundamental value. So when the current exchange rate is
above its long-run fundamental value, fundamentalists expect a future depreciation of the
currency. In this sense this rule can be seen as a negative feedback rule that introduces
a mean reversion in the exchange rate. We describe the general fundamentalist rule as
seft =   (st   est) (3.14)
where seft is the k period ahead expected fundamentalists change in the exchange rate,
 is a parameter describing the speed with which the exchange rate will revert back to
its fundamental value, and est is the measure for the fundamental exchange rate.
As fundamental exchange rate, we use two standard theoretical constructs; a PPP-
based and a sticky price monetary model-based fundamental. When exchange rates are
expressed as units of foreign currency per unit of domestic currency, then the PPP-based
fundamental exchange rate can be described by the following relation:
est = pt   pt (3.15)
where pt is the log of the domestic countrys price level in the domestic currency and
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pt denotes its foreign counterpart (United States)
15. Unfortunately, most measures of
price levels that are issued by statistical agencies are of little use in constructing these
PPP-based fundamental exchange rates, because they are typically reported as indexes
and thus they do not measure the absolute price level at a particular point in time.
Therefore, we can only use the price level relative to the previous periods level. If we
dene t  pt   pt 1 as the domestic ination rate with pt as the price level in natural
logarithms, and we dene the foreign rate of ination  similarly, then the PPP-based
fundamental exchange rate, est , can be given by
est = est 1 + t   t (3.16)
We assume that at time t agents can observe the current price level pt and hence
can determine what the ination over the past period was. The initial value for the
fundamental exchange rate, es0, is unknown and therefore has to be either estimated or
imposed, in order to determine the value for the contemporaneous PPP-based fundamen-
tal spot rate in the entire sample period. We therefore proceed as follows. We take the
initial sample period of January 1975 through September 1989 as the period in which
we want to calibrate the fundamental series. The initial value of the fundamental rate
is determined in such a way that the sum of the squared di¤erences between the actual
spot rate series and the fundamental series is minimized during this sample period. This
gives us an estimated est. Instead of keeping the initial value constant for the rest of the
sample period, we update the initial value for each subsequent sample period, such that
we obtain a fundamental value series using all information that is available at each point
in time. This results in a market exchange rate that oscillates around its fundamental
value.
The second approach to forming a fundamental exchange rate looks at a broader set
of macroeconomic variables. We use a version of the simple exible-price monetary model
of exchange rate popularized by Frenkel (1976) and Mussa (1976) that states that log
money demand depends linearly on log real income, the log price level and the nominal
exchange rate. This model reads:
st = 0 + 1(rt   rt ) + 2(yt   yt ) + 3(mt  mt ) + 4(pt   pt ) + "t (3.17)
Instead of making assumptions about the elasticities we estimate the weights for
the various macroeconomic variables empirically using a rolling regression approach. In
the rst step the weights are estimated using a linear regression of the spot rate on
the macroeconomic variables during the initial sample period of January 1975 through
September 1989. The tted values of this regression can therefore be seen as a proxy for
the fundamental exchange rate during the sample period. In the next step, the estimated
model is used for a one-period forecast to determine the fundamental exchange rate at the
15Throughout the remainder of the chapter an asterisk always denotes the foreigncountry; in our
case, this is the United States.
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rst date in the second (survey) sample period of October 1989 through December 200416.
Next, the model is re-estimated using one month of extra information, etcetera. Figure
3.2 shows the resulting fundamental exchange rates, based on PPP and the monetary
model, for the three countries.
Figure 3.2: Fundamental Exchange Rates
Panel A: U.K. Pound Panel B: Japanese Yen
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Notes: Figure displays the market and fundamental exchange
rates for the three currencies. Fundamentals are based on PPP
and the monetary model.
3.5.2 Chartist Forecast Rules
One way chartists form their forecasts is by extrapolating the most recent change in the
exchange rate into the future:
sect   st = (st) (3.18)
16In other words, the fundamental exchange rate at period t is always estimated using all the data on
the macroeconomic variables and spot exchange rate up to period t  1.
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where  is strictly between 0 and 1 and indicates the degree to which chartists extrapolate
the past; st is the most recent change in the exchange rate. Alternatively, chartists
follow a moving average rule, where the most recent short-run moving average in the
exchange rate is compared to the moving average over a longer period. When the short-
run moving average is above (below) its long-run moving average, agents expect the
domestic currency to appreciate (depreciate) further relative to the foreign currency:
sect   st = (MAst  MAlt) (3.19)
where  2< 0; 1 >, MAst denotes the short term moving average and MAlt the moving
average over a longer time period. In the estimation, we put MAst at one month and
MAlt at the six months moving average.
3.5.3 A Switching Model
The expectation of an individual agent i about the future change in the exchange rate
is assumed to be formed as the weighted average of the fundamental and the chartist
forecast rule:
sei;t   st = !fi;t(seft   st) + !ci;t(sect   st) (3.20)
We assume that the weights !i;t are conditional on the absolute distance between the
market price and the fundamental price, as in Westerho¤ and Reitz (2003).
!fi;t = 1  !ci;t =
1
2
(1 + tanh( jst   estj) (3.21)
This functional form transforms the misalignment st est to be bounded between zero
and one and centered around one half, such that it is directly interpretable as the weight
individuals put on the fundamentalist rule. The switching parameter  represents the
intensity of choice, and governs the reaction of individuals to a certain misalignment.
A positive  implies that the weight on fundamentalism increases as the misalignment
increases. This occurs as agents think that the probability of mean-reversion is larger
when the distance to the fundamental is larger. On the other hand, if  < 0 then the
exchange rate is driven more by chartists as the misalignment is larger. This can be
interpreted as agents riding the bubble: the chartist behavior becomes self-fullling as
the price is pushed away from the fundamental price. Finally, the larger  is in absolute
terms, the stronger the reaction of agents is concerning the misalignment. In other words,
a higher switching parameter makes agents more sensitive, causing them to switch rules
more quickly in reaction to a misalignment of the exchange rate vis-à-vis the fundamental
rate.
In estimating this fundamentalist chartist setup with switching mechanism, we work
with the cross-sectional mean of the survey responses due to data limitations. However,
this does not change much in the interpretation of the model. Instead of looking at
individual weights, results will provide information about the average weights on funda-
mentalist and chartist tools across individuals. As we are interested in the development
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of these weights through time, it does not make a di¤erence if we look at individuals or
at the mean. After all, if we nd changing weights at the aggregate level, it must imply
that individuals are changing their strategy. Also, if the weight on a certain strategy
appears to be small on the aggregate level, it implies that the proportion of individuals
that are actually using that strategy is apparently small.
The results of estimating the model formed by Equations (3.20) and (3.21) are depicted
in Table 3.5 Panel A for the short horizon, and in Table 3.5 Panel B for the long horizon.
Several important conclusions can be drawn. First of all, the two chartist coe¢ cients
are negative, which indicates expected mean reversion of the three exchange rates. For
the two fundamentalist rules the results are less clear-cut, although in the majority of
the cases, and especially for the longer-term forecasts, they appear negative as well. This
nding indicates that the fundamentalists are not destabilizing trend-chasers, but actually
act as contrarians, who partly revert each change in the exchange rate.
Second, both fundamentalist and chartist variables are highly signicant, Third, the
tness of the linear model is fairly good: the adjusted R2 statistic is up to 75 percent.
Fourth, the inclusion of the extrapolative (moving average) rule has preference over the
inclusion of the moving average (extrapolative) rule at the short (long) horizon, in terms
of the likelihood of the model. There is a preference for the PPP-based fundamental rule
compared to the monetary model-based fundamental rule; this is especially the case in
Germany.
The switching parameter  is generally negative. This implies that the weight attached
to the fundamentalist rules actually decreases as the distance between the market rate
and the fundamental rate is larger. Furthermore, the switching parameter is signicant
in the majority of cases. Also, inclusion of the switching parameter signicantly increases
the likelihood of the model17. These results are direct evidence of the fact that the weight
agents attach to the fundamentalist versus chartist rule is actually changing through time,
conditional upon the position of the exchange rate compared to the fundamental rate.
Figure 3.3 shows that there is indeed considerable variation in the weight that re-
spondents put on the fundamentalist rule. The scatter plots indicate that there is a
negative and non-linear relationship between the misalignment and the weight put on
the fundamentalist rule.
This section has shown that the population of respondents consists of both fundamen-
talists and chartists, using a number of di¤erent strategies in forming their expectation.
Also, people are switching between strategies, given the time-varying fundamentalists
weight we found. So far, the previous sections have shown that (1) there is a consider-
able amount of dispersion among expectations; (2) that this dispersion is the result of
individual, idiosyncratic, and type-e¤ects; and (3) that there is switching between these
sources of dispersion. In the next section, nally, we will look into the question whether
and how this dispersion is related to market conditions.
17Results not shown in the chapter.
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Figure 3.3: FundamentalistsWeight
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Notes: Figure displays the evolution of weights through time as
estimated by Equations (3.20) and (3.21) (upper row) and the re-
lation between the absolute misalignment and weight (lower row).
It represents the 3-months forecasting horizon, using PPP as fun-
damental and the autoregressive chartist rule.
3.6 Dispersion and Market Conditions
The heterogeneous expectations literature indicates that there is a direct causal relation-
ship running from dispersion of beliefs to market volatility18. However, it also provides
us with contrasting hypotheses concerning the sign of the e¤ect. As the market price is
moving away from the fundamental price, there is a negative relationship between disper-
sion and market volatility because the expectations of the di¤erent groups are opposite
to each other19. As the market price moves more and more away from the fundamental
price, the fundamentalists get driven out of the market. The technical analysts remain
active, continue to push the market price away from the fundamental price and increase
market volatility as the number of technical analysts increases and their expectations
become self-fullling.
If the market price is moving towards the fundamental price, however, there is a pos-
itive relationship between dispersion and volatility as the di¤erent groups expect similar
18See Hommes (2006) for an extensive survey.
19Fundamentalists expect the price to return to the fundamental rate while technical analysts expect
the price to continue to move in the direction it has been moving in the previous periods.
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directions of change. In this situation volatility is rising as all traders active on the mar-
ket push the price in the same direction; there is no counter acting force which is active
when the price is moving away from the fundamental price and fundamentalists are still
active. Both groups remain active as both strategies are protable.
We rst study whether there is correlation between dispersion of beliefs and market
conditions, and, second, whether there is a causal relation. The correlation is examined by
splitting the sample in a high- and a low-dispersion sub-sample and testing the di¤erence
between the market conditions (i.e., volatility and heavy tails). Causality is studied
by applying a (modied) Granger causality test. Table 3.6 displays the results of the
correlation tests.
Table 3.6: High and Low Dispersion versus Conditions
3-months horizon 12-months horizon
UK Pound Jap Yen Euro UK Pound Jap Yen Euro
a) Volatility
Low .00039 .00094 .00077 .00041 .00092 .00093
High .00138*** .00128 .00121** .00135*** .00134* .00098
b) Kurtosis
Low 2.626 2.699 2.115 3.918 2.471 3.419
High 5.797** 4.175 3.714 6.334** 4.275* 3.043
c) Tail Index
Low 1st 301.058 42.445 12.164 3.133 4.187 10.381
5th 9.030 6.130 7.731 4.245 6.549 5.265
10th 4.412 5.177 7.535 3.374 4.508 3.961
High 1st 3.303 15.273 5.661 3.303 15.272 6.236
5th 1.846* 3.089 3.512 1.619 3.871 3.105
10th 1.807 2.395 3.572 1.932 3.230 3.648
Notes: Table displays the characteristics of FOREX returns for
sub-samples with low and high dispersion of beliefs (coe¢ cient of
variation smaller or larger than the mean coe¢ cient of variation).
The cut-o¤ points for the Hill index are taken at the 1st, 5th, and
10th percentile. *, **, *** denotes a signicant di¤erence between
low and high dispersion at the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively.
Dispersion of beliefs is measured by the coe¢ cient of variation; high (low) dispersion
implies higher (lower) than average dispersion. Volatility is measured by the sample
variance; heavy tails by the kurtosis and the Hill index. Overall, the results imply that
uncertainty is signicantly larger in periods with high dispersion compared to periods
with low dispersion. Volatility is always higher during high dispersion periods; this is
signicant in four out of six cases. Kurtosis is higher during high dispersion periods in
ve out of six cases; three times signicant. The tail index is consistently lower (i.e., tails
are heavier) for all three cut-o¤ points for high dispersion periods20.
20The di¤erence between high dispersion and low dispersion tail indices is hardly signicant as a result
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We study the causal relationship between market volatility and dispersion by means
of Granger causality tests. In the previous sections we argued that dispersion can be
measured in various ways. Similarly, volatility can be quantied by several di¤erent
methods. Altogether, we examine twelve di¤erent dispersionvolatility measure combi-
nations in order to check the robustness of the results21 ;22. The dispersion measures are
the coe¢ cient of variation and the high-minus-low range. The volatility measures are the
monthly absolute returns, the monthly squared returns and a GARCH - measure23.
Table 3.7 presents the results for the three exchange rates. For the Euro, looking
at the absolute and squared returns for the three-month horizon, we nd a signicantly
positive causal relationship running from the variance to dispersion for both dispersion
measures. The twelve months horizon gives a more mixed image. For the coe¢ cient of
variation we nd similar results as for the three months expectations, but concerning the
range we nd positive signicant results running from the heterogeneity to the variance.
The GARCH volatility measure renders a di¤erent image altogether. For the three
months horizon we nd, for all dispersion measures, a signicant causal relationship
running from trader heterogeneity to market uncertainty. For the twelve months horizon
we nd a similar pattern, but in the opposite causal direction.
For the Japanese Yen we see a signicant positive causal link from the market vari-
ance to dispersion for both dispersion variables and horizons, at least when variance is
measured by absolute and squared returns. In the case of the GARCH measure we nd
a two-way causal relationship for both dispersion measures and horizons.
The results for the U.K. Pound, nally, reect a relatively homogeneous conclusion.
For all variance and dispersion measures we nd a signicantly positive causal link from
market uncertainty to dispersion of opinion. For a small number of combinations we nd
a two-way relation, but there does not seem to be a pattern.
In general we can conclude that the causal relationship between market volatility and
trader dispersion tends to be signicant for di¤erent measures of both trader heterogeneity
of the relatively low number of observations on which the tail index is based.
21The causal relation between dispersion and extreme values could be examined by determining the
conditional kurtosis. We choose not to do so, however, because Bollerslev (1987) shows that the condi-
tional kurtosis is a constant fraction of the conditional volatility. Brooks et al. (2005) propose a model
with time-varying degrees of freedom for the t-distribution used in a TGARCH setup. However, De
Haan et al. (1989) note that ARCH-type processes generate heavy tailed distributions, such that it is
su¢ cient in our case to focus solely on the conditional variance.
22In a standard setup, the Granger-causality test regresses the lagged values of two variables on itself.
In our analysis we do not use the lagged but the contemporaneous value of market volatility. The reason
for this is that dispersion at time t is formed at the end of the month, when forecasts are submitted.
Volatility at time t, on the other hand, is formed during that past month (given that t is measured in
months). Therefore, including the contemporaneous value of volatility is informative in the causality
question; excluding it would imply dismissing one month of information. We focus on the rst and
second lag of the Granger causality test as we assume that there is no relation between the variables over
periods longer than two months. Since all variables are not normally distributed we apply a Box-Cox
adjustment to both the left and right hand side variables.
23The GARCH measure was constructed by estimating a GARCH(1; 1) for daily data and taking
monthly averages of the daily conditional volatilities.
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Table 3.7: Dispersion and Volatility
Absolute Returns Squared Returns GARCH
from Variance Dispersion Variance Dispersion Variance Dispersion
to Dispersion Variance Dispersion Variance Dispersion Variance
a) UK Pound
CoefVar 3M 0.001*** 0.587 0.001*** 0.606 0.790 0.000**
12M 0.009*** 0.172 0.009*** 0.180 0.039** 0.043**
Range 3M 0.004*** 0.561 0.002*** 0.496 0.016** 0.000***
12M 0.168 0.087* 0.139 0.092* 0.017** 0.398
b) Japanese Yen
CoefVar 3M 0.000*** 0.774 0.000*** 0.795 0.001*** 0.000***
12M 0.010** 0.598 0.014** 0.652 0.007*** 0.008***
Range 3M 0.000*** 0.311 0.000*** 0.358 0.002*** 0.000***
12M 0.156 0.509 0.180 0.600 0.021** 0.018**
c) Euro
CoefVar 3M 0.000*** 0.099* 0.000*** 0.081* 0.010** 0.025**
12M 0.000*** 0.047** 0.000*** 0.046** 0.054* 0.172
Range 3M 0.000*** 0.102 0.000*** 0.097* 0.045** 0.077*
12M 0.012** 0.095* 0.016** 0.095* 0.245 0.533
Notes: Table presents p-values of the Granger causality tests for
the three and twelve month horizons (3M and 12M) between mar-
ket volatility and dispersion of beliefs. Variance to Dispersion
implies that the null hypothesis is that causality runs from vari-
ance to dispersion of beliefs. *, **, *** denotes signicance at the
10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively.
and market volatility. This result corroborates the ndings of MacDonald and Marsh
(1996) but is opposite to the results of Frankel and Froot (1990), who nd causality
running in the opposite direction. Furthermore, the results are not in line with the
theoretical predictions that dispersion a¤ects volatility. This might be caused by the
fact that we do not have data for the total market, but only a subset of traders. Since
the traders are relatively homogeneous in nature (most of them are nancial institutions
based in London), the observations of trader heterogeneity might be biased downward.
Given that we observe a subset of the total set of traders who cannot inuence the
market signicantly, current uncertainty can cause uncertainty concerning the future,
hence relatively diverse expectations.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, newly available survey data were used to investigate whether expecta-
tions of future exchange rates are dispersed in that agents have di¤erent beliefs about
the future path of the exchange rates. By using a number of measures for dispersion of
beliefs we nd that there are distinct periods of high and low dispersion where market
participants disagree as to what will happen to the future level of the exchange rates.
Furthermore, the tail index estimates suggest that the frequency at which extremist
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di¤erences in expectations among market participants occurs, is higher than that what
would occur under normality. Since the hypothesis of rational expectations would require
that market participants be homogeneous in their formation of expectations, the nd-
ings of heterogeneity, however, cast some doubts on the homogeneous agent framework
commonly used in nance and macroeconomics.
We also study the sources of the di¤erential beliefs of market participants by using sev-
eral formulations for exchange rate expectations. Importantly, our ndings suggest that
dispersion arises because of a combined e¤ect of market participants holding individual
information and attach di¤erent weights to some elements of the common information
set. In addition to these two e¤ects, we also document evidence of the existence of di¤er-
ent types of agents (fundamentalists and chartists). Therefore, the relative importance is
investigated of the role of both chartist- and fundamentalist-based forecasting techniques
and we nd that chartist rules are predominantly used at the shorter spectrum of the
forecast horizon and fundamentalist rules are predominantly used at the longer spectrum
of the forecast horizon. Moreover, the results indicate that market participants switch
between di¤erent forecast techniques, depending upon the position of the exchange rate
compared to its fundamental value.
Finally, an exploratory investigation suggests that the relationship between market
volatility and trader dispersion tends to be signicant and positive for di¤erent measures
of both trader heterogeneity and market volatility. This result corroborates the ndings of
MacDonald and Marsh (1996) but is opposite to the results of Frankel and Froot (1990),
who nd causality running in the reverse direction.
The present chapter suggests that it is important to consider heterogeneous expecta-
tion and their role in determining foreign exchange market dynamics for the international
nancial markets. We believe that the relationship between dispersion of beliefs and mar-
ket conditions and the role of market participants in periods of nancial instability are
important areas for future research. As such, it provides us with a viable and interesting
alternative to asset pricing models.
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis have established two conclusions. First of all, in
Chapter 2 it is shown that macro-economic fundamentals have the exact same statistical
properties as returns from nancial markets (i.e., the stylized facts). However, it is
also shown that these dynamics in the exchange rate markets are not caused by, nor
correlated with, the dynamics in the fundamentals. This is a direct empirical rejection
of the monetary model. Chapter 3 studied the appropriateness of one of the underlying
assumptions behind the monetary model, namely the notion of the representative rational
agent. As it turns out, agents are not homogeneous. Also, part of the heterogeneity is
caused by the use of di¤erent types of models in forming expectations. In the next chapter
we use the heterogeneity amongst market participants to explain the disconnection in the
higher moments.
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Heterogeneous Agents and Non-Normal Fundamentals
4.1 Introduction
The notion of bounded rationality and the consequential heterogeneity of expectations has
been causing a shift of paradigm in the nancial economics literature. The rst studies,
to our best knowledge, to introduce heterogeneous beliefs in a model are by Frankel
and Froot (1986, 1987, 1990). Their direct motivation to introduce heterogeneity was the
observation that the US Dollar started to deviate substantially from its fundamental value
(in this case, uncovered interest parity) by the mid 1980s, starting from the beginning
of the eighties. Their hypothesis is that the exchange rate is formed by the interaction
of two di¤erent groups: fundamentalists and chartists. Fundamentalists trade under the
expectation that the exchange rate will return to its fundamental value. Chartists, on the
other hand, use (simple) technical rules, and extrapolate the recent past changes in market
prices1. As such, the interaction between the groups causes long run mean reversion
induced by the fundamentalists, but also substantial short run deviations induced by
chartists. The speed of mean reversion and the extent of the deviation is dependent on
the relative magnitudes of the fundamentalist and chartist groups. In their empirical
application, Frankel and Froot indeed nd that the disconnection of the US Dollar from
its UIP value is caused by chartist trading.
The heterogeneous agents modelling literature experienced its biggest impulse from
the seminal work by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). Brock and Hommes also combine
two groups of agents, but allow agents to change strategy through time. Each period
agents evaluate the relative protability of the di¤erent groups and condition next pe-
0This chapter is based on Grimaldi, M. and R.C.J. Zwinkels (2005). Heterogeneous Agents and Non-
Normal Fundamentals, NiCE Workingpaper. Part of it was written while staying at the K.U.Leuven.
1In fact, Frankel and Froot model chartism as purely random shocks. More complex functional forms
of chartist behavior have been introduced later based on Brock et al. (1992).
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riods strategy on this evaluation. As such, the fraction of fundamentalists and chartists
changes through time, inducing the behavior of the market as a whole to be time-varying.
The model thus embeds both micro- and macro-considerations, and provides a feedback
mechanism between these two levels. Individual behavior is directly modelled while the
(weighted) average of individuals forms the total marketplace. Market characteristics
again determine next periods individual behavior.
This general idea has been used and extended in a number of studies, see for ex-
ample Chiarella and He (2002), Lux (1998), Lux and Marchesi (2000), De Grauwe and
Grimaldi (2005, 2006), and others. Hommes (2006) and LeBaron (2006) provide thor-
ough overviews of the literature. The purpose of the (early) literature has always been
to provide an explanation for the stylized facts and anomalies in nancial markets that
rational expectations models were unable to give. Using simulation techniques, the com-
bination of fundamentalists, chartists, and switching between these groups, has proven
to be an explanation for the existence of phenomena like volatility clustering, long run
mean-reversion, disconnection, and excess volatility.
This chapter sees into the question whether a heterogeneous agents model is able to
solve the puzzle that was laid bare in Chapter 2, the disconnection in higher moments. It
proposes an explanation for the missing link between the fundamentals and the exchange
rate dynamics. The disconnect puzzle in the level of the exchange rate is explained by the
model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006), but, to our knowledge, the mechanism
causing disconnection in the higher moments has never been examined. We therefore
combine the classical fundamental view of Friedman (1953) with the heterogeneous agents
view of Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). More specically, heterogeneous agents models
usually assume that the fundamental exchange rate is a random walk, but Chapter 2 has
shown us that the properties of the fundamentals are similar to those of exchange rate
returns. We therefore replace the i.i.d. innovations of the fundamental rate in the model
of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) by an ARCH-process, such that it replicates
the true fundamental dynamics. We test whether the fundamentals cause the exchange
rate simulated by the model in the level, variance and extremes, and determine the
mechanisms behind the results. The purpose is twofold; one, to gain more insight into the
mechanisms behind the disconnection and, two, to strengthen the case for heterogeneous
agents models.
Simulations from the model are consistent with the disconnection between fundamen-
tals and exchange rates found in the empirical literature. However, we only nd these
results if the fraction of technical analysts active in the market is relatively large, which
is the case in bubble periods. Given that the empirical evidence of transmission of in-
formation from the macro-economic variables to the exchange rate is weak, we conclude
from the results that the foreign exchange market is in a constant state of disconnection,
caused by a large fraction of active chartists. This is again consistent with the survey
results of Allen and Taylor (1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992).
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the
model, Section 4.3 consists of the methodology applied in order to study the behavior of
the model. Section 4.4 describes the results and Section 4.5 discusses the implications of
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the results. Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 The Model
In this section, we introduce the non-linear model of the exchange rate. This basic setup
will be employed in the next chapter as well, and to a somewhat lesser extent in Chapters
6 and 7. The model is a direct descendant of the celebrated Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998) model, which is extended and rewritten in terms of exchange rates by De Grauwe
and Grimaldi (2005, 2006). They model the exchange rate as a nancial asset, while using
the macro-economic fundamentals as an exogenous variable. The model consists of three
building blocks. First agents decide on the optimal portfolio in a mean variance utility
framework using simple expectations formation rules concerning the future exchange rate.
Second, the actual exchange rate is formed by the weighted average of heterogeneous
expectations and, third, the simple rules are evaluated ex-post by comparing their risk-
adjusted protability. The following step consists of choosing a forecasting rule for the
next cycle, based on past performance.
4.2.1 Investment Decision
Each agent maximizes mean-variance utility, dened as
U(W it+1) = E
i
t(W
i
t+1) 
1
2
V it (W
i
t+1) (4.1)
in which i is the type of agent, W it+1 represents the wealth of agent i in period t + 1, E
is the expectations operator,  is the coe¢ cient of risk aversion and V it (W
i
t+1) represents
conditional volatility of wealth of agent i in period t+ 1.
Agents distribute wealth between the home country and the foreign country, and both
assets pay a xed rent. Next periods wealth is therefore equal to
W it+1 = (1 + r
)st+1di;t + (1 + r)(W it   stdi;t) (4.2)
in which r and r represent home and foreign interest rates, st is the exchange rate in
period t and di;t is the amount of wealth invested abroad by agent i in period t, denoted
in foreign currency.
The investment decision is taken by adjusting di;t such that utility is maximized. The
optimal amount d is found by substituting Equation (4.2) into (4.1) and maximizing
with respect to di;t.
di;t =
(1 + r)Eit(st+1)  (1 + r)st
2i;t
(4.3)
in which 2i;t = (1 + r
)2V it (st+1). The individual demand for foreign assets d

i;t is thus
dependent on the home and foreign interest rates, combined with the beliefs about changes
in the exchange rate, adjusted for the variance in the expected exchange rate.
69
Chapter 4. Heterogeneous Agents and Non-Normal Fundamentals
Total market demand for foreign assets is equal to the sum of individual demands
HX
i=1
ni;td

i;t = Dt (4.4)
in which H is the total number of groups, ni;t is the number of agents of type i in period
t and Dt is total demand for the foreign asset. Market clearing completes the model
Xt = Dt (4.5)
in whichXt is the supply of foreign assets, which we assume to be exogenous and constant
without loss of generality.
Combining and rewriting Equations (4.3) to (4.5) yields the market clearing exchange
rate
st =

1 + r
1 + r

1PH
i=1
wi;t
2i;t
"
HX
i=1
wi;t
Eit(st+1)
2i;t
  
tXt
#
(4.6)
in which wi;t =
ni;tPH
i=h ni;t
is the relative weight of trader type i and 
t =

(1+r)
PH
i=h ni;t
.
Note that the current exchange rate is a function of expected future exchange rates. A way
of interpreting this is that there is a Walrasian auctioneer; investors trade using market
orders. At the beginning of the period, they choose their optimal demand of the risky
asset to submit to the market maker. At the end of period t, the market maker xes the
equilibrium exchange rate st that clears the market. The exchange rate is therefore always
in equilibrium. The assumption of a Walrasian auctioneer is a simplication compared
to realistic market microstructure models. However, as indicated in the introductory
chapter, this thesis will look into the expectation formation process of traders taking the
microstructure as given.
4.2.2 Forecasting Strategies
The functional form of the expectation formation rules can be adapted such that it
ts the data best. The problem is that agents can use an innite number of di¤erent
rules; rationality can only take one form while bounded rationality can take innitely
di¤erent forms. The switching mechanism, however, works as a disciplining mechanism
of the model; it prevents the modeler from inserting unrealistic forecasting strategies or
strategies that are not being used. The weight of these strategies would go to zero, as
the rules are not actually being used. Several di¤erent forms of expectations formation
mechanisms have been uncovered over the years. In short, the expectation formation
process can take di¤erent functional forms, depending on forecast horizon, sample period,
and foreign exchange markets.
Two types of agents are assumed to be active in the market: fundamentalists and
chartists. The fundamentalists expect the exchange rate to move towards the fundamental
rate, which is perfectly visible to all agents, providing mean reverting dynamics into the
exchange rate. The forecasting rule of the fundamentalists is given by
Eft (4st+1) =   (st 1   st 1) (4.7)
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in which st 1 is the fundamental rate and  2< 0; 1 > is the speed of adjustment
parameter, which can be thought of as to depend on the speed of adjustment of the
goods market2.
The standard in heterogeneous agents modelling is to model the fundamental exchange
rate as a random walk. We replace this process with a more realistic one; i.e., inspired
by Chapter 2 we replace the random walk by an ARCH(1)-process. We have chosen for
this process as it contains the features that are found in the macro-economic variables
(i.e., excess kurtosis, fat tails and volatility clustering). By denition, the process has
volatility clusters and De Haan et al. (1989) have shown that ARCH-type processes
generate distributions with heavier tails than normal. The fundamental exchange rate is
given by
st = s

t 1 + gt
gt = "t
p
0 + 1g2t 1
(4.8)
with "t  N(0; 1).
The chartist forecasting strategy is based on extrapolation of recent changes of the
exchange rate, such that they only take the fundamental rate into account via the market
exchange rate. Past movements are extrapolated irrespective of the level of the exchange
rate, such that expectations can become self-fullling and a bubble can inate if the
fraction of chartists is su¢ ciently high. The chartist rule is specied as an adaptive
expectation formation rule
Ect (4st+1) = (Ect 1(4st) + (1  )4st 1) (4.9)
in which  2 R is the degree of extrapolation and  2 h0; 1i regulates the distribution
of weights over past changes. The extrapolation coe¢ cient  regulates the degree of
persistence, such that more volatility is brought into the market as  increases. If  < 0
shocks are expected to be reversed in the future; if 0 <  < 1 shocks are expected to
continue in the future, but to a lesser extent and if  > 1 past movements are expected
to become larger, such that shocks become explosive.
Next to the forecasting rules of the level, the risk agents are exposed to is also hetero-
geneous because of the fact they form their expectation for the level di¤erently. Since the
volatility of next periods exchange rate expectations is not observable, an alternative risk
measure has to be dened. As risk is a function of uncertainty about the future exchange
rate, and the expected exchange rate cannot be accurate because of the non-linear nature
of the model, risk can be seen as a function of the past forecasting errors
2i;t = 
2
i;t 1 + (1  )
Eit 2(4st 1) 4st 1 (4.10)
in which  distributes weight across past forecasting errors.
2Note that the expected future return depends on the previous misalignment and is not dependent on
the current misalignment. The current exchange rate is formed by expectations of the future exchange
rate.
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4.2.3 Which Strategy?
The nal step is to determine which strategy agents use. The exibility to change strat-
egy is illustrative for the boundedly rational setup. The model represents a complex
non-linear world, such that expectations cannot be unbiased without innitely accurate
estimates of the coe¢ cients and starting values of the model. The bounded rationality
therefore does not come forward in non-accurate expectations, but lies in the fact that
agents do not use all available information in forming expectations, while they do have
costless access to that information. For example, agents know the expectations formed
by both strategies because they compare prots. However, they do not take into account
the existence of other agents when forming expectations, thus do not use all available
information. The bounded rationality also shows from the fact that not all agents change
strategy immediately once a certain strategy performs better than the other does in a
given period. The number of agents using a given strategy evolves gradually over time,
conditional on relative performance. On the other hand, agents do condition the choice
of their expectation rule on past performance, which is relevant for maximizing utility.
In addition, chartists are not showing herding behavior because the choice of expecta-
tion rule is not directly conditional on what other agents do, but on best forecasting
performance3.
This specication is more appropriate than the representative rational agent model
since the hypothesis of rationality is rejected in all tests on survey expectations (see e.g.
Cavaglia et al., 1993). Furthermore, introducing mutual conditioning in expectation for-
mation creates the phenomenon of "innite regress" (Townsend, 1983), i.e. the exchange
rate depends on the expectations of other agentsexpectations, which depends on the
expectations of the expectations of other agentsexpectations, and so on, ad innitum.
This leads to intractable mathematical problems except under very restrictive simplifying
assumptions.
We assume that agents are susceptible to both cognitive dissonance and status quo
bias. Market participants are rm believers in either fundamentalism or chartism. If,
however, it turns out that their expectations do not materialize, traders enter into a
state of cognitive dissonance and try to adapt their beliefs accordingly. However, because
agents are assumed to be relatively rm believers, they change their belief with a certain
delay, i.e., status quo bias. Practically, the cognitive dissonance measure is conditional on
the ex-post relative performance of the strategies. The fraction of chartists, as introduced
by Brock and Hommes (1997), is equal to
wc;t =
exp[(c;t 1   2c;t 1)]
exp[(c;t 1   2c;t 1)] + exp[(f;t 1   2f;t 1)]
(4.11)
3Indirectly, chartists do follow what other agents do because it is more protable to be chartists the
more chartists there are in the market. However, the expected level of return is the decision variable,
not the number of chartists.
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and the fraction of fundamentalists is equal to
wf;t = 1  wc;t =
exp[(f;t 1   2f;t 1)]
exp[(c;t 1   2c;t 1)] + exp[(f;t 1   2f;t 1)]
(4.12)
in which wi;t is the fraction of agent i in period t and i;t is the prot of strategy i. While
the value of i;t measures the degree of cognitive dissonance, the parameter  denes
the status quo bias. This parameter measures the status-quo bias in the decision to
switch to the more protable rule (Kahneman et al., 1982); with  equal to zero agents
are insensitive to the relative protability of the rules, and are distributed evenly across
strategies. In other words, status quo bias is innite, so agents do not adjust beliefs in
response to a state of cognitive dissonance. On the other hand, with increasing  agents
react more strongly to the relative protability of the rules. In the limiting neoclassical
case when  goes to innity all agents react immediately to a di¤erence in protability,
i.e. all choose the forecasting rule which proved to be more protable in the previous
period. The parameter is also known as the intensity of choice.
The cognitive dissonance measure, in terms of prot, nally, is dened as
i;t =
8<:
0 if Eit 1(4st) = 0
jst   st 1j if Eit 1(4st)4st > 0
  jst   st 1j if Eit 1(4st)4st < 0
(4.13)
The magnitude of prots is dened as the return from investing one monetary unit in
foreign currency for one period. The home and foreign interest rates are assumed to be
equal and constant, such that only the return from the exchange rate change has to be
taken into account when comparing strategies. Prots are positive or negative conditional
on predicting the correct sign of the exchange rate return. We have chosen for this setup
because it is the most appropriate alternative. If we use utility instead of return, the
performance is dependent on wealth. This is undesirable because traders are interested
in the contemporaneous forecasting power of rules, not on past performance. Using
only the one-period return is also less appropriate since this setup does not incorporate
absolute di¤erences in the magnitude of expectations, only the expected directions of
change.
4.3 Methodology
In this section we discuss the methodology applied to examine the transmission of dy-
namics from the fundamental rate to the exchange rate in the model. First we present
the simulation setup and, second, the tests we perform on the simulated series to examine
the transmission of dynamics.
4.3.1 Stochastic Simulations
It is not possible to generate an ARCH-type process in a deterministic setting (see
Equation (4.8)), such that we need to study the behavior of the model stochastically.
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It is less straightforward to examine the data from a stochastic process compared to a
purely deterministic setup because the non-linear nature of the model render it highly
sensitive to small shocks; as such, there is a path dependency. To solve this, we apply the
Monte Carlo simulation methodology; 1; 000 series of 10; 000 periods are simulated with
random seed. We focus on the average result, such that incidental e¤ects are levelled out.
The standard set of parameters of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) is used, which are
values, they claim, that are close to empirically observed values and that replicate best
the characteristics of the market. The extrapolation parameter is set equal to  = 0:9;
weight distribution  = 0:2; speed of adjustment  = 0:2; variance weight distribution
 = 0:5; risk aversion  = 1:2; intensity of choice  = 1 and the home and foreign interest
rates are set equal to 5%.
The coe¢ cients of the process driving the fundamental, Equation (4.8), are chosen
as follows: 0 = 0:025 and 1 = 0:85. The unconditional variance of shocks to the
fundamental is equal to 0:164, which is equal to the variance of fundamental shocks used
in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). In addition, the persistence of volatility clusters is
maximized with this set of coe¢ cients.
4.3.2 Time-Series Tests
In order to judge the validity of the model, we study the exchange rate and fundamental
rate simulated by the model, and compare the results with real life situations and the
results fromChapter 2. The tests are therefore geared towards examining the transmission
of shocks from the level, variance and extremes of the fundamental rate to the level,
variance and extremes of the exchange rate. If dynamics in the fundamental rate are
indeed transmitted to the exchange rate, this is an indication that crises have their roots
in the real economy. If we see exchange rate crises without any large shocks in the
fundamental rate, this is an indication that crises are triggered by trader interaction and
speculative behavior5.
We use the two-stage Cross-Correlation-Function (CCF) by Cheung and Ng (1996)
to test for transmission of level and second moment e¤ects from the fundamental rate
to the exchange rate. This is a natural extension of the well-known Granger Causality
test for the level. The CCF test is chosen above a multivariate (MV ) - GARCH setup
because it does not involve the simultaneous modelling of intra- and inter-series dynamics.
The sensitivity of theMV  GARCH estimates to the choice of rst and second moment
equations, plus the sensitivity to the choice of the asymptotic distribution of the maximum
likelihood estimator for a multivariate GARCH process render it di¢ cult to implement
properly. Furthermore, Cheung and Ng (1996) show that the CCF test is robust to
nonsymmetric and leptokurtic errors.
The CCF test consists of two steps. In the rst step, an ARMA GARCH model is
4The unconditional variance of an ARCH(1) process is equal to 01 1 .
5See Ederington and Lee (1993) for the impact of the arrival of scheduled macroeconomic news on
volatility. Low and Muthuswamy (1996) and Melvin and Yin (1996) study the e¤ect of the frequency of
news.
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estimated. For this step, we use an ARIMA(2; 1; 0) GARCH(1; 1) conguration for the
exchange rate and an ARIMA(0; 1; 0) GARCH(1; 0) conguration for the fundamental
rate. We have chosen the lag structure of the exchange rate by implementing the Box-
Jenkins method; the rst di¤erence of the fundamental rate is obviously the rst order
ARCH-process. In the second step of the test procedure, we rst dene Ut and Vt as the
squared standardized residuals from the rst step. Subsequently, the normally distributed
test statistic is given by
S =
p
Tbruv(k) (4.14)
in which bruv(k) is the computed cross-correlation between Ut and Vt at lag k and T is the
number of observations.
Since the CCF-test procedure does not estimate the magnitude of the causal relation,
we estimate an augmented ARIMA   GARCH equation using the results from the
CCF-test. The augmentation lies in the fact that we add fundamental innovations as
an independent variable in the level equation, and fundamental conditional variance as
exogenous in the variance equation of the exchange rate. The equation is given by
4st = 1 + 24 st 1 + 34 st 2 + 44 st 1 + "t (4.15)
2s;t = 1 + 2
2
s;t 1 + 3"
2
t 1 + 4
2
s;t 1
in which 2s;t is the conditional variance of the market exchange rate and 
2
s;t the condi-
tional variance of the fundamental exchange rate.
In order to test for the transmission of extremes, we use a new and simple methodology.
Two dummies are constructed in order to check whether an extreme macro-economic
shock is directly translated into an extreme shock to the exchange rate. The dummy
of the exchange rate Est is equal to one when the absolute exchange rate return in a
given period is larger than  times the standard deviation of the exchange rate returns,
and zero otherwise. A similar dummy is created for the fundamental rate, Eft , using the
fundamental standard deviation. Thus,
Est =

1 if 4 st > s
0 if 4 st < s (4.16)
Eft =

1 if 4 st > s
0 if 4 st < s
with  = 2 in the benchmark case.
The correlation between the dummies, tested with the Pearson Chi-Square test taking
the causality-structure into account, is an indication of the transmission of fundamental
shocks to the exchange rate. A signicant correlation implies that exchange rate crises
are triggered by macro-economic shocks, while a non-signicant correlation implies that
exchange rate crises are caused by speculative behavior of traders.
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Figure 4.1: Example of Misalignment
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Notes: Figure illustrates the misalignment be-
tween the fundamental rate and the exchange
rate simulated by the model
Next to the correlation between the dummies, we estimate a standard logit model
with the extreme dummy of the simulated exchange rates as dependent variable. This is
a robustness check of the Pearson Chi-Square test; furthermore, it allows us to control for
other variables that might trigger extreme shocks. We add fundamental variance 2s;t,
exchange rate variance 2s;t, chartist weight wc;t, and the fundamental extreme dummy E
f
t
as regressors in the logit equation. Also, we interact these terms with the misalignment
st st in order to study the di¤ering mechanisms during bubble situations. The equation
is given by
Est = z

Eft ; 
2
s;t; 
2
s;t; wc;tjst   st

(4.17)
in which z is the logit function.
4.4 Results
Subsections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 present the results of the CCF test, augmented regression
and extremes test respectively, but rst we examine the plot of the exchange rate and
fundamental rate. Figure 4.1 illustrates the behavior of the model by plotting the mis-
alignment between the simulated exchange rate and fundamental rate of one of the 1; 000
series. The exchange rate follows the fundamental rate relatively closely in most periods,
but is severely disconnected from the fundamental rate on a number of occasions. We use
this observation and distinguish between normal and bubble sub samples in the tests.
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Table 4.1: Results CCF-test
Level Variance
lag k % Sign % Sign
-1 5 4.8
0 5 4.9
1 22.8 17.4
2 24.8 20.1
3 17.9 21.7
4 13.8 20.4
5 10.8 21.3
Notes: Table presents the percentage of signif-
icant causal relations between the fundamental
rate and the exchange rate for both the level
and the second moment. The rst column de-
notes the number of lags of the fundamental
rate.
4.4.1 Level and Variance
Table 4.1 presents the results of the CCF-test applied to the simulated returns. Com-
paring the rst lag with the no-lag case, we observe a strong increase in the percentage
of signicant causal relations in the level. This is caused by the timing structure of the
model as shocks to the fundamental rate a¤ect the exchange rate with a lag of one period.
The 5:0% signicant relations at lags  1 and 0 are the result of using the 5% signicance
level. We observe the same e¤ect for causality in the second moment; the percentage of
signicant causal relations jumps from 5 to 17:4 at the rst lag. Although the percentage
at the rst lag is lower for the variance compared to the level, the e¤ect for the variance
is more persistent, which shows from the fact that the percentage remains high at longer
lags. This result corroborates with the observation of low persistence in the level and
high persistence in the second moment of exchange rate returns.
The results of our simulation approach imply that the level and variability of the
macro-economic variables inuence the level and variability of the exchange rate. This is
not in line with the results of the purely empirical approach of Hodrick (1989), Cumper-
ayot (2005) and Chapter 2 from this thesis, who report weak evidence in favor of a causal
relation between the fundamentals and the exchange rate.
Now we know the structure and directions of causality, we are able to estimate the
augmented ARMA   GARCH model given by Equation 4.15 in order to study the
magnitude of the e¤ects found by the CCF-test. The total sample in divided into two
sub samples, one in which jst   sj < 2:5 and one in which jst   sj  2:5. This setup
allows us to examine the di¤erence in transmission of information between normal and
bubble periods.
Table 4.2 presents the results of the augmented regressions from Equation 4.15. The
median coe¢ cient for the fundamental e¤ect on the level of the exchange rate in the
normal sub sample is positive and highly signicant for a large percentage of series. The
level e¤ect in the bubble sub sample is signicantly smaller and a smaller proportion of
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Table 4.2: Augmented Regression Estimates
Normal Bubble
Level: 4 0.045 0.007
(6.140) (0.974)
[83.2] [27.4]
Variance: 4 0.004 4.0E-04
(1.796) (0.716)
[48.3] [34.6]
Notes: Table presents estimation results of
Equation (4.15), i.e. the median of the esti-
mated coe¢ cients, t-values (in round parenthe-
sis) and percentage of signicant coe¢ cients [in
square parenthesis] of the augmented GARCH
estimation. Normal represents the normal sub-
sample and Bubble the bubble subsample.
the series is signicant compared to the normal sub sample. The results of the CCF test
are thus largely driven by information transmission in normal periods.
Concerning the variance, we observe a positive and signicant e¤ect for the normal
sub sample in half of the cases and a positive and signicant e¤ect for the bubble sub
sample in one third of the cases. Also for the variance we can conclude that the result of
the CCF-test is driven by the normal sub sample.
The estimation procedure is repeated for di¤erent values of the threshold between the
sub samples in order to determine the region in which fundamentalists have a signicant
e¤ect on the exchange rate.
Figure 4.2 indicates a relatively stable percentage of signicant coe¢ cients for both
the level and the variance in the normal sub sample, and a steeply declining percentage
in the bubble sub sample. This implies that as long as the sample consists of a number of
periods in which the exchange rate is close to the fundamental rate, the regression results
will be signicant. The transmission of information decreases considerably if we increase
the distance between the fundamental rate and exchange rate if the sample does not
consist of a number of periods in which the exchange rate is close to the fundamental rate.
Given that the average maximum misalignment is 125, we can conclude that the band
around the fundamental rate in which the fundamental rate inuences the exchange rate
is relatively narrow compared to the range of the exchange rate around the fundamental
rate. The results for the bubble sub sample are in line with the empirical results of
Hodrick (1989), Cumperayot (2005) and Chapter 2.
4.4.2 Extremes
In this subsection we test whether exchange rate crises in the model are triggered by
macro-economic shocks, as we have seen in Argentina and Mexico, or by speculative
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Figure 4.2: Sensitivity to Threshold
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Notes: Figure depicts the percentage of signif-
icant coe¢ cients representing the transmission
of level and variance shocks from the fundamen-
tal to the exchange rate (vertical axis) versus
the threshold between normal and bubble sub-
sample (horizontal axis)
Table 4.3: Results Pearson Chi-Square test
Total Normal Bubble
Abs 0.015 0.021 0.212
[57.7] [55.7] [31.8]
Pos 0.033 0.035 0.195
[53.0] [48.7] [33.1]
Neg 0.031 0.027 0.218
[53.7] [51.0] [32.5]
Notes: Table presents the median probability of
independence between the extremes of the ex-
change rate Est versus the extremes of the fun-
damental rate Eft , tested with the Pearson Chi-
Square test. The number of signicant relations
is given in square parenthesis. The fundamental
rate extreme dummy is lagged one period.
behavior, as in the Asian crisis6, with the method of extreme correlations. The test
results indicate that the link between extremes is signicant for the total sample and
the normal sub sample, given that the median P-value is below 5%. The p-values of
the bubble sub sample are substantially higher compared to the normal sub sample and
the total sample, which is a conrmation of the results from the analyses of the level
and second moments. The di¤erentiation between positive and negative shocks does not
6The Asian crisis has it roots in the imbalances in the countries in the preceding decade, but the crisis
itself is triggered by speculative behavior.
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give signicant di¤erences, which results from the symmetric structure of the model. The
percentage of signicant relations between extremes is over 50% for the normal sub sample
and over 30% for the bubble sub sample, which is in line with the median values. Also
in the case of the extremes, the threshold between the normal and bubble sub samples
inuences the results.
Figure 4.3: Sensitivity to Threshold (extremes)
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Notes: Figure presents the percentage of signif-
icant correlations between the extremes of the
fundamental rate and exchange rate (vertical
axis) versus the threshold between the normal
and bubble subsample (horizontal axis)
Figure 4.3 is comparable to Figure 4.2. The percentage of signicant relations remains
constant for the normal sub sample if we increase the threshold, while the percentage
decreases as the threshold increases for the bubble sub sample. Also for the extremes,
the transmission of extremes from the fundamental rate to the exchange rate via the
fundamentalists is limited to a relatively narrow band around the fundamental. The
results for the bubble sub sample are in line with the results of the empirical literature,
see Cumperayot (2005) and Chapter 2.
Table 4.4 presents the estimation results for the logistic regression, controlling for the
misalignment. The coe¢ cient for the direct e¤ect of the fundamental extreme dummy is
positive and the interaction term with the misalignment is negative. This implies that
the occurrence of extreme fundamental shocks increases the probability of an extreme
exchange rate shock, but that the e¤ect decreases with increasing misalignment. This is in
line with the results from the correlation analyses. The percentages of signicant relations
for the direct e¤ect is comparable to the percentage signicant relations at zero threshold
for the correlations. The low percentage of signicant e¤ects for the interaction term
can be explained by the fact that the fundamental e¤ect on the exchange rate decreases
slowly when increasing the misalignment, as we have seen in the previous test. The same
reasoning holds for the estimates of the fundamental conditional volatility. The e¤ect of
the exchange rate volatility on the probability of an extreme shock is highly signicant for
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Table 4.4: Results Logistic Regression
Direct e¤ect Interaction st   st
Eft 0.6962 -0.0229
(2.2841) (-0.9226)
[588] [179]
2s;t 0.1660 -0.0039
(1.6412) (-0.6192)
[394] [168]
2s;t 99.9005 6.5386
(8.6503) (4.1697)
[939] [864]
wc;t 6.2960 -0.2295
(12.8007) (-4.8936)
[991] [925]
Notes: Table presents the median estimated coe¢ cient and t-value
(in round parenthesis), and the percentage of signicant relations
[in square parenthesis] of the logistic estimation, Equation (4.17).
The dependent variable is Est ; The middle column presents the
direct e¤ect; the third column represents the interaction e¤ect
with the misalignment st   st .
almost all series; furthermore, the e¤ect gets stronger when the misalignment increases.
This is the result of the fact that extreme values occur during periods of high volatility.
The e¤ect increases as the misalignment increases as a result of a diminishing stabilizing
e¤ect of fundamentalists. The chartist weight nally adds signicantly to the probability
of an extreme exchange rate shock, but the e¤ect decreases as the misalignment increases.
The positive direct e¤ect is the result of the fact that chartists expectations work self
fullling; a high fraction of chartists can trigger an extreme return. The cross-term is
negative because extremes occur when the fraction of chartists is growing. The fraction of
chartists goes to one relatively quick as the misalignment grows, whereas the misalignment
can continue to increase as the fraction of chartists is constant and (almost) equal to one.
4.5 Discussion
In this section we explain the results from the previous section concerning the level,
variance, and extremes in terms of the mechanisms of the model and we analyze what
this implies in combination with the empirical results of Hodrick (1989), Cumperayot
(2005) and Chapter 2.
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Figure 4.4: Fraction of Chartists and Misalignment
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Notes: Figure presents the fraction of chartists
(left scale) and the absolute misalignment be-
tween the exchange rate and fundamental rate
(right scale).
4.5.1 Transmission Mechanisms
The transmission of fundamental news to the exchange rate in the level is signicant in
normal periods, which can be explained by the fact that the proportion of fundamental
traders is relatively high during those periods. As the market rate oscillates around
the fundamental, none of the strategies is dominant. Fundamentalists do not become
dominant because the exchange rate does not move towards the fundamental rate in a
large number of consecutive periods, whereas chartists do not become dominant because
the exchange rate does not move in a single direction for a large number of consecutive
periods. Since fundamentalists take fundamental news into account when forming their
expectations, fundamental shocks are incorporated into the exchange rate. Since only
half of the traders active in the market are fundamentalists, the e¤ect of fundamental
shocks on the level of the exchange rate is relatively small.
The transmission of information from the level of the fundamental rate to the level of
the exchange rate is not signicant in bubble periods because the fraction of fundamen-
talists is low, such that chartists dominate the market. Fundamentalism is not protable
as the exchange rate moves away from the fundamental rate. As chartists do not take
the fundamental rate into account when forming expectations, fundamental information
is not incorporated into the exchange rate during bubble periods. This mechanism is
clearly illustrated in Figure 4.4.
We observe the same pattern for the variance; transmission in normal periods and
no transmission in bubble periods. The reason is that high volatility in the exchange
rate can be caused by two sources when we use ARCH-type fundamental innovations.
During bubble periods, when the fraction of chartists is high, volatility is brought into
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the market by chartists extrapolating the past, such that prices increase or decrease at
an increasing rate7. In normal periods, when the fraction of fundamentalists is relatively
high, volatility is brought into the market by the fundamental rate. If the variance
of the fundamental rate is high, the variance of the expectations of fundamentalists is
high, causing the variance of the exchange rate to be high. Also, as fundamentalists
bring volatility into the exchange rate returns, chartistsexpectations also become more
volatile since exchange rate returns are used in forming expectations. Volatility clusters
can thus be formed by trader interaction or by large shocks in the real economy.
The transmission of extreme fundamental shocks is stronger in normal periods com-
pared to bubble periods, and can also be explained by the abovementioned principle for
the level and the variance. However, this is not the complete story. In the case of ARCH-
innovations, agents expect an extreme fundamental shock, because extreme fundamental
shocks occur during a period of high fundamental volatility, see De Haan et al. (1989).
As there is large volatility in the fundamental surrounding the period in which there is
an extreme fundamental shock, fundamentalists already incorporate large shocks in their
expectations (as expectations are based on fundamental innovations in previous periods).
If an extreme fundamental innovation occurs, all information is quickly incorporated into
the exchange rate.
The same holds, to a lesser extent, for chartists. A small but signicant part of
fundamental volatility is being transmitted to the exchange rate, which implies that
volatility is building up in the exchange rate if it is building up in the fundamental rate.
As chartists expectations are based on past returns, agents expect a larger exchange
rate return in volatile periods than in tranquil periods. This accelerates the transmission
of extreme fundamental shock to the exchange rate. The same mechanism occurs in
chartists-induced volatility clusters. Volatility due to self-fullling pressure causes agents
to expect large exchange-rate changes. This causes extremes.
4.5.2 Implications
The question is what the simulation results imply for the functioning of nancial mar-
kets in reality. The behavior of the model in bubble periods replicates the behavior
of real life nancial markets, in the sense that there is no transmission of information
whatsoever from the fundamental to the exchange rate. Consequently, nancial mar-
kets are constantly in a bubble situation and are therefore constantly detached from the
macro-economic fundamentals, if we follow the model. This is di¢ cult to test, as the
fundamental rate is not directly observable in reality. However, the fact that monetary
models are poor predictors of the exchange rate is an indication that the exchange rate
is indeed disconnected from its fundamental for long periods on end. Furthermore, De
Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006) show that the exchange rate follows the fundamental rate
more closely in periods of high fundamental volatility. Given the results, this implies that
there is more transmission of dynamics from the fundamental rate to the exchange rate
7Prices accelerate because the fraction of chartists increases and chartists use a bandwagon type of
expectation formation rule.
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in periods of high fundamental volatility. This corroborates with the empirical nding
that macro-economic models perform better empirically in relatively volatile countries.
Another implication of the model is that a large fraction of agents trading on foreign
exchange markets are chartists. This corroborates the results of Allen and Taylor (1990),
who nd that at least 90% of foreign exchange traders use some form of technical analysis
and Frankel and Froot (1986, 1990) who nd that the fraction of fundamentalists in the
market decreases considerably during the 1981-1985 period.
4.6 Conclusion
The dynamics of macro-economic variables are similar to those of exchange rate returns,
but there is no connection between the phenomena. Furthermore, heterogeneous agents
models replicate the characteristics of exchange rate returns, including the disconnect
puzzle in the level, but do not take into account the dynamics of the fundamentals. These
observations are combined in this chapter and an explanation is proposed for the missing
link between the exchange rate and the underlying macro-economic fundamentals.
Previous work that demonstrated the ability of heterogeneous agents models to explain
the disconnect puzzle in the level is extended to the variance and the extremes by using
an alternative fundamental rate in a heterogeneous agents model. We replace the original
fundamental rate, which is a random walk, by a process that mimics the characteristics of
macro-economic fundamentals, which is an ARCH-process. This allows us to study the
transmission of volatility and extremes, besides the transmission of shocks in the level,
from the fundamental rate to the exchange rate.
The results show that the exchange rates simulated by the model replicate the dis-
connect puzzle if the exchange rate is in a bubble situation, i.e. if the exchange rate is
su¢ ciently detached from the fundamental rate. This result holds for the transmission of
information in the level, the variance, and the extremes. Fundamental information is not
transmitted to the exchange rate in a bubble situation because the market is dominated
by chartists. In contrast to fundamentalists, chartists do not take the fundamental rate
into account when forming expectations. In normal situations, if the fraction of chartists
is not as high as in bubble situations, fundamental information is transmitted to the
exchange rate by the fundamentalists.
The results of this chapter give a possible explanation for earlier empirical results.
First, the results imply that the empirical regularities found for nancial markets can be
explained by the fact that exchange rates are notably disconnected from their fundamental
rate for long periods on end, and second, the majority of traders use technical analyses.
This is directly in line with our ndings in Chapter 2, and also with Allen and Taylor
(1990) and Taylor and Allen (1992) who state that over 90% of trader use some sort of
technical trading input.
Although the heterogeneous agents literature thus far has provided a more realistic
model and appealing results, one of the biggest drawback remains that the verication of
the models is based solely on simulation techniques. Given the highly non-linear nature
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of the models and (sometimes) the high data demands, proper empirical verication has
been di¢ cult. The simulation setup provides an interesting laboratory experiment, in
that the mechanisms driving the results can be laid bare. However, the outcomes are also
relatively sensitive to the coe¢ cients and starting values, such that the models tend to
become somewhat stylized. Furthermore, the models are not confronted with real data.
In the next chapters, a rst endeavour into the empirical estimation of heterogeneous
agents models is made.
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CHAPTER 5
Heterogeneity of Agents and Exchange Rate Dynamics: Evidence
from the EMS
5.1 Introduction
Heterogeneity of economic agentsexpectations seems a promising alternative in explain-
ing the dynamics of asset prices, including the exchange rate, as presented in the previous
chapters, but also in the literature at large, see de Long et al., 1990; Frankel and Froot,
1987; Brock and Hommes, 1998; Lux and Marchesi, 2000; Hommes, 2001. For instance,
heterogeneous agent models are able to replicate the characteristics of exchange rate
returns; volatility clustering, fat tails of the distribution of returns and the absence of
rst-moment predictability and long-run mean reversion are replicated by De Grauwe
and Grimaldi (2005, 2006). Verication of the heterogeneous agent models, however, has
only been done by either simulations or analytical derivations - both methods are elabo-
rately presented in De Grauwe et al. (2004). The advantage of this approach is that it
allows the mechanics of the model to be studied in a purely deterministic way; it gives a
clear view on the e¤ect of the mechanisms in the model. The disadvantage, however, is
that the model is not directly confronted with real-life nancial data. It is therefore not
certain whether the mechanisms formally described in the heterogeneous agent models
are actually present in the dynamics of nancial markets, despite the fact that the models
are capable of reproducing the characteristics observed in exchange markets.
Although the heterogeneity of agents approach is intellectually satisfying, the hetero-
geneity model has hardly been estimated with empirical nancial data because of the
non-linear nature of the model that (mainly) arises from the existence of the mechanism
that governs the switching between beliefs. Recently this issue has been explored either
0This chapter is based on De Jong, E., W.F.C. Verschoor, and R.C.J. Zwinkels (2007). Heterogeneity
of Agents and Exchange Rate Dynamics: Evidence from the EMS, NiCE Workingpaper.
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directly or indirectly by a number of papers. As an early example, Shiller (1984) intro-
duces a model with rational smart money traders and ordinary investors and shows that
the proportion of smart money traders varies considerably during the 1900-1983 period
by assuming the e¤ect of ordinary investors to be zero. Vigfusson (1997) and Ahrens
and Reitz (2005) have circumvented the problem of the non-linear switching mechanism
by replacing it by a Markov regime-switching approach. Baak (1999) and Chavas (2000)
nd signicant evidence of agent heterogeneity in the beef market by applying a Kalman
lter approach. Winker and Gilli (2001, 2004) estimate a heterogeneous agent model
indirectly by minimizing a loss function consisting of the kurtosis and ARCH-estimates
of the simulated data by adjusting the coe¢ cients of the model. Reitz and Westerho¤
(2003, 2005, 2006) and Manzan and Westerho¤ (2007) estimate a model of chartists and
fundamentalists with switching mechanism for exchange rates by rendering the weights
(Reitz and Westerho¤) or the chartist coe¢ cients (Manzan and Westerho¤) conditional
on the misalignment between the market and fundamental price. Alfarano et al. (2005,
2006) introduce and estimate a simple heterogeneous agents model from which the dis-
tribution function of returns can be written as a function of the fundamentalistsweight.
Only a small number of studies estimate a full edged dynamic heterogeneous agents
model with switching based on performance. Boswijk et al. (2007) directly estimate a
heterogeneous agents model with switching mechanism; they simplify and rewrite the
model of Brock and Hommes (1997) and estimate it for the S&P500. Overall, the ma-
jority of the empirical studies nds evidence in favor of the heterogeneous agents models;
both trader heterogeneity and switching believes are found.
This chapter explores the relevance of the heterogeneity of agentsexpectations, who
use incomplete information and who have di¤erent beliefs about the future exchange rate.
The approach uses simple expectation formation rules, which form the asset price forming
mechanism. The tness of the rules is controlled ex-post by checking their risk-adjusted
protability; agents can switch to the more protable rule. We extend the analyses
of Boswijk et al. (2007) by estimating the heterogeneous agent model of De Grauwe
and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) for the European Monetary System (EMS) exchange rates.
Unlike previous foreign exchange rate studies, we avoid the problems of dening the true
fundamental exchange rate, on which there is no consensus in the literature and which
may also change over time during a oating rate period (Manzan and Westerho¤, 2005).
While using the central parity rate as the fundamental rate, we estimate the model for the
EMS-period from March 1979 until December 1998. The EMS was literally an exchange
rate target zone with narrow bands, such that there are movements in the exchange rate,
but still we have an observable fundamental.
Note that the intuition behind the heterogeneity model changes somewhat1. Mean re-
version does not necessarily have to be interpreted as fundamentalism, but as condence
in the target zone regime2. True fundamentalists can also expect the exchange rate to
1An important feature of xed exchange rate regimes is that parities are usually imperfectly credible
and not permanent.
2The EMS exchange rate mechanism could very well lead to mean reversion in bilateral EMS exchange
rates if the system succeeds in maintaining longer-run targets rates or central rates.
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move away from parity if they believe the central rate is not accurate and the exchange
rate will move towards the actual economics based fundamental rate as perceived by
traders. In this paper, we simply dene fundamentalists as agents who condition their
expectations on the central parity, irrespective of whether they are stabilizing or destabi-
lizing for the target zone regime. Chartists, or technical analysts, in contrast, base their
expectation on past returns. Furthermore, the behavior of market participants can be
dependent on the position of the market rate in the band, comparable to the S-curve of
Krugman (1991). Initially destabilizing chartists who believe the regime is credible might
become stabilizing or revise their coe¢ cients as the exchange rate gets close to the upper
or lower band. In addition, the fundamentalistsexpectation of mean-reversion might
get stronger as the exchange rate moves closer to the band if they expect Central Bank
interventions. Thus, mean reversion can be stronger if the expected gain is larger, so if
the exchange rate is close to the band and the regime is credible, and vice versa.
The current study complements previous studies and makes several new contribu-
tions. Using a sample of eight EMS exchange rates for the period from March 1979 to
December 1998, we nd strong evidence in favor of the heterogeneous agents model. For
seven countries, we nd signicant evidence of heterogeneous expectations; signicant
switching of believes is found for only two countries, but switching is signicantly bene-
cial for the explanatory power of the model in seven cases. In addition, we show that the
heterogeneous agent model outperforms the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting in
all country/period combinations. Finally, we nd that the limit behavior of the model for
the total sample is generally stable, while it di¤ers considerably per country and period
for sub samples.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the hetero-
geneous agents model, while Section 5.3 presents the methodology to empirically estimate
the model. In Section 5.4 the estimation results are reported. In addition, Section 5.5
presents the forecasting ability of the model. Section 5.6 discusses the deterministic be-
havior of the model, in particular the stability and type of limit behavior if we iterate
the model forward. Finally, Section 5.7 concludes the chapter.
5.2 The model
The model applied here is directly comparable to the one introduced in the previous
chapter. Therefore, we will only go through it briey and stress the points where it
di¤ers. Again, agents are assumed to be of di¤erent types i depending on their beliefs
about the future exchange rate. Each agent of type i can invest in two assets, a domestic
and a foreign one, and maximizes mean-variance utility given by the following equation:
U(W it+1) = E
i
t(W
i
t+1) 
1
2
V it (W
i
t+1) (5.1)
where W it+1 represents wealth of agent i in period t+ 1, E
i is the expectations operator
of agent of type i,  is the coe¢ cient of risk aversion and V it (W
i
t+1) represents conditional
volatility of wealth of agent i in period t+ 1.
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Agents can distribute their wealth between assets in the home country and assets in
the foreign country; both pay a xed rent. Next periods wealth is therefore equal to
W it+1 = (1 + r
)st+1di;t + (1 + r)(W it   stdi;t) (5.2)
where r and r represent home and foreign interest rates, st+1 is the exchange rate in
period t+1 and di;t is the amount of wealth invested abroad, denoted in foreign currency.
Thus, the rst term on the right-hand side of Equation (5.2) represents the value of the
foreign part of the portfolio in domestic currency at time t + 1, while the second term
represents the value of the domestic part of the portfolio at time t + 1. Next period
wealth is dependent on the rates of return of the assets and the appreciation of the
foreign currency. The investment decision is taken by choosing that amount of foreign
assets di;t that maximizes Equation (5.1). The optimal amount is found by substituting
Equation (5.2) into (5.1) and maximizing with respect to di;t. The optimal amount of
wealth invested abroad for investor type i becomes:
di;t =
(1 + r)Eit(st+1)  (1 + r)st
2t
(5.3)
where 2t = (1+r
)Vt(st+1). The amount of wealth invested abroad di;t is thus dependent
on the home and foreign interest rates, combined with both the heterogeneous beliefs
about the future level of the exchange rate and its variance.
This is where the model in this chapter di¤ers most signicantly from the previous
chapter; the assumption of homogeneous expectations concerning the variance is added,
V it (st+1) = Vt(st+1)8i. Homogeneous risk assessment is not a stringent assumption. Move-
ments in the market itself, uncertainty surrounding the future exchange rate, are always
the source of risk. The total market, obviously, is equal for all types of agents. Further-
more, this assumption reduces the complexity of the model considerably, such that it is
suitable for estimation purposes.
Total market demand for foreign assets at time t is equal to the sum of individual
demands, i.e.:
HX
i=1
ni;td

i;t = Dt (5.4)
where H is the number of di¤erent forecasting strategies, ni;t is the number of agents of
type i in period t andDt is total demand for the foreign asset. Market equilibrium implies
that market demand is equal to market supply Xt, which we assume to be exogenous.
Thus,
Xt = Dt (5.5)
where Xt is the exogenous supply of foreign assets. For simplicity we assume the supply
of foreign assets exogenous and constant; without loss of generality we can put Xt = 0.
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Substituting the optimal holdings into the market demand and then into the market
equilibrium equation and solving for the exchange rate st yields the market clearing
exchange rate:
st =

1 + r
1 + r
 HX
i=1
wi;tE
i
t(st+1) (5.6)
where wi;t =
ni;tP
i
ni;t
is the weight of agent of type i.
The next step in the analysis is to specify how agents evaluate the tness of the
strategy they are using. We assume that agents use one of three rules, evaluate their
cognitive dissonance, i.e. compare their (risk adjusted) protability ex-post, and then
decide whether to abide by the rule or switch to another one. Again, the concept is
based on the switching mechanism as proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997), based on
a multinomial logit setup. Such a mechanism consists of making the weights of the simple
rules a function of the relative protability of these rules, i.e.:
wi;t =
exp

(i;t 1   2t 1)

exp

(i;t 1   2t 1)

+
P
j 6=i exp

(j;t 1   2t 1)
 (5.7)
which yields, after rewriting
wi;t =
1
1 +
P
j 6=i exp [(j;t 1   i;t 1)]
(5.8)
where wi;t is the fraction of agents of type i in period t and i;t is the prot of strategy i.
Brock and Hommes (1997) dene protability to be the total earnings (prots) on the
optimal foreign asset holding. We dene the protability as the one-period excess return
from investing in the foreign asset, multiplied by the optimal demand for the foreign
asset. More formally,
i;t = (st(1 + r
)  st 1(1 + r))(1 + r
)Eit(st+1)  (1 + r)st
2t
(5.9)
The prot measure is somewhat di¤erent compared to the previous chapter; here we
take the magnitude of the expected change into account, while in the previous chapter
only the sign of the expectation was relevant.
We assume di¤erent types of agents, which we will call fundamentalists and chartists3.
Fundamentalists condition their expectation on a comparison between the market and
the fundamental rate. This chapter introduces two chartists (technical traders) groups,
one using an auto-regressive (AR) and the other a moving average (MA) rule. The fun-
damentalists condition their expectation on the di¤erence between the market exchange
rate and the central parity. Thus, the forecasting rule for the fundamentalists is
3Note that the chartists do not take into account information concerning the fundamental exchange
rate. For evidence that chartism is used widely to make forecasts see Cheung and Chinn (2001), and
Taylor and Allen (1992). Neely and Weller (1999) show that this is also the case for the EMS period.
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Eft (st+1) =
nX
k=1
 k(st k   st k) (5.10)
where st k is the fundamental exchange rate in period t k and  k the speed of adjustment
parameter4. This is a generalization of the fundamentalist rule proposed in De Grauwe
and Grimaldi (2005, 2006); they assume  k 2<  1; 0 > such that fundamentalists provide
a mean reverting dynamics. We do not assume this because it is unknown on forehand
what the e¤ect of fundamentalists will be in the market. Empirical evidence suggests
that exchange rates are mean reverting in the long run (see e.g. Mark, 1995). Therefore,
agents have the opportunity to condition expectations on a high(er) number of lags.
The second group of agents in the model is technical analyst or chartist, using the
serial correlation in the returns. Their forecasting rule is specied as
EARt (st+1) =
nX
k=1
k(st k) (5.11)
where the chartistsexpectation depends on the value of the parameter . With  1 <
k < 0 chartist expectations are stabilizing because agents expect a (partial) reversion
of previous periods return. If k > 0 on the other hand, chartists have bandwagon
expectations pushing the exchange rate constantly in a certain direction.
The rst two groups are similar to those dened in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005,
2006) and the previous chapter; this is standard in the literature. We introduce a third
group in order to generalize the model. The third group also uses a chartist strategy,
based on the di¤erence between the short term and long term moving average. Brock et
al. (1992) introduces this strategy and demonstrate its relevance in nancial markets; see
also Chiarella et al. (2006) for the deterministic behavior of this rule in a heterogeneous
agents setting. The forecasting rule is given by
EMAt =
nX
k=1
(1;kMAi;t 1   2;kMAj;t 1) (5.12)
whereMAi;t andMAj;t are the i and j months moving average of the level of the exchange
rate, i > j. The strategy works destabilizing if k > 0 as agents expect short run
deviations from the long-term trend to persist; if k < 0 the rule is stabilizing as agents
expect the exchange rate to return to its long run moving average.
5.3 Estimation of the Model
The heterogeneous agent model described above needs some adjustments before it can
be estimated empirically. Furthermore, the target-zone character of the data sample
4De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) introduce information costs in the expectation formation for
fundamentalists. However, because our fundamental, the parity, is freely visible for all agents, we
assume these costs to be zero.
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demands some further adjustments to the model. The fundamental exchange rate in a
simulation setup can be put equal to zero, such that it is possible to use the absolute
di¤erence between the exchange rate and the fundamental rate when simulating the
model. However, the fundamental rate is not equal to zero and increasing in our setup,
so we replace the misalignment (st s) by (st s)=s, representing the misalignment in
percentages. Because the exchange rate is non-stationary as a result of the realignments,
ordinary least square (OLS) estimates can be biased. For this reason, we replace the levels
of the exchange rate in Equation (5.6) with the percentage changes of the exchange rate,
which are stationary. Next to the issue of non-stationarity, we encounter an endogeneity
problem as the exchange rate return a¤ects the misalignment whereas the misalignment
a¤ects the exchange rate return5. In order to handle this issue, we use a two-stage least
square (2SLS) setup. We therefore instrument the misalignment by the foreign exchange
reserves of the home country, the realignments in the central parity and past values of
the misalignment. Test results indicate that the endogeneity problem is solved with the
instrumented variable.
For all three strategies, we assume that agents run a simple regression in order to
obtain the optimal lags, in the sense of forecasting ability, for the misalignment, auto
regressions, and moving averages6. Because we want to verify whether the strategy of
agents is conditional on the position of the exchange rate in the target zone, we add the
absolute misalignment times the decision variable to the expectation formation functions
in Equations (5.10) to (5.12). We can write the forecasting rule for the fundamentalists
as follows:
Eft (rt+1) =
X
k=s;l
 1;k
st k   st
st
+  2;k
st k   st
st
jst k   st j
(1 + bt k)st
(5.13)
with s and l the two optimal lags obtained from the exploratory regression by agents;
bt k the maximum bandwidth (in percentages) of the target zone in period t   k and
rt =
st st 1
st 1
. The second part of the second term on the right hand side thus represents the
current position of the exchange rate in the target zone vis-à-vis the maximum bandwidth
(in percentages). The rst coe¢ cient,  1;k, represents the direct e¤ect of the misalignment
on the expectation of fundamentalists, as in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006);  2;k
represents the e¤ect the position of the exchange rate in the band on the expectation. If
 1 <  1;k;  2;k < 0, fundamentalists are mean reverting, which becomes stronger as the
exchange rate moves towards the upper or lower band of the target zone. For both chartist
strategies we also add the interaction term; the AR-chartist forecasting rule becomes
EARt (rt+1) =
X
k=s;l
1;k(rt k) + 2;k(rt k)
jst k   st j
(1 + bt k)st
(5.14)
5The Haussman test indicates a highly signicant endogeneity problem and the correlation between
the misalignment and the residuals is signicant.
6Agents are assumed to use two di¤erent lags. See the appendix for the optimal lag structure used
by the agents.
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and the MA-chartist forecasting rule becomes
EMAt (rt+1) = (1;1MAi;t 1   1;2MAj;t 1) + (2;1MAi;t 1   2;2MAj;t 1)
jst k   st j
(1 + bt k)st
(5.15)
Equations (5.6), (5.8) and (5.9) together with the functional forms of the expectation
formation mechanisms described in Equations (5.13) to (5.15) can be combined to a single
equation-framework and be estimated by non-linear least squares7.
The database contains monthly bilateral exchange rates for currencies of countries
that became EMS member in March 1979: Belgium, Denmark, France, The Netherlands,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. For a number of years, prior to the formal adherence
to the EMS, the Spanish peseta was informally kept within a +/- 6 percent band with
respect to EMS currencies. The exchange rate data are obtained from Datastream. Even
though daily and weekly rates are available, we choose to employ monthly data in order to
avoid issues surrounding short-term noise such as the day-of-the-week e¤ect with regard
to exchange rate volatility (on which, see Hsieh, 1988). The interest rate series are call-
money rates, which are largely provided by Datastream and the International Statistical
Yearbook 20018. The sample includes 238 monthly observations, ranging fromMarch 1979
through December 1998, marking the introduction of the Euro9. The conditional variance
of the exchange rate returns, obtained from aGARCH(1; 1) estimation procedure, is used
for the variance of the exchange rate .
5.4 Empirical results
The rst step consists of estimating the model without switching mechanism, so with
constant fractions, such that the model becomes linear in the expectation formation
functions of the three groups. The model simplies to Equation (5.6), with wi;t = 1=3,
and the expectation formation functions in Equations (5.13), (5.14) and (5.15). The
reason is that we rst want to verify whether there is indeed signicant evidence of
heterogeneity on the foreign exchange market, before determining whether agents are
switching between expectation formation techniques as well. Heterogeneity is dened
as the contemporaneous presence of di¤erent expectation formation techniques in the
market, i.e. one or more signicant coe¢ cients for more than one of the expectation
formation Equations (5.13), (5.14) and (5.15). For the fundamentalists and AR-chartists
we apply two lags; for the MA-chartists one. This setup removes all autocorrelation in
the level and second moment of the residuals. The results of the estimation of this linear
setup of the model are presented in Table 5.1.
7For an application of the estimation procedure see Boswijk et al. (2007).
8Experiments with long-term government bond yields did not a¤ect the empirical results.
9Spain and Portugal entered the EMS 1990 and 1993 respectively; they were included in the analysis
as of the date of adherence to the EMS. Italy left the system for four years in the sample; these years
are not included in the analyses.
94
5.4. Empirical results
Table 5.1: Estimation Results (no switching)
Be De Fr Nl It Ir Po Sp
Fundamentalists
 1;s 0.729*** 0.503 -1.049*** -0.371 -1.094*** -0.031 0.460* 1.390***
(0.280) (0.426) (0.336) (0.419) (0.234) (0.142) (0.251) (0.495)
 2;s -0.956*** -0.276 -0.064 -0.950 0.397 -0.379*** -1.661** -4.592***
(0.137) (0.192) (0.125) (0.807) (0.285) (0.086) (0.650) (1.012)
 1;l -1.321*** -0.569 0.672* 0.013 0.928*** -0.274 -1.661** 0.171
(0.287) (0.423) (0.333) (0.312) (0.194) (0.206) (0.650) (0.362)
 2;l 0.594*** -0.529** 0.080 0.531 -0.285** 0.072 1.753*** 0.659
(0.168) (0.214) (0.121) (0.524) (0.136) (0.075) (0.534) (0.553)
MA - chartists
1;1 -0.033 -0.402 -0.211 -0.123 0.003*** 1.799 0.045** -0.012
(0.046) (0.342) (0.514) (2.025) (0.001) (3.761) (0.020) (0.009)
1;2 -0.030 -0.399 -0.211 -0.123 0.003*** 1.863 0.050** -0.011
(0.046) (0.340) (0.514) (2.014) (0.001) (3.768) (0.019) (0.009)
2;1 -0.033 0.315 0.606 -14.732 -0.003*** -1.862 -0.598*** -0.050**
(0.084) (0.659) (0.419) (9.522) (0.001) (9.697) (0.090) (0.021)
2;1 -0.033 0.314 0.607 -14.731 -0.003*** -1.886 -0.598*** -0.049**
(0.084) (0.660) (0.420) (9.523) (0.001) (9.708) (0.090) (0.020)
AR - chartists
1;s -0.748*** 0.477* 0.333 -0.690** -0.686*** 0.431 -0.218 -0.684**
(0.259) (0.269) (0.325) (0.306) (0.258) (0.280) (0.714) (0.324)
2;s 0.426* -1.208*** -0.036 2.235*** 0.410** -0.711*** 17.227*** 1.483**
(0.236) (0.320) (0.164) (0.670) (0.198) (0.203) (2.508) (0.567)
1;l 0.308 -0.908* -0.293 -0.029 -0.155 -0.904*** 0.392 -0.452
(0.226) (0.467) (0.330) (0.295) (0.277) (0.319) (0.295) (0.350)
2;l 0.026 0.180 0.331** 0.132 -0.252** 0.214 -1.813 3.106***
(0.142) (0.359) (0.166) (0.676) (0.116) (0.162) (1.238) (0.668)
R2 0.477 0.320 0.335 0.273 0.282 0.314 0.824 0.535
Notes: Table presents the estimation results of the model formed
by Equations (5.6), (5.13), (5.14) and (5.15). Subscripts 1 and
2 indicate the direct and position dependent e¤ect, respectively;
s and l represent the optimal lags (see the Appendix). Standard
errors are given in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote rejection at
the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively.
Overall, Table 5.1 indicates that there is heterogeneity in the behavior of agents in
the foreign exchange market, given the contemporaneous signicant existence of funda-
mentalism and one or two forms of chartism. The exchange rate returns are therefore
a¤ected by di¤erent beliefs concerning the future. Given the number of signicant coef-
cients per group and the distribution over countries, the market seems to be dominated
by fundamentalists and AR-chartists; MA-chartism is signicant for only three countries
in this setup. Furthermore, the general tendency seems to be for agents to be stabilizing,
i.e. they expect either the exchange rate to return to the fundamental, the exchange rate
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to return to the long-run moving average, or past exchange rate returns to be reversed.
Agents active on the market therefore seem to have a large amount of trust in the regime
(the monetary authorities), as evidenced by the majority of negative coe¢ cients.
For Italy, Portugal, and Spain, we observe evidence of all three groups given the one or
more signicant coe¢ cients for all three expectation formation techniques; for Belgium,
Denmark, France and Ireland two groups (fundamentalism and AR-chartism) and for The
Netherlands one group (AR-chartism). Fundamentalists are in general condent in the
system in the short run given the negative  1;s and/or  2;s coe¢ cients. That is, either
they are directly stabilizing as  1;s < 0 and thus expect a misalignment to be partially
reversed in the next period, or they become mean-reverting as the exchange rate moves
towards the band of the target zone, so as  1;s > 0,  2;s < 0 and
 1;s <  2;s. In
other words, in the latter case agents expect the exchange rate to move away from the
fundamental as the exchange rate is relatively close to parity, but expect the monetary
authority to intervene as the exchange rate approaches the band of the target zone causing
the exchange rate to return towards the central parity. In the long run, on the other hand,
the signs of the fundamentalist coe¢ cients  1;l and  2;l are predominantly positive, and
are thus destabilizing. Agents expect the exchange rate to move away from the central
parity in the long run ( 1;l > 0) and do not expect the monetary authority to intervene,
but expect the movement away from the central parity to accelerate as the band of the
target zone approaches ( 2;l > 0).
The MA-chartist group is generally stabilizing given the negative estimates for . A
negative 1;i implies that agents expect a positive di¤erence between the short run moving
average and the long run moving average to decrease in the next period. A negative 2;i
implies that agents expect the di¤erence between short- and long-run moving averages
to decrease quicker as the exchange rate moves closer to the band of the target zone.
The 1;i and 2;i coe¢ cients are not signicantly di¤erent, implying that agents look at
the di¤erence between the moving averages; they do not look at the moving averages
individually.
Moreover, the results of the AR-chartists are somewhat mixed concerning the conclu-
sions about stabilizing/destabilizing expectations. This group is initially also stabilizing
given the negative 1;k coe¢ cients. A negative 1;k implies that an exchange rate shock
is (partially) reversed in the next period. The 2;k coe¢ cients on the other hand, show
a mixed image. A positive (negative) 2;k implies that agents expect the extrapolation
(reversion) of shocks to be stronger as the exchange rate moves towards the band of the
target zone. The total e¤ect, so 1;k +2;k, is positive for four countries and negative for
four countries in both the short and the long run.
Boswijk et al. (2007) nd signicant evidence of two groups in the S&P500 returns;
fundamentalists, who expect mean reversion to the fundamental rate, and trend followers,
who expect the deviation of the market price from the fundamental price to increase10.
10Boswijk et al. (2007) rewrite the model in terms of the current Price/Earnings (P/E) ratio in
deviation from the fundamental P/E ratio. It is assumed that both groups base their expectation on this
deviation, while in my model expectations are based on di¤erent sources of information (i.e., deviation
from the fundamental, AR-terms and MA-terms).
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The fact that we do not nd trend-following behavior can be explained by the target-
zone character of the sample; mean reversion in the EMS exchange rate is also found
by Ball and Roma (1993), who estimate a jump-di¤usion model, and by Anthony and
MacDonald (1999), who use cointegration techniques. The model t in terms of adjusted
R2 is somewhat lower in the case compared to Boswijk et al. (2007); 0.273 to 0.824
versus 0.77 to 0.82. This can be explained by the fact that Boswijk et al. (2007) use
yearly stock-market data compared to the monthly exchange rate data; both the lower
frequency data and the other market usually yield a better t.
In the next step of the analysis, we estimate the model including the switching mech-
anism dened by Equations (5.8) and (5.9). Table 5.2 gives the estimation results for the
setup of the model with switching mechanism for the eight EMS countries11.
Overall, the intensity of choice parameter  is not signicantly di¤erent from zero,
which would imply that agents do not change their expectation formation strategy through
time, irrespective of its forecasting performance relative to alternative strategies. There
are, however, three issues that potentially a¤ect this result. First, the switching parame-
ter  itself is not identied in the estimation procedure12; what is estimated, is  = =.
The estimated intensity of choice is biased downwards if agents are risk-averse ( > 0);
also, given that two coe¢ cients are estimated, the variance of the estimate of  is biased
upwards. Both these e¤ects might contribute to the fact that  is not found to be signif-
icantly di¤erent from zero. Second, large changes in  do not have a large e¤ect on the
weights wi;t because of the setup of the switching mechanism (Equation 5.8). Teräsvirta
(1994), however, suggests that this e¤ect is not relevant; signicant heterogeneity in the
regimes is a su¢ cient condition. The third explanation could be the fact that all types
of agents use the realized exchange rate returns to optimize the lag structure of their
forecasting function. As a result, the prot di¤erences might be relatively small, causing
a low number of switches between strategies. The results are directly comparable to the
results of Boswijk et al. (2007), who also report insignicant estimates for the switching
parameter.
For two countries, The Netherlands and Italy, we do nd signicant estimates for .
Both coe¢ cients are positive, which means that agents move away from strategies that
are relatively protable in period t13 because they have learned that a certain strategy will
not be protable in consecutive periods. The size of the switching parameters is relatively
small , implying that agents only switch between strategies if the prot di¤erence is large.
Generally, the signs and magnitudes of the  ,  and  coe¢ cients in Table 5.2 are
comparable to the no-switching case in Table 5.1. Large, but not signicant, changes only
occur in cases in which the estimates are non-signicant. In total, ten more coe¢ cients are
signicant in the switching case compared to the non-switching setup. The expectation
11Experiments with di¤erent forecasting rules for both the fundamentalists and chartists (adaptive
and static expectations) and di¤erent prot-functions (mean square error, lagged prots) do not alter
the results signicantly.
12Note that  is not identied in the estimation. Focusing on the denominator of Equation (5.8),
(i;t 1   j;t 1) =  (1+r
)
2t
(st 1(1 + r)  st 2(1 + r))

Eit 2(st 1)  Ejt 2(st 1)

13Or that  and  are both negative. However, a negative risk aversion is highly unlikely.
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Table 5.2: Estimation Results (with switching)
Be De Fr Nl It Ir Po Sp
Fundamentalists
 1;s 0.715** 0.346 -0.372** -0.415 -1.002*** -0.062 0.441*** 0.561***
(0.282) (0.413) (0.173) (0.339) (0.167) (0.132) (0.096) (0.203)
 2;s -0.952*** -0.446*** -0.201*** -0.498 0.592*** -0.288*** -2.667*** -1.551***
(0.138) (0.160) (0.061) (0.832) (0.111) (0.081) (0.234) (0.261)
 1;l -1.302*** -0.608 0.341** -0.211 0.862*** -0.241 -0.120 0.103
(0.290) (0.418) (0.160) (0.289) (0.155) (0.193) (0.102) (0.261)
 2;l 0.591*** -0.011 0.162*** 1.414** -0.227* 0.060 -1.030*** 0.519
(0.169) (0.220) (0.058) (0.567) (0.118) (0.071) (0.313) (0.549)
MA - chartists
1;1 -0.034 -0.254 0.009 -0.621 0.003*** 4.415 0.026*** -0.024***
(0.046) (0.349) (0.122) (1.921) (0.001) (3.797) (0.007) (0.006)
1;2 -0.031 -0.254 0.009 -0.620 0.003*** 4.468 0.026*** -0.023***
(0.046) (0.348) (0.123) (1.921) (0.001) (3.803) (0.007) (0.006)
2;1 -0.028 0.052 -0.044 -5.105 -0.003*** -8.413 -0.256*** 0.028**
(0.085) (0.793) (0.427) (8.919) (0.001) (9.687) (0.051) (0.012)
2;1 -0.028 0.054 -0.045 -5.113 -0.004*** -8.447 -0.256*** 0.028**
(0.085) (0.794) (0.428) (8.919) (0.001) (9.698) (0.051) (0.012)
AR - chartists
1;s -0.734*** 0.444* -0.253*** -0.604*** -0.478** 0.271 0.710*** -0.606**
(0.265) (0.265) (0.075) (0.216) (0.223) (0.267) (0.118) (0.233)
2;s 0.432* -1.481*** 0.096** 1.905*** 0.508*** -0.275* -1.579*** 1.520***
(0.236) (0.429) (0.038) (0.483) (0.115) (0.169) (0.479) (0.355)
1;l 0.308 -0.278 -0.403*** -0.363** -0.003 -0.877*** 0.246 -0.140
(0.226) (0.414) (0.118) (0.183) (0.230) (0.306) (0.193) (0.194)
2;l 0.029 -0.259 0.410*** 0.358 -0.299*** 0.205 3.785*** 1.648***
(0.142) (0.416) (0.059) (0.483) (0.101) (0.158) (1.168) (0.471)
Switching
 2.9E-5 0.009 -3.776 0.344** 7.8E-5*** 0.027 0.147 0.004
(4.3E-5) (0.006) (4.011) (0.157) (2.9E-5) (0.019) (0.237) (0.002)
R2 0.446 0.344 0.483 0.295 0.428 0.344 0.853 0.636
Notes: Table presents the estimation results of the model.
Gamma represents the switching parameter. Subscripts 1 and
2 indicate the direct and position dependent e¤ect, respectively;
s and l represent the optimal lags (see the Appendix). Standard
errors are given in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote rejection at
the 10, 5 and 1 % level, respectively.
formation rules therefore t the data better when the weight put on these rules is not
constant through time.
We observe that the R2s are higher in seven cases; likelihood ratio tests indicate that
these di¤erences are signicant. The results indicate that the linearity assumption, i.e.
constant fractions, is too rigid and that the switching mechanism is indeed benecial
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in explaining movements in the returns. The switching of agents between strategies is
therefore present in the data. This shows not only from the higher R2, but also from
the higher number of signicant coe¢ cients. In other words, although we do not nd
signicant estimates for , including the switching mechanism does signicantly improve
the t of the model. The issues noted above concerning the insignicance of the switching
parameters therefore seem to have a signicant e¤ect on the results.
Figure 5.1 plots the evolution of weights of the strategies over time. Weights are
stacked, such that they add up to unity. The gures clearly illustrate that the switching
parameters are relatively small in general; weights hover roughly around one third and
two thirds14. There are no large changes in the distribution of population beliefs. Fur-
thermore, none of the strategies is dominant for long periods on end. We do observe,
however, persistence in the distribution of weights; beliefs do not bounce up and down
per month, but change gradually. This is also the result of the relatively high status quo
bias.
The weights in the price setting equation are relatively volatile for France and Portu-
gal. For France this is the result of a relatively high , which makes agents sensitive to
di¤erences in forecasting ability. The high volatility for Portugal is mainly the result of
the volatile exchange rate itself, which causes large potential di¤erences in prots between
the strategies. Therefore, although traders are not particularly sensitive to di¤erences in
prot, large deviations in performance trigger shifts in beliefs. Weights for Belgium and
Ireland are relatively constant; for Belgium this is due to a relatively small . Ireland
shows increased volatility in the weights around the 1993 crisis. The other countries are
intermediate cases.
The volatility in weights of the two groups in Boswijk et al. (2007) is higher compared
to what we nd; weights range from zero to one and change more rapidly. This is a
direct result of the much higher estimates for the switching parameter (-7.54 to -10.29).
Furthermore, weights tend to be less extreme in our case because we have three groups;
this decreases the probability of one group being dominant. De Grauwe and Grimaldi
(2005, 2006) report that chartists are dominant (i.e. have a market share that exceeds
50%) in a simulation analysis of the model. The results indicate that AR-chartists have
the highest average weight, but this does not exceed 50%. MA-chartists have the lowest
average weight in general. Combined, however, chartists (so MA + AR) have a larger
than 50% market share. The simulation results of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006)
are therefore partly corroborated. Allen and Taylor (1990) report that over 90% of foreign
exchange market traders use some form of technical analysis. We do not nd such strong
chartist dominance.
The e¤ect of the intensity of choice parameter  is again clearly illustrated in Figure
5.2, where we present scatter plots of prot di¤erence versus weight di¤erence. In all
scatters we observe that the higher the estimated , the stronger is the S-shape. A
strong S-shape implies that the distribution of beliefs (Y-axis) changes rapidly as the
prot di¤erence diverges from zero (X-axis); traders are thus more sensitive to prot
di¤erences. As  approaches zero, the scatter rst becomes a straight sloping line, then
14Recall that weights are constant and equal to 1=3 with  = 0.
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Figure 5.1: Weights
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Notes: Figure depicts the fundamentalist, MA-chartist, and AR-
chartist weights through time, as estimated by the model. The
weights of the groups are stacked, such that the upper line is equal
to one and distances between the lines represent weights. Note
that the weights in the gure are the 12-month moving averages
of monthly weights.
a straight at line; agents respond sluggish to a di¤erence in performance. The scatters
are in general downward sloping, indicating that a positive di¤erence in prots between
strategies results in a negative di¤erence in weights. In other words, agents move away
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Figure 5.2: Prot Di¤erence versus Weights Di¤erence
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from a strategy that is protable in period t because it is apparently less protable in
period t+ 1; this results from the positive estimate of .
5.5 Forecasting power
Next to the in-sample performance of a model, the ability of a model to forecast exchange
rates out-of-sample is considered an important criterion of its quality. The most famous
example is of course Meese and Rogo¤ (1983), who showed that the news models from
the 1970s performed worse than a simple random walk in terms of root-mean-squared
forecasting error. To our best knowledge, only a handful of papers have come up with
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a model that is able to outperform the random walk in out-of-sample forecasting during
a oating rate regime, see for example, Mark (1995), Clarida and Taylor (1997) and
Gandolfo et al. (1990).
Results are somewhat more promising for the EMS period because there might be more
forecastability in a target-zone than a oating rate system since market expectations are
bounded by the upper and lower bands (given that the regime is credible). Aroskar et al.
(2004) outperform the random walk model with an error correction model for all cases in
the pre- and post-crisis period and for half of the cases in the crisis period. Mizrach (1992)
presents better forecasting results with a multivariate nearest-neighbor than the random
walk for the Italian Lira; Fernandez-Rodriguez et al. (1999) present better root-mean-
squared-error performance for their simultaneous nearest-neighbor predictor compared to
the random walk for six out of nine currencies.
In order to verify the forecasting power of the model, we employ an alternative method
compared to the papers stated above. Common practice is to apply a rolling regression
technique, so to rst estimate the model for a sub-sample, second create forecasts, third re-
estimate the model with one extra observation, etc. We do not apply a rolling regression
technique, but use the set of coe¢ cients estimated over the total sample for all forecasts,
with which dynamic forecasts are made by iterating the model forward for the appropriate
number of periods. The reason is twofold; rst, given the non-linear nature, the behavior
of the model, and thereby the forecasts, is highly dependent on the magnitude of the
coe¢ cients (see Chiarella et al., 2002). Therefore, if we are interested in explaining
movements in the market, it is essential to incorporate the coe¢ cients representative for
the market at hand. This is especially the case for the EMS because of the changing
nature of the regime itself (realignments in the beginning years, stable middle period,
and the crisis in the nal years). Second, the model uses a relatively high number of
coe¢ cients, thus needs a relatively long sample period to be estimated properly.
The method of forecasting demands more information concerning the coe¢ cients, but
uses less information regarding the exogenous variables compared to e.g. Meese and Ro-
go¤ (1983) and Mark (1995). In forecasting, we assume that the level of the fundamental
(central parity), the bandwidth of the target zone, the interest rates, and the volatility
remain constant, while Meese and Rogo¤ (1983) and Mark (1995) use future fundamental
variables to generate forecasts. The model thus does not use more information than the
random walk model in this respect. Another advantage of the method is that forecasts
can be formed over the complete sample, including the volatile beginning years of the
EMS. This is not possible when applying the rolling regression technique because it needs
a su¢ ciently large sub-sample in order to estimate the rst set of coe¢ cients. The com-
parison of forecasting ability between the random walk and heterogeneous agents model
is therefore based on a larger number of observations when using the method, and can
therefore be tested more rigorously.
The forecasting ability of the model is judged by comparing the mean absolute error
(MAE) and mean squared error (MSE) of the forecasts formed by the heterogeneous
agents model to those of the random walk model (i.e., no change). The signicance
of the di¤erence in forecasting ability is tested by the Dybold and Mariano (1994) test
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statistic. The rectangular lag window is applied; with k   1 sample autocovariances for
the k step ahead forecast error. We focus on the 1, 3, 6, and 12-month forecast horizon
for the eight countries. Table 5.3 presents the forecast errors made by the model divided
by the forecast errors made by the random walk for the four forecast horizons and eight
countries.
Table 5.3: Forecasting Results
1 Month 3 Months 6 Months 12 Months
Be MAE 0.976 0.830** 0.777*** 0.799***
MSE 0.565*** 0.419*** 0.409*** 0.596***
Dk MAE 0.917*** 0.856*** 0.275*** 0.718***
MSE 0.675*** 0.591*** 0.544*** 0.553***
Fr MAE 0.906 0.777*** 0.747*** 0.787***
MSE 0.557*** 0.464*** 0.516*** 0.617***
Nl MAE 0.956*** 0.859*** 0.810*** 0.868***
MSE 0.703*** 0.477*** 0.475*** 0.663***
Ir MAE 0.939 0.850*** 0.764*** 0.756***
MSE 0.639*** 0.581*** 0.582*** 0.586***
It MAE 0.994 0.897* 0.932 0.923
MSE 0.731** 0.587** 0.832 1.580**
Po MAE 1.668*** 1.652*** 1.777*** 1.022
MSE 4.375*** 4.631*** 5.131*** 1.617***
Sp MAE 0.668*** 0.832*** 0.975 1.043
MSE 0.338*** 0.575*** 0.821** 0.885
Notes: Table presents the ratios between the forecast errors made
by the model versus the random walk, i.e. a value larger (smaller)
than one indicates a better forecasting performance for the ran-
dom walk (model). *, **, *** denotes rejection of the null hy-
pothesis of no di¤erence in forecasting performance at the 10, 5,
and 1 percent level, respectively.
Overall, the results suggest that the heterogeneous agents model outperforms the
random walk model in forecasting for all horizons; for the majority of countries both
the MAE and MSE are smaller for the model than the random walk given the fact that
the ratios in Table 5.3 are smaller than unity. Furthermore, the di¤erence in forecasting
ability is generally highly signicant; only for Italy and the longer horizons of Spain is
the signicance somewhat less. Exception clearly is Portugal, for which the model highly
underperforms vis-à-vis the random walk. This might be due to the shorter sample
resulting in less accurate estimates.
For both the MAE and MSE we observe that the forecasting power of the model
vis-à-vis the random walk generally improves as the forecasting horizon increases up to
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six months, while it decreases again for the twelve months horizon; the ratios for the
three (six) months horizon are smaller than the one (three) months horizon, and larger
for the twelve months horizon than the six months horizon. This can be explained by
the fact that the mean reversion of the exchange rate to the central parity creates a
growing forecast error for the random walk as the forecast horizon increases, while it is
incorporated in the heterogeneous agents model by the stabilizing expectations of the
three groups. The change in this trend for the twelve months horizon could be due to the
fact that realignments in the central parity are not incorporated in the forecasts made by
the model15. For Italy and Portugal there does not seem to be a clear tendency over the
forecast horizons, while the results for Spain indicate that the shorter the horizon, the
better the forecasting performance. This can be explained by the relatively high number
of realignments for the southern-European countries.
Compared to the results of Mizrach (1992), who outperforms the random walk for
the Italian Lira, we nd forecastability for a broader set of countries participating in
the EMS; we nd relatively weak results for the Italian Lira. The results are directly
in line with those of Fernandez-Rodriguez et al. (1999): signicant outperformance of
the random walk for the Belgian Franc, Danish Kroner, French Franc, Dutch Guilder,
Irish Punt and Italian Lira, underperformance versus the random walk for the Portuguese
Escudo and no signicant results for the Spanish Peseta16. Aroskar et al. (2004) split
their sample in a pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis sample, while we only consider the total
sample. However, we do corroborate their results for the pre- and post-crisis periods and
show better results than the crisis period (which is also incorporated in the sample).
5.6 Stability
The literature on heterogeneous agents models has been concerned with two main objec-
tives. First, to try to replicate the stylized facts of nancial markets such as heavy tails,
volatility clustering, excess kurtosis by simulation techniques, see e.g. De Grauwe and
Grimaldi (2005, 2006), Lux (1998), Lux and Marchesi (2000). The second objective is to
derive analytically the deterministic behavior in terms of local stability or instability of
the nonlinear dynamic models involved, see De Grauwe et al. (2004), Chiarella and He
(2002), and Chiarella et al. (2002).
In this section, we study the deterministic behavior of the model. More specically,
we investigate the stability and type of limit behavior of the model if we iterate the model
forward, using the estimated set of coe¢ cients. Figure 5.3 displays the limit behavior
of the model for seven countries (Spain explodes after two iterations), after iterating the
model forward until convergence using the estimated coe¢ cients for the total sample
period.
The majority of countries converges to either a stable point or a stable limit cycle.
15In forecasting period t+ k, the model uses the parity in period t.
16Fernandez-Rodriguez et al. (1999) also include the British Pound in their analysis and nd under-
performance of the model versus the random walk.
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Economically this implies that the target zone does not collapse, even without active
central bank policy as the inuence of the monetary authority is zero in the simulation;
exchange rates do not diverge from the parity rate. The mean-reverting e¤ect of the
expectation formation strategies keeps the exchange rate within bands. The monetary
authorities have shaped expectations in such a way in the 1974-1998 period that the
Figure 5.3: Model Stability
Belgium Denmark France
Netherlands (1) Netherlands (2) Italy  (1)
Italy  (2) Ireland (1) Ireland (2)
Portugal
Notes: Figure depicts simulations of the model for seven coun-
tries (Spain explodes within two periods), using the coe¢ cients
as they are estimated for the total sample. The second plots for
Netherlands, Italy, and Ireland are close-ups of the limit behavior.
105
Chapter 5. Heterogeneity of Agents and FOREX Dynamics: EMS
market controls itself afterwards.
The model converges to a stable equilibrium for France, given that the model con-
verges to a xed point. The exchange rate returns for Denmark, Portugal, and Spain are
not on a sustainable path, the returns explode after forward iteration. Spain explodes
within a small number of periods, but for Portugal and Denmark we observe a relatively
calm beginning, followed by one extreme negative for Portugal and followed by an explo-
sive oscillative pattern for Denmark. For Spain and Portugal, this can be explained by
the relative short in-sample period and the volatile exchange rate. For Denmark, how-
ever, with a stable exchange rate, the explosive behavior is completely the result of the
nonlinear nature of the model; the explosive oscillations can occur as AR-chartists be-
come dominant. The Belgian exchange rate becomes a two-period limit cycle; the Dutch
exchange rate becomes a 19-period limit cycle; the Italian a 21-period cycle, and Ireland
a 89 months cycle.
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) present the sensitivity of the model to di¤erent
coe¢ cients. Especially the intensity of choice  and the extrapolation parameter of
AR-chartists appear to be of great importance for the limit behavior of their model. We
corroborate their ndings given the fact that the countries that exhibit explosive behavior
all have relatively high (absolute) estimates for the AR-chartist extrapolation parameters
; a value of jj > 1 is explosive by denition.
Given that the exchange rates in the EMS show di¤erent periods, like the turbulent
beginning years characterized by a high number of realignments; the stable middle part,
and the turmoil in 1992 and 1993, it is interesting to look at the limit behavior of the
model in sub samples, so using sets of coe¢ cients estimated from sub samples. For this
purpose, we estimate the model for a rolling window of 100 observations17, and check
whether the limit behavior of the model for a certain country changes over time.
The characterizations of the limit cycles of the sub samples are presented in the
Appendix. The stability of the deterministic system follows more or less the stability of
the EMS itself. In the beginning years, we nd a relatively high number of non-stable
limits, so either explosive limits or highly complex cycles. The middle years of the EMS
give a relatively high number of stable limit cycles and xed points attractors. Around the
1992/1993 crisis, the number of unstable and explosive limits rises again. The changing
limit behavior is an indication that expectation formation and investor behavior is not
constant through time.
Figure 5.4 depicts some examples of the (complex) limit cycles we found. It is an
illustration of the complex behavior that the simple model is capable of producing. In
addition, it illustrates how the behavior of one single model can change dramatically when
the coe¢ cients change; di¤erent starting values or coe¢ cient values have a much larger
impact on this non-linear dynamic model than a standard e.g. monetary model18. It is a
real-life example of the sensitivity analyses with respect to the coe¢ cients as is done in
De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006). Outcomes of the model can di¤er signicantly in
17The rst sub sample is thus 1979M03 1987M12, the second 1979M04 1988M01 etc. Spain and
Portugal are omitted because of lack of observations.
18Starting values are no issue in linear models since parameter estimates are usually found analytically.
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reaction to a similar exogenous shock when coe¢ cients are marginally di¤erent. Further-
more, even though the model produces a stable limit in most cases, this does not mean
that this limit is reached in the same number of periods. As also comes clear from Figure
5.4, stability can be reached after a positive or negative swing, or stabilizing oscillations;
in some occasions, it took the model more than ten thousands periods to converge to a
stable equilibrium. Therefore, even if a number of sets of coe¢ cients yield similar limit
properties, short term dynamics can di¤er dramatically.
5.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we explored the empirical relevance of the heterogeneity of agentsexpec-
tations, who use incomplete information and who have di¤erent beliefs about the future
exchange rate. In particular, we extend the analyses of Boswijk et al. (2007) by esti-
mating the heterogeneous agent model of De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) for the
European Monetary System (EMS) exchange rates. By using the central parityrate as
the fundamental rate, we estimate the model for the EMS-period, from March 1979 until
December 1998.
The empirical results suggest that there is heterogeneity in the behavior of agents
in the EMS exchange rate market, given the contemporaneous signicant existence of
fundamentalism and one or two forms of chartism. Exchange rate returns are therefore
a¤ected by di¤erent beliefs concerning the future. One type of agents conditions its
decisions on the distance to the central parity and two other types of agents condition
their decision on past returns (based on auto regression and moving average). All groups
have mean-reverting beliefs, so the fundamentalists expect the misalignment to decrease
in the next period, AR-chartists expect a given periods return to be partially reversed
the next period, and MA-chartists expect the exchange rate to return to its long run
moving average. The coe¢ cient governing the switching of believes is signicant in two
out of eight cases, but the model with switching mechanism does perform signicantly
better than the model without switching mechanism. Therefore, although the intensity
of choice is not signicantly di¤erent from zero in estimation, there are clues that agents
switch between forecasting strategies. Moreover, all results are robust to the country and
the functional forms of the expectation formation rules and the prot function.
The empirical relevance of the model is further demonstrated by its forecasting abil-
ity. The estimation results show that the heterogeneous agents model outperforms the
random walk model in forecasting future exchange rate returns in practically all the coun-
try/horizon combinations. Finally, we nd that the limit behavior of the model for the
total sample is generally stable, while it di¤ers considerably per country and period for
sub samples.
Next to the promising simulation results in Chapter 4, the current chapter shows
that heterogeneous agents models also yield positive results in a pure empirical setup.
Obviously, this is only an individual case and the combination of the central parity as
fundamental rate and the bands of the target zone a¤ect the generalizability of the results.
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Therefore, we extend the empirical analysis of heterogeneous agents models in the next
chapter by looking at equity markets in a multi-market model.
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5.A Appendix to Chapter 5
Fundamentalist AR chartist MA chartists
k l k l i j
Belgium 2 3 1 12 4 5
Denmark 1 2 1 2 7 8
France 3 4 8 9 9 10
Netherlands 1 20 13 16 9 10
Ireland 2 19 1 20 8 9
Italy 2 4 2 7 8 10
Portugal 3 9 2 16 2 3
Spain 1 10 8 10 1 2
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CHAPTER 6
Behavioral Heterogeneity and Shift-Contagion: Evidence from the
Asian Crisis
6.1 Introduction
The observation that an extreme nancial event in a certain country can cause a chain
of events in other, not only closely related, countries has triggered a vast line of research
starting in the end of the 1990s, see Claessens and Forbes (2001) and Kaminsky et al.
(2003) for a review. Although the literature is diverse concerning the exact denition,
the term used to describe this observation is contagion. The commonly used denitions
for contagion can be split in two broad groups. The rst group considers the spread
of crises across countries a result of the linkages that exist between countries, such as
trade linkages, nancial linkages, and common shocks. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) label
this interdependence; the underlying assumption is that there are no structural changes
during extreme events. The second type of denition is narrower in the sense that it
states that the spread of shocks is not only the result of the every day linkages, but that
crisis-contingent mechanisms come into play. That is, linkages between assets change
during crisis periods. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) refer to this type of contagion as shift-
contagion. Crisis-contingent mechanisms can be based on multiple equilibria, endogenous
liquidity shocks, and political transmission mechanisms. The underlying assumption is
that the typical conduct of markets changes. The price of assets is, in the end, determined
by agents trading in a nancial market. The behavior of agents forming the market thus
changes during crises given that the degree of co-movement between assets changes during
crisis periods.
As seen in the previous chapters, agents condition their behavior on the state of the
0This chapter is based on De Jong, E., W.F.C. Verschoor, and R.C.J. Zwinkels (2007), Behavioural
Heterogeneity and Shift-Contagion: Evidence from the Asian Crisis, NiCE Workingpaper.
113
Chapter 6. Behavioral Heterogeneity and Shift-Contagion: Asia
market in the heterogeneous expectations literature as well, comparable to the crisis-
contingent theories. Behavior is state dependent as agents can change their strategy as
how to form their expectations conditional on the past performance of that strategy.
Consequently, the distribution of agents over the groups, thus the weights given to the
various strategies in determining the market price, varies through time conditional on the
goodness of t of the di¤erent strategies.
The combination of shift-contagion and heterogeneous agents has, to our best knowl-
edge, never been explored. Therefore, in this chapter we develop a model inspired by
the heterogeneous agents literature in order to give an explanation for the notion of
shift contagion. Instead of introducing heterogeneous agents, we propose a model with
a boundedly rational representative agent who updates the weights she or he gives to
di¤erent information sources each period. Also, instead of focusing on a single asset mar-
ket, we introduce a system spanning multiple asset markets with explicit time varying
linkages between the markets induced by investor behavior.
Studies by Allen and Taylor (1990), Taylor and Allen (1992), Menkho¤ (1997), and
Cheung and Chinn (2001) indicate that fund managers at large nancial institutions base
their expectations and subsequent trading behavior on both economic fundamental and
technical analyses. Since capital markets are dominated by large, often institutional,
investors, it is safe to assume that all have equal access to information. Also, from Beine
et al. (2003) it is known that market participants have a tendency to imitate each other.
Based on these insights, in this chapter we model the market as being dominated by a
boundedly rational but representative fund manager. The expectation and behavior of
the fund manager is not only based on fundamental and technical analysis, as in the het-
erogeneous agents literature, but also on foreign developments. Based on the existence of
real and nancial linkages between di¤erent markets, the fund manager also incorporates
information from foreign markets. The source of observed price changes is evaluated each
period, and the relative weights on the three di¤erent sources of information for form-
ing next periods expectation are adapted accordingly. Therefore, the fund manager is
sensitive to behavioral biases as well.
The relation between the di¤erent asset markets in the model is established by in-
troducing a third source of information for the fund manager, next to fundamental and
technical, which is conditional on past returns in the foreign market. By doing so, we
incorporate the existence of linkages between the markets, while staying in the line of
reasoning of the model that the market price is determined by a boundedly rational fund
manager. Like the other sources, the relative weight on the international information
in determining the market price changes through time. As the fund manager focuses
more on foreign markets in forming expectations, the co-movement between the markets
increases. The model therefore combines the two denitions of contagion; there is inter-
dependence because of the ever existing fundamental relation between markets, and there
is shift-contagion because the importance attached to international information receives
the exibility to change over time.
By explicitly modelling the behavior of market participants, one can determine whether
the focus on the foreign market changes during crises, so whether shift-contagion is present
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or not. If it is observed that the behavior of market participants changes signicantly
during crises, i.e. if the weight on the foreign market becomes larger, it can be interpreted
as evidence of shift-contagion. In doing so, we develop a model that gives a behavioral
underpinning, on a micro-level, of the notion of contagion. Furthermore, the model is
shown to be vector auto regressive (VAR), with time-varying coe¢ cients. Contrary to
what is the case with a regular VAR, an economic model is underlying the empirical one,
thus providing an economic intuition. The time variation in the coe¢ cients is induced
by the changing weights.
Using the same type of methodology as in the previous chapter, the model is again
veried by empirical estimation; this time for two countries during the Asian crisis. By
doing so, we attempt to shed some light on the (changing) mutual dependence between
asset markets during crises. Within the literature of heterogeneous agents models, the
added value lies in the fact that we introduce a model with multiple asset markets and
a boundedly rational fund manager basing expectations on three sources of informa-
tion. Literature on heterogeneous agents models usually applies simulation techniques;
the scarce studies that do confront the models with actual data use a relatively low fre-
quency (monthly or lower); Chapter 5 also uses monthly data. In this chapter, the model
is empirically estimated using high frequency data (daily). The contagion literature is
enriched by the fact that we o¤er a totally di¤erent viewpoint on the notion of chang-
ing mutual dependence between markets. Also, a (micro) behavioral underpinning is
suggested.
In accordance with the results of Reitz and Westerho¤ (2003, 2005, 2006), Boswijk
et al. (2007), and the previous chapter, we nd evidence of the use of di¤erent infor-
mation sources and switching between them. All three sources are found to be used
simultaneously, and the relative weights put on the information sources are found to be
time-variant. Our results do not corroborate the most recent results concerning shift-
contagion of e.g. Forbes and Rigobon (2002) and Candelon et al. (2005). As the weight
on international information increases at the onset of the crisis, we nd evidence of shift-
contagion of the crisis in the Thai market to the Hong Kong market during the crisis
period.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 we develop
the model. Section 6.3 describes the empirical literature of both the contagion and
heterogeneous agents models, and the estimation and data issues involved in estimating
the model. In Section 6.4 we describe the estimation results and Section 6.5 focuses on
di¤erent issues of the crisis. Section 6.6 concludes.
6.2 The Model
In this section we describe the non-linear dynamic model with multiple asset markets,
which we will estimate for two equity indices during the Asian crisis. The model is again
related to the heterogeneous agents model from the previous two chapters. The model is
altered in two directions, though; rst, we introduce a boundedly rational representative
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agent with di¤erent information sources and, second, we allow the model to span multiple
asset markets.
The step from heterogeneous agents with a single source of information each to a
representative agent with multiple sources of agents is motivated by the fact that capital
markets are dominated by large, often institutional, investors. For example, the Bank of
International Settlement in their 2006 report states that two thirds of the trade, and thus
the price formation, in foreign exchange take place between large nancial institutions.
Because the institutions are large, it is safe to assume that they have equal aces to infor-
mation; information costs and the like do not play a signicant role. Allen and Taylor
(1990, 1992) indicate that these large institutions base behavior on a combination of fac-
tors, namely fundamental and technical analysis. Beine et al. (2003) state that nancial
institutions imitate each other based on reputation e¤ects and strategic considerations.
Therefore, the market is not modelled as being populated by heterogeneous individuals
with a single source of information, but by a boundedly rational, but representative agent
with multiple sources of information.
The basic heterogeneous expectations model described in Brock and Hommes (1997,
1998) assumes that agents can invest in a risk-free asset and one risky asset. Westerho¤
and Dieci (2006) and Chiarella et al. (2005) set up a model with interacting heterogeneous
agents, who are able to invest in a risk-free asset and two risky assets. Westerho¤ (2004)
assumes that only chartists can switch between markets based on an information-cost ar-
gument. Westerho¤ and Dieci (2006) show that the properties of two otherwise unrelated
markets with common traders are related; Westerho¤ (2004) and Chiarella et al. (2005)
show that the existence of common investors can cause co-movement in markets.
Contrary to the models with multiple asset markets of Westerho¤ and Dieci (2006),
Chiarella et al. (2005) and Westerho¤ (2004), we do not assume that individual agents
can invest in multiple markets, but we introduce a third source of information in local
markets, next to the technical and fundamental, labelled international, which conditions
expectations on (past) movements of foreign markets. In this way we incorporate the
existence of real and/or nancial linkages between asset markets, while remaining in the
logic of the model. This setup embeds all di¤erent forms of potential linkages, while the
aforementioned papers with multiple asset market solely rely on the existence of nancial
linkages due to internationally operating investors. The dynamics in the weights are left
to determine the actual co-movement between the asset markets, so the total e¤ect.
The reason for investors to focus on foreign markets can be based on di¤erent motives.
First of all, there can be real linkages (international trade, foreign direct investments)
between the respective countries. In the case with two proximate countries, (Thailand
and Hong Kong) this is clearly the case. Second, there can be nancial linkages between
countries causing the stock markets to be correlated. Westerho¤ and Dieci (2006) show
that internationally operating investors can cause correlations between markets based
in liquidity needs. Furthermore, cross-listings introduce correlations. As Hong Kong,
together with Singapore, is the nancial centre of south-east Asia, there are numerous
links to and fro the Hang Seng index. Finally, if both markets get hit by a common shock,
markets will be correlated. This is not unlikely with countries with such geographical,
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cultural, and economic proximity as the ones in the sample. Given that investors know of
these textbook linkages, it makes sense for them to take these into account when forming
expectations.
As mentioned above, we assume that the fund managers expectation is formed by
the weighted average expectation put forward by di¤erent information sources
Etrt+1 =
HX
h=1
wh;tEh;t(rt+1) (6.1)
in which rt+1 is the return in period t+1 dened as Pt+1+yt+1 Pt with Pt+1 the log real
price in period t+1 and yt+1 log real dividends in period t+1; wh;t is the relative magnitude
or weight of group h in period t with
PH
h=1wh;t = 18t and E is the expectation operator.
Furthermore, as proposed in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005), because the representative
fund manager makes up the representative majority of the market and acts directly in
accordance with its expectations, the realized return in period t + 1 equals the average
or market expectation plus a random shock
rt+1 = Etrt+1 + "t+1 =
HX
h=1
wh;tEh;t(rt+1) + "t+1 (6.2)
Dividends are assumed to follow a random walk with drift, i.e. Etyt+1 = dyt, with d
the drift equal to one plus the average growth rate of dividends. Equation (6.2) can then
be rewritten as
4Pt+1 =
HX
h=1
wh;tEh;t(4Pt+1)  (yt+1   dyt) + "t+1 (6.3)
Given that d is the average growth rate of dividends, the (yt+1   dyt) term is i.i.d.
since dividends are assumed to follow a random walk. Assuming that innovations to the
dividend process are independent from shocks to the price process as a whole, we end up
with
4Pt+1 =
HX
h=1
wh;tEh;t(4Pt+1) + t+1 (6.4)
with Et+1 = 0 and i.i.d. As indicated before, the weights wh;t are conditional on past
performance of the forecasting rules
wh;t =
exp [h;t 1]
HX
h=1
exp [h;t 1]
(6.5)
in which h;t 1 is the tness of strategy h in period t  1 and  is the by now well known
status quo bias, or intensity of choice.
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The tness of the strategies h;t 1 is modelled as Eh;t 2(4pt 1)4pt 1 , as inWesterho¤
and Dieci (2006)1. If both terms, i.e. the expected and the realized returns, have the same
sign, the tness measure is positive; opposite signs result in a negative prot. Therefore,
predicting the correct (wrong) direction of change of the price level results in a positive
(negative) tness value. Furthermore, the absolute magnitude of the expectation works
multiplicative. In other words, taking risks by having a large expectation in absolute
sense can return in a large prot if the realized return is of the proper sign, but also in a
large loss if the realized return is of the opposite sign.
The nal step is to dene the expectation formation rules based on the di¤erent
information sources. We assume that fund managers perceive that there are three di¤erent
sources of information relevant for the market. The rst source, fundamental information,
conditions expectations on the level of the market price compared to what is perceived
to be the level of the fundamental price (which is perfectly visible to, and the same for,
all agents in the market)
Ef;t 1(4Pt) = 1(Pt 1   P t 1)+ + 2(Pt 1   P t 1)  (6.6)
in which P t is the fundamental price in period t. In order to introduce more exibility,
we allow the rule to respond di¤erently to an overvaluation of the market vis-à-vis the
fundamental, (Pt 1   P t 1)+, compared to an under-valuation, (Pt 1   P t 1) . Kahne-
mann and Tversky (1979) show that an undervaluation will be corrected quicker than an
overvaluation.
The e¤ect of the fundamental information depends on the sign and magnitude of i.
If  1 < i < 0, fundamentalist expectations are mean-reverting and thus stabilizing;
however, as i > 0 they are destabilizing as they drive the price away from the funda-
mental price. A value of i <  1, nally, represents overshooting. The market price will
oscillate explosively around the fundamental price.
The second source, technical or chartist information, conditions expectations on past
price movements
Ec;t 14 Pt = 1 (4Pt 1)+ + 2 (4Pt 1)  (6.7)
Depending on the sign and magnitude of i chartist behavior is either stabilizing or
destabilizing. Values of  1 < i < 0 imply stabilizing behavior since previous periods
price movements are (partly) reversed. If i > 0, behavior is destabilizing since past
movements are (partly) extrapolated; jij > 1 always implies explosive expectations2.
Again, we introduce exibility by introducing an asymmetry between positive (4Pt 1)+
and negative (4Pt 1)  past returns.
The third and nal source of information is international and conditions the expecta-
tion on past returns in the foreign market.
1In fact, Westerho¤ and Dieci model the tness as Di;t(exp(Pt)  exp(Pt 1)) in which Di;t is demand
for the asset. However, their demand is modelled as our forecasting rules are modelled. Furthermore,
exp(Pt)  exp(Pt 1) is a variation to our log price di¤erence.
2Oscillative explosive for <  1and explosive for > 1
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Ei;t 14 Pt = 1
 4P t 1+ + 2  4P t 1  (6.8)
in which P t is the price in the foreign market. The correlation between the markets is
positive if one country benets from e.g. another countriesgrowth by increased exports
(i > 0). A negative correlation is also possible as two countries are e.g. competing on the
world market (i < 0). Similar reasoning can be thought of concerning nancial linkages.
For example, an international investor might pull funds out of country A because of
liquidity issues when stock prices in country B go down. This causes a positive correlation
between country A and B. Because of the di¤erent possible linkages that exist between
the markets, the reaction to positive and negative shocks is again asymmetric. The
fund manager thus incorporates the existence of other market participants, such that it
becomes a representative agent.
Equations (6.4) to (6.8) can be combined to form one equation representing the change
in the asset price as a function of lagged price changes, both domestic and foreign, and
fundamental prices. This model can be applied to each stock market, such that the
model can be used to describe multiple markets simultaneously, next to each other, with
explicit cross-linkages. As we focus on the interaction between two specic markets in
this chapter, we write the model as a system of two interacting equations, in which each
equation represents a local version of the model. Rewritten in matrices, this results in
 4Pt
4P t

=

wf;t
wf;t

1(Pt 1   P t )+ + 2(Pt 1   P t ) 
1(P t 1   P t )+ + 2(P t 1   P

t )
 

+ (6.9)

wc;t1 wc;t2 wi;t1 wi;t2
wi;t1 wi;t2 wc;t1 wc;t2
0BBB@
(4Pt 1)+
(4Pt 1)  4P t 1+ 4P t 1 
1CCCA
in which
wh;t =
exp [Eh;t 2(4pt 1)4 pt 1]X
h=f;c;i
exp [Eh;t 2(4pt 1)4 pt 1]
, wh;t =
exp

Eh;t 2(4pt 1)4 pt 1
X
h=f;c;i
exp

Eh;t 2(4pt 1)4 pt 1

Variables and coe¢ cients with an upper bar represent foreign equivalents of local
variables and coe¢ cients. Basically, the model formed by Equation (6.9) is vector auto
regressive (VAR) with time-varying coe¢ cients that are conditional on past price move-
ments, with 4Pt and 4P t as endogenous and (Pt 1 P t ) and (P t 1 P

t ) as exogenous
variables3. The time variation in the coe¢ cients is a function of the t of the three
di¤erent expectation formation rules. Contrary to a normal VAR, which is a method of
3To be more precise, the misalignment is not truly exogenous; the fundamental price is strictly
exogenous, but the lagged price is predetermined.
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determining the relation between variables without imposing an underlying (economic)
model, the VAR proposed here is formed by modelling micro-behaviour of individual
agents. Therefore, it provides an intuitive explanation for a normally (economic) theory-
lacking VAR. Time-variation in the coe¢ cients is often highly parameterized, by, for
example, a Markov chain. In our case, the time variation is relatively parsimonious, and
is based on an economic interpretation.
The time variation in the coe¢ cients is also the mechanism driving contagion in this
setup. The correlation between the markets is given by the importance attached to
international information, i.e. coe¢ cients i, times the weight wi;t (in both markets).
Without switching between information sources, the correlation is constant. However,
after introducing switching, the correlation between markets also becomes time varying.
With increasing variability in market A, the accuracy of expectations based on interna-
tional information in market B will go up because the returns of the two markets will
be more similar4. This is still interdependence, because weights do not change (yet);
the correlation does not change, but returns are more similar as a result of the increase
in variance (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002). As prots due to international informa-
tion increase, the fund manager will put more weight on the international information.
Increasing weight (with constant coe¢ cients) implies a higher correlation between the
markets; the product wi;ti increases. Therefore, an increase in volatility in one market
(for example caused by a crisis) in the heterogeneous agents setup causes contagion.
6.3 Empirical Considerations
After the theoretical background of the model in the previous section, we turn to the
empirical part in this section. We start of with a review of the existing empirical contagion
literature5. Second, this section handles the data and methodological issues concerned
with estimating the model described in Section 6.2.
6.3.1 Empirical Evidence on Contagion
As stated in the previous chapter, the empirical literature on heterogeneous agents mod-
els is limited. The studies that have been conducted, however, all indicate the existence
of heterogeneous beliefs, and switching between forecasting rules. For the contagion lit-
erature the situation is more or less opposite: there are many studies, without consensus.
The early empirical papers on contagion are unanimous in their conclusions concern-
ing the existence of contagion. Irrespective of the method and denition they employ,
contagion is found to be signicant. For instance, King and Wadhwani (1990) nd in-
creased cross-market correlations between the U.S., U.K., and Japan after the U.S. stock
market crash. Lee and Kim (1993) extend this analysis and nd similar results. Increased
4This is exactly why Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argue that one should take the increase in volatility
into account when examining changing correlation between markets during crises.
5A review of the empirical literature on heterogeneous agents models can be found in the previous
chapter.
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co-movement is also found after the 1994 Tequila crisis and 1997 Asian crisis by Calvo and
Reinhart (1996) and Baig and Goldfajn (1998). Using a limited dependent variable setup,
Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) nd increased probability
of a crisis after another country has been hit by a crisis.
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) however, nd evidence for interdependence, not shift-
contagion. That is, corrected for the increased volatility in asset returns during crises,
the correlation between markets did not increase during the Asian and Mexican crises
and the 1987 U.S. stock market crash. Using the same correction method as Forbes and
Rigobon (2002), Lomakin and Paiz (1999) conclude that most shocks are transmitted
through non-crisis-contingent channels. Likewise, Candelon et al. (2005) reject the null
hypothesis of shift-contagion after the 1994 Mexican Peso crisis and 1997 Asian crisis
after adjusting for heteroskedasticity; Rigobon (2003) and Gravelle et al. (2006) nd
little evidence for shift-contagion in Latin-American bond markets.
6.3.2 Data and Sample
We have chosen to focus on the Asian crisis for a number of reasons. First of all, especially
during crises, we expect the heterogeneous agents model to perform well, as there is clearly
a shift in sentiment during extreme events. Therefore, introducing di¤erent types of
investor behavior and exibility to switch between types should be benecial in explaining
the evolution and spread of crises. The Asian crisis is chosen as it is more widespread than
previous crises in the sense of both the geographical scope and the impact on the real side
of the economies involved. Given the central role of the fundamental price in the model,
the Asian crisis provides an appropriate case study. The Thai stock exchange, Bangkok
S.E.T., and the Hong Kong stock exchange, the Hang Seng, have been chosen because the
rst is the country in which Asian crisis o¢ ciallystarted with the attack on the Thai
Baht in July 1997. The latter is chosen as Hong Kong, together with Singapore, is the
nancial centre of the south-east Asian region, a leading stock exchange. Furthermore,
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) note that it was not until the crash of the Hong Kong market
in October 1997 that the press started to focus on Asia and that the words crisisand
contagionappeared. Corsetti et al. (2005) follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in this
respect.
All raw data used in this chapter are taken from Datastream. We use daily data
from February 1981 to December 2006, which are 6760 observations. This sample is
chosen because we want to focus on the potentially changing behavior of agents during
the build-up of the crisis, the crisis itself, and its aftermath.
6.3.3 Fundamental Price
In order to construct a fundamental price, which is used in determining the expectation
of fundamentalists, we consider a dynamic version of the classical Gordon growth model
for equity valuation. Gordon (1962) states that the price of equity is equal to
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P t =
1 + g
r   gYt (6.10)
in which g is the growth rate of dividend, r the discount rate and Yt real dividends. One
of the issues concerning this model is the period over which to consider the growth and
discount rates. In the boundedly rational setup, agents cannot use future information in
order to determine the current fundamental value; that is, g and r in period t can only
contain information up to period t. Therefore, we make the model dynamic by assuming
that g and r are time-varying. To be more specic, the growth rate g in period t is the
average over all available past values until period t and the discount rate r is the expected
(i.e. average) return in period t, determined from past values until period t. Thus, gt
and rt are rolling averages of the growth rates of dividend and returns, respectively.
Fama and French (2002) state that the average stock return r is the sum of the average
dividend yield, E(Y=P ), plus the average rate of capital gain, E(4Pt=Pt 1). The Gordon
model implies that the average rate of capital gain is equal to the average growth rate of
dividends Yt (= g). Therefore, Equation (6.10) reduces to
P t =
1 + gt
Et(Y=P )
Yt (6.11)
in which gt is the average growth rate of dividend and Et(Y=P ) is the average dividend
yield (both averages up to period t).
In order to create a fundamental price for the two markets, we apply Equation (6.11)
to the stock price indices of Thailand, the Bangkok S.E.T. and Hong Kong, the Hang
Seng. For Yt we use earnings instead of dividends since we believe that earnings are less
a¤ected by management choices compared to dividends6. This is especially the case in
recent years with respect to the increasing importance of rms who enter the stock market
on the basis of expected future dividends (i.e. IT-rms). Nominal data are discounted
using CPI. To create the rolling averages of the growth rate gt and earnings yield Yt=Pt 1,
we used as much data as was available to us, so assuming that agents have equal access to
information. For Thailand the starting point is 1975; for Hong Kong 1973. The sample
we concentrate on when estimating is 1981 2006, such that the rolling averages used
in the sample are based on a relatively large number of observations, also at the start of
the sample. Earnings data are updated weekly, such that the fundamental stock price is
also updated weekly. Finally, we transform the fundamental price to logs.
Figure 6.1 displays the log real market price and fundamental price determined using
the dynamic Gordon model as described above for 1981 - 2006. The Hang Seng market
price oscillates relatively close around the fundamental price during the entire sample.
Clearly recognizable is the Asian crisis in 1997 and 1998, when the index loses 58%
of its value, starting in October 1997 with the attack on the Hong Kong Dollar and the
accompanying interest rate hikes in Hong Kong to defend the currency board. Remarkable
is that only 28% of the drop is a correction to the fundamental price. As a result of the
6Fama and French (2002) note that one can use any variable that is cointegrated with the stock price.
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Figure 6.1: Market and Fundamental Prices
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Notes: Figure presents the (log real) market and fundamental
prices of the Hang Seng and Bangkok S.E.T. The fundamental
prices P i are determined by the dynamic Gordon model, Equation
(6.11).
sharp drop, the fundamental price itself also decreases in 1998, while the market price is
rising again.
The picture for Thailand di¤ers considerably. Striking is the bubble period from 1987
until 1996, reecting the immense foreign capital inows into the country at that time
in reaction to the liberalization of the capital account. Just before the decline in May
1996, the market is 85% overvalued relative to the Gordon-based fundamental. During the
decline, fromMay 1996 until August 1998, the market loses 85% of its value. The immense
drop in stock value causes the fundamental value to drop as well. After the correction, the
market value remains close to the fundamental, and is actually considerably undervalued
for a number of years. Both the Thai and Hong Kong market start climbing again halfway
1998. Note that the decline in the stock market in Thailand (May 1996) commences well
before the attack on the pegged exchange rate (July 1997).
Table 6.1 presents the summery statistics of the realized (log real) market prices and
their rst di¤erences (so the return in the model), the constructed fundamental price,
and the misalignment (i.e. the di¤erence between market and fundamental price). The
descriptive statistics conrm the image from the graphs. For Hong Kong we nd that
the mean, median, and standard deviation of the market price are signicantly higher
than the fundamental price. Both series are integrated of order one, and cointegrated.
The fact that the Thai market is overvalued during a large part of the sample period
causes the mean and median of the market price to be signicantly larger compared to
the fundamental price. Range and standard deviation are also signicantly higher for the
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Table 6.1: Forecasting Results
PHK P

HK 4PHK PHK P  PTH P TH 4PTH PTH P TH
Mean 8.905 8.798 0.000 0.215 6.495 6.422 0.000 -0.034
Median 9.047 8.892 0.000 0.261 6.513 6.517 0.000 0.050
Maximum 9.904 9.763 0.172 1.045 7.932 7.253 0.113 0.935
Minimum 7.478 7.700 -0.405 -1.034 5.497 5.241 -0.161 -1.459
Std. Dev. 0.574 0.505 0.017 0.348 0.663 0.513 0.015 0.446
Skewness -0.442 -0.290 -2.695 -0.762 0.262 -0.617 -0.056 -0.577
Kurtosis 2.192 2.500 63.106 3.871 1.774 2.303 11.921 3.049
Notes: Table presents the descriptive statistics of the (log real)
prices Pi, fundamental prices P i , price changes Pi and mis-
alignments Pi   P i of the Hang Seng and Bangkok S.E.T. stock
markets.
market price. The market and fundamental prices for Thailand are both integrated of
order one and cointegrated7.
Despite the crash in the Hong Kong market, the average return is 0.02% positive over
the total sample; for Thailand this is 0.007%. The variability of the Bangkok S.E.T.
return is signicantly smaller than of the Hang Seng return given the range and standard
deviation. The positive trends for Hong Kong and Thailand are reected in the signs of
the skewness. Black Monday in October 1987 causes the Hang Seng index to decrease by
40%8; this single observation a¤ects the abovementioned results somewhat.
The mean misalignment is signicantly di¤erent from zero for Hong Kong, implying
that the market is, on average, overpriced. The Bangkok market is signicantly overpriced
as well; the maximum overvaluation and variability in the misalignment is also larger
compared to Hong Kong.
6.3.4 Estimation Issues
As indicated in Section 6.2, the model is basically a VAR with time varying coe¢ cients.
Standard VARs can be consistently estimated by using equation-by-equation OLS. How-
ever, because of the nonlinearities induced by the switching mechanism, we choose to
estimate the model using equation-by-equation maximum likelihood. Also because of the
non-linear structure of the model, the estimation results appeared highly sensitive to the
starting values of the estimation procedure; especially the intensity of choice parameter
appeared to be the source of this sensitivity. To resolve this issue, we perform a grid-
search over all dimensions using the log-likelihood as selection criterion, such that we are
ascertained that the results represent a global maximum.
The estimation process consists of a number of sub-analyses. First of all we estimate
the model without switching mechanism in order to test whether the expectation forma-
tion rules are used at all. Second, we add the switching mechanism to see whether there
is also switching between the rules. A comparison between these static and dynamic cases
7Johanssen cointegration test indicates one cointegrating vector.
8A dummy was added to the analyses for this date, as the model did not converge.
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can show us whether the switching mechanism is able to add signicantly to the t of the
model. As a second di¤erentiation we estimate the model for three di¤erent sub-periods,
pre-crisis, crisis, and post-crisis, next to the total sample. This gives an impression of the
robustness of the estimation results. Furthermore, given the fairly long sample, market
behavior might have changed altogether. The results to these tests are presented in the
next section.
6.4 Empirical Results
The results of estimating the model described in Section 6.2 using the fundamental price
and estimation procedure developed in Section 6.3 are presented in this section. We
rst focus on the estimated coe¢ cients in two cases: with and without switching mech-
anism. By doing so, we attempt to stress the importance of the non-linear structure of
the model, i.e. the possibility of agents to change their forecasting strategy. Second the
estimation results of the sub samples are presented and nally we examine the develop-
ment and characteristics of the weights wi;t attached to the di¤erent strategies in price
determination.
6.4.1 Estimation Results
Table 6.2 presents the estimation results of the model described by Equation (6.9) with
and without switching mechanism. In terms of the model, without switching implies that
 = 0; the distribution of weights over the di¤erent strategies is uniform and constant
through time, i.e. wh;t = 1=3. With switching implies that the switching parameter  is
estimated simultaneously with the expectation formation functions of the three sources.
Concentrating on the linear case rst (left two columns), it can be observed in general
that all three sources are signicantly used in both the Thai and Hong Kong stock ex-
changes. Fundamental information is only stabilizing in case of an overvaluation for Hong
Kong (negative 1) and in case of an undervaluation for Thailand (negative 2). In case
of an overvaluation in Thailand or an undervaluation in Hong Kong, the fundamentals
are destabilizing given the positive 1 for Thailand and positive 2 for Hong Kong. The
magnitudes of the coe¢ cients are relatively small, and indicate that around 0.4% of the
misalignment is translated to tomorrows price change. This modest magnitude is the
result of the daily frequency; it is known that mean-reversion to the fundamental occurs
only in the long run, and will therefore not be particularly strong at the daily frequency.
The coe¢ cients for under-valuation are signicant for both countries.
All but one coe¢ cients for the technical analyses are positive, indicating that this
source extrapolates recent price changes (i.e. i > 0). Only negative price changes
in Hong Kong are (partly) reversed, leading to stabilizing dynamics in that case. The
magnitude of the coe¢ cients indicates that on average one third of the price shock of
today is transferred to tomorrow. Coe¢ cients for Thailand appear to be somewhat larger
in absolute value. In addition, positive shocks are extrapolated stronger than negative
shocks; this di¤erence is signicant for both indices. All of the coe¢ cients of the chartist
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Table 6.2: Estimation Results
Without Switching With Switching
Hong Kong Thailand Hong Kong Thailand
Fundamental
1 -0.0039 0.0040 -0.0024 -0.0028*
(.0026) (.0030) (.0019) (.0016)
2 0.0062** -0.0037** 0.0014 -0.0014
(.0029) (.0018) (.0022) (.0012)
Technical
1 0.2607*** 0.3719*** 0.6032*** 0.2140***
(.0426) (.0332) (.0690) (.0238)
2 -0.1887*** 0.1957*** -0.2190*** 0.3250***
(.0251) (.0280) (.0104) (.0403)
International
1 0.2149*** 0.1219*** 0.2427*** 0.2310***
(.0420) (.0467) (.0392) (.0413)
2 0.0076 0.3453*** 0.0718 0.3009***
(.0544) (.0280) (.0493) (.0414)
Switching
 -34.4285*** -20.7198***
(7.7364) (3.8287)
Log Likelihood
18341.41 18797.55 18373.04 18795.85
Notes: Table presents the estimated coe¢ cients and standard er-
rors (in parenthesis) of the system in Equation (6.9), without (left
two columns) and with (right two columns) switching mechanism,
for Hong Kong and Thailand. *, **, *** represents signicance
at the 10, 5 and 1 percentage level, respectively.
information are signicant, indicating that (this form of) technical analysis is indeed
broadly applied in these markets. This is in a way surprising because returns in nancial
markets are known not to contain any autocorrelation.
The results for the third and nal source, international information, indicate that the
fund managers are indeed looking at other markets; there is signicantly positive corre-
lation between the stock exchanges of Thailand and Hong Kong, i > 0, and signicant
for all but one case. A positive return in the foreign market in period t   1 results in
a positive return in the home market in period t. Managers in Hong Kong incorporate
positive shocks from Thailand more than negative shocks; in Thailand this is reversed,
positive shocks from Hong Kong are less strong incorporated than negative shocks. Both
these di¤erences are signicant. Finally, it appears that the focus on Hong Kong by Thai
investors is somewhat stronger than vice versa, on average.
The fact that there is positive correlation between the two stock markets is an indi-
cation that there is interdependence between the two markets on average over the total
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sample period. Given that the international information is signicantly applied implies
that past returns from the foreign market contain information on returns of the home
market. We cannot conclude anything about shift-contagion from these results, because
the coe¢ cients are estimated over the total sample period, and therefore represent an
average e¤ect.
As for the non-linear case, so estimating the system with switching mechanism, we
observe in the two columns on the right hand side of Table 6.2 that the coe¢ cients for
the three sources remain highly comparable. This is especially the case for the signi-
cant coe¢ cients (i.e., chartists and international). Results for fundamental information
change, but remain relatively weak. Introducing the possibility for fund managers to
switch between information sources thus does not seem to have an impact on the loading
they attach to certain pieces of information when forming expectations.
The intensity of choice parameter  is negative and signicant for both Hong Kong
and Thailand. The negative signs imply that the weight attached to information with a
relatively good forecasting ability in period t is decreased in period t+1. In other words,
sources that yield better forecasts than competing sources in a given period perform
worse than the other sources in the next period, such that the fund manager moves uses
less of the well performing information as they expect it will not perform well the next
period. The higher absolute magnitude of  in Hong Kong compared to Thailand implies
that traders are more sensitive to di¤erences in performance between sources; they are
more inclined to change strategy in response to a di¤erence in forecasting performance.
Finally, we observe that the log-likelihood for Hong Kong increases signicantly after
introducing the switching mechanism; exibility therefore adds to the power of the model.
For Thailand there is no signicant di¤erence in the likelihood; however, as the intensity
of choice parameter is signicant, switching does appear to be relevant.
The fact that we nd signicant coe¢ cients for all three sources of information simul-
taneously makes us conclude that the agents active on the Thai and Hong Kong stock
exchanges indeed use a combination of the proposed strategies. If the representative agent
would use only one source, we would not have found signicant coe¢ cients for more than
one at the same moment. Furthermore, the fact that the switching parameters are both
signicant and that the model t is signicantly higher in the switching case implies
that there are not only heterogeneous information sources used on the market, but that
the relative weight put on the di¤erent types of information also changes through time.
Agents thus switch between strategies.
These results are consistent with the results of Boswijk et al. (2007), Reitz and West-
erho¤ (2003), and the previous chapter. All three studies nd evidence of heterogeneous
behavior in the S&P500 and the major foreign exchange markets. Boswijk et al. (2007)
nd two groups of fundamentalists who di¤er in their mean-reversion coe¢ cients; sig-
nicant switching, however, is not found. Reitz and Westerho¤ (2003) nd a group of
chartists and a group of fundamentalists, including signicant and rapid switching be-
tween the groups. De Jong et al. (2007) show the existence of di¤erent groups and the
importance of switching during crisis periods.
The results are not yet directly comparable to the contagion literature, because the
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use of the international information in both countries does not provide a rm conclusion
concerning shift-contagion; it only indicates signicant interdependence on average during
the total sample period. The signicant switching is a rst indication that the importance
of the international source possibly changes over time, though. This would imply that
the correlation between the markets is also time-varying, thus pointing towards shift-
contagion. However, it could also be the case that managers only switch between chartist
and fundamental information, leaving the correlation between the two stock markets
constant. Also, contagion refers to the change in correlation during extreme periods, or
crises. The sheer observation of time-variation does not say anything about the timing
of these changes. We will look further into these matters surrounding the Asian crisis in
Section 6.5.
6.4.2 Estimation Results Sub-Samples
Table 6.3: Estimation Results Subsamples
1981 - 1990 1991 - 1999 2000 - 2006
Hong Kong Thailand Hong Kong Thailand Hong Kong Thailand
Fundamental
1 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006* 0.001 -0.001 -0.021
(.003) (.003) (.004) (.007) (.003) (.018)
2 0.002 0.005 0.018 -0.001 -0.060 -0.002
(.003) (.019) (.029) (.003) (.073) (.003)
Technical
1 0.962*** 0.579*** 0.682*** 0.719*** 0.091 0.429***
(.151) (.049) (.117) (.103) (.073) (.188)
2 -0.215*** 0.717*** -0.231*** -0.056 0.310* -0.218***
(.030) (.053) (.014) (.046) (.170) (.023)
International
1 -0.116 0.197** 0.418*** 0.119** 0.038 0.042
(.073) (.078) (.059) (.055) (.055) (.082)
2 0.067 0.237*** 0.143* 0.599*** -0.161** 0.276***
(.121) (.025) (.077) (.096) (.074) (.084)
Switching
 -32.310** -2.710*** -25.547*** -16.415*** -196.143 -162.545*
(13.693) (.418) (6.529) (5.096) (170.238) (88.755)
Log Likelihood
6910.414 7868.775 6139.289 6018.055 5345.539 5121.220
Notes: Table presents the estimation results of Equation (6.9) for
the three sub samples 1981 - 1990 (pre-crisis), 1991 - 1999 (crisis),
and 2000 - 2006 (post-crisis). *, **, *** represents signicance at
the 10, 5 and 1 percentage level, respectively.
Table 6.3 presents the estimation results of the model for three sub-samples, the pre-
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crisis period (1981 1990), which includes the massive inow of foreign capital, the crisis
period (1991 1999), and the post-crisis period (2000 2006). Estimations represent the
model with switching mechanism.
The pre-crisis period shows strong use of technical analyses, given the high and highly
signicant -coe¢ cients. The extrapolation is stronger in this early period compared to
the total period. International information is only signicantly used in the Thai market;
shocks from Bangkok are not transmitted to Hong Kong, which is opposite to the total
sample. The switching parameter nally again turns up negative and signicant. The
magnitude of this intensity of choice is, especially for Thailand, lower in absolute sense
compared to the total sample.
During the crisis-period, behavior changes somewhat. Technical analysis remains
strong, albeit somewhat less so than in the pre-crisis period. Most striking di¤erence
is the fact that the Hong Kong market starts incorporating information from the Thai
market; it remains equally important in the Thai market. The intensity of choice in
Thailand rises considerably.
The post-crisis period, nally, shows a di¤erent image altogether. Chartist informa-
tion only remains signicant for Thailand, while it is only marginally present for Hong
Kong. International information only turns up signicantly for negative shocks in both
markets; it also turns negative for Hong Kong. The intensity of choice parameters both
become very large in absolute sense, but lose their signicance.
The fact that the parameters of the expectation formation rules change considerably
through time, is another indication that there is indeed time variation in the way market
participants form their expectations. So, next to the switching induced by the model, we
observe time variation in a broader perspective. Given that also the coe¢ cients for the
international information change over the three sub-samples, the correlation between the
markets is di¤erent in the three periods. In other words, while the correlation between
markets in the model changes due to changing weights, the correlation changes in this
case due to changes in the expectation formation rule itself, i.e. the -coe¢ cients. Also,
the behavior of agents concerning switching changes through time, given the changing
intensity of choice parameter.
The use of fundamental information remains relatively modest through time, as a
result of the high frequency data. The importance of technical analyses, on the other
hand, appears to decrease over the three sub-periods considered. This can be explained
by the fact that the liquidity of these markets increases through time; developed nancial
markets are characterized by the absence of auto-correlation. This can be recognized
particularly in the results for the Hong Kong market, which is obviously by far the larger
and more developed market. The relatively strong autocorrelation during the middle
period can be explained by the crisis. This causes prices to move in a similar direction
(down, in this case) for longer periods on end. Striking is also the change in coe¢ cients
for international information. The rst period only shows transmission of shocks from
Hong Kong to Thailand. This can be explained by the fact that the Thai market was still
very small in that period and therefore unimportant for Hong Kong, while the Hong Kong
market developed itself into a nancial hub. The crisis period shows strong transmission
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in both directions; in other words, there is evidence of contagion, the correlation between
the markets increases during the crisis by the increase in internationalist coe¢ cients. This
does not yet take into account the change in weights on the internationalist rule. The
international focus disappears again for a large part in the post-crisis period.
6.4.3 Weights
The estimation results indicate that the representative agent in the market has a time-
varying forecasting strategy. In this subsection we will analyze the development and
distribution of the weights through time, in order to determine the e¤ect of the crisis.
Furthermore, it allows us to draw inferences concerning the potential shift-contagion.
Figure 6.2 (upper panel) displays the evolution of weights wh;t estimated by the model
over the total sample period. The daily weights shift between zero and one, and oscillate
around the uniform distribution of one-third. There appear to be clusters of high volatility
in the weights surrounding the periods in which volatility in the returns themselves is
high. For example, there is an increase in volatility in 1993/1994, and very clearly a
volatile period around the crisis in 1997/1998. For Hong Kong, the volatility appears to
be highest for the technical information, followed by the fundamental, and is clearly lower
for the international. As a result of the smaller intensity of choice (in absolute terms),
the volatility in the weights is smaller for Thailand compared to Hong Kong. There does
not seem to be much di¤erence between the three sources.
The plots of the smoothed weights9 in the bottom panel of Figure 6.2 show a clearer
image of the market dynamics. Because of the smoothing we observe a small band,
with weights again moving around one-third, but during di¤erent periods we do observe
very pronounced shifts. For example, during the Asian crisis we observe a strong rise
in chartist weights in Hong Kong, and a strong rise in fundamental weight in Thailand.
We will look further into this mechanism in Section 6.5. Table 6.4 presents descriptive
statistics of the daily strategy weights; the numbers illustrate the ndings from Figure
6.2 somewhat more.
Mean values of the weights for both Hong Kong and Thailand are close to one-third
for all periods, i.e. none of the strategies is dominant or gets driven out of the market
for long periods on end. The lowest mean value we observe is for the post-crisis period
chartists in Thailand (0.318). This illustrates the increasing quality of the market, as
we have seen in Table 6.3. The range and standard deviations move in accordance with
the magnitude of the intensity of choice; higher intensity of choice results in a higher
variability and range of the weights. Generally, weights range between zero and one;
exceptions are the pre-crisis periods for both markets.
By interpreting the correlations between the weights, we get a general picture con-
cerning the switching tendencies of the fund manager. The correlation coe¢ cients are
generally negative, reecting the fact that the weights sum up to one. Also because of
the fact that the three weights sum up to one, there exists something like triangular-
arbitrage. This can be most clearly illustrated by the pre-crisis sample for Hong Kong.
9Smoothed weights are 3-months moving averages of the daily weights.
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Figure 6.2: Weights
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Notes: Figure represents the weights of the three groups wh;t as estimated by the
model. Upper plot for daily weights, and lower for smoothed (3-months moving
average) weights. FUN represents fundamentalists; CH chartists; INT interna-
tionalists. TH is Thailand and HK Hong Kong. W is weight and WS smoothed
weight.
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Table 6.4: Weights Characteristics
Hong Kong Thailand
8106 81-90 91-99 00-06 81 06 81-90 91-99 00-06
wf 0.335 0.333 0.338 0.325 0.336 0.334 0.335 0.335
Mean wc 0.334 0.334 0.334 0.339 0.332 0.332 0.335 0.318
wi 0.331 0.332 0.328 0.336 0.332 0.333 0.33 0.346
wf 0.963 0.598 0.971 0.845 0.991 0.758 0.983 1
Max wc 0.999 0.999 0.999 1 0.999 0.559 0.97 1
wi 0.897 0.748 0.949 0.998 0.864 0.442 0.973 1
wf 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.23 0.011 0.000
Min wc 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.122 0.000 0.000
wi 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.000
wf 0.056 0.056 0.077 0.071 0.036 0.013 0.044 0.153
StDev wc 0.081 0.108 0.085 0.126 0.04 0.014 0.071 0.129
wi 0.044 0.056 0.056 0.104 0.034 0.009 0.061 0.192
wf wc -0.852 -0.97 -0.767 -0.569 -0.609 -0.752 -0.517 -0.084
Corr. wc wi -0.74 -0.969 -0.465 -0.829 -0.543 -0.436 -0.79 -0.605
wi wf 0.278 0.879 -0.212 0.013 -0.335 -0.265 -0.116 -0.743
Notes: Table presents characteristics of estimated weights for the
pre-crisis period (1981-1990), crisis period (1991-1999), post-crisis
period (2000-2006), and the total sample. wf , wc, wi represents
fundamental, technical, and international weight, respectively.
There it can be seen that correlations between the importance of fundamental and tech-
nical information, and technical and international information, are close to minus one.
As a result, the correlation between international and fundamental information is close
to positive one.
In the Hong Kong market, switching is heaviest between fundamental and technical
analysis, followed by switching between technical and international information. The
resulting correlation between international and fundamental is generally low, meaning
that the fund manager does not often change between these sources. This pattern can
also be roughly observed in the Thai market.
6.5 The Crisis
In order to examine the ability of the model to give an explanation of the notion of
contagion, we are focusing on the period directly surrounding the Asian crisis in 1997 and
1998. By examining the evolution of the weights directly prior to the crisis, especially the
weight on international information, we will be able to judge the event that triggered the
crisis. Furthermore, given that the weights on international information are an indication
of the correlation between markets, it will allow us to conclude about the existence of
contagion.
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6.5.1 Evolution of weights
Figure 6.3: Weights during Crisis
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Notes: Figure depicts the evolution of the weights wh;t for both
Hong Kong (left) and Thailand (right) during the Asian crisis.
Figure 6.3 shows a close-up of the evolution of the three time-series of (smoothed)
weights for Hong Kong and Thailand around the time the markets started crashing. This
is 1997 for Hong Kong, and 1996 for Thailand. For both markets, there is a clear turning
point on which relative tranquillity changes into high volatility. Weights are distributed
around one third until August 1997 in the Hong Kong market, after which a surge in
technical analysis can be seen, bringing the index down. In the months prior to this, it
can be observed that fundamental and international e¤ects gain inuence at the expense
of chartist inuence. As the market was overvalued at that time (see Figure 6.1) and the
Thai market was already falling, the increase in fundamental and international weights
increases the downward pressure on prices. As the market was in an upswing, technical
analysis provided upward pressure to price. When the di¤erence between the chartist
weight versus the fundamental plus international weight became too large, prices started
falling. This negative trend was picked up by the technical analysis, which extrapolated
this, causing the large increase in weight on chartism.
The story for the Thai market is somewhat more straightforward. Until July 1996,
weights are distributed around one third. Because of a sharp increase in the use of
the fundamentalist rule, the price starts dropping. This drop is picked up by technical
analysts, as can be seen by the increase in weight on technical analyses in August 1996.
The increase in chartism is only temporary; fundamentalism continues to increase until
the market price reaches the fundamental price, so the over-pricing has vanished.
In terms of contagion, we observe that the Hong Kong market indeed falls as a result
of the crisis in Thailand; the focus on international information increases prior to the
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start of the crisis in Hong Kong. However, the fall of the market is not only triggered by
this contagion e¤ect, but also by the mean-reverting dynamics induced by fundamental
analyses.
6.6 Conclusions and Suggestions
The purpose of this chapter was to combine insights from the contagion literature and the
heterogeneous expectations literature in order to get a better view on market-dynamics
during nancial market crises. For this end, we developed and estimated a dynamic model
with a boundedly rational representative agent for the asset market. The representative
agent, a fund manager, forms expectations based on three sources of information: eco-
nomic fundamental, technical, and international. The relative importance of each source
is time varying, conditional on its impact on price in the previous period. The notion of
contagion is incorporated by modelling two such models next to each other; the fact that
the representative fund manager in both markets conditions its expectations on infor-
mation from the other market introduces conditional interaction between the two risky
assets.
The model reduces to a VAR with time-varying coe¢ cients and an economic under-
pinning. This time variation is induced by the fact that the fund manager adapts the
weight it puts on the di¤erent sources of information. The model is estimated for the
Hang Seng and Bangkok S.E.T. indices for a period surrounding the Asian crisis, 1981-
2006. The chapter therefore adds to the contagion literature by proposing a completely
novel view on the notion of contagion. Furthermore, the heterogeneous agents literature
is enriched by applying a representative agent with multiple information sources in a
model with multiple asset markets. Furthermore, the daily frequency is used, which is
higher than has been done before when estimating heterogeneous agents models to our
best knowledge.
Estimation results indicate that the fund manager indeed uses the di¤erent informa-
tion sources in forming expectations on the Thai and Hong Kong stock markets; all three
sources are found to be present. Second, we also nd that there is switching between
the sources; that is, agents change their strategy conditional on past performance of the
rules. Over time, large shifts in behavior are observed, caused by crises, but also by
market development.
Concerning the behavior of the fund manager at the onset of the crises, it is observes
that the crisis in Thailand is triggered by a shift of focus towards the fundamental price.
The crisis in Hong Kong is triggered in rst instance as a result of increased focus on infor-
mation from the Thai market, but also from an increased weight put on the fundamental
price. We therefore nd evidence of the existence of shift-contagion.
Future research in this eld can spread into di¤erent directions. First of all, theoretical
knowledge of the behavior of heterogeneous interacting agents models with multiple asset
markets is relatively limited. The focus thus far has been primarily on single asset
markets, while global nancial markets are becoming more and more interrelated. In the
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application of heterogeneous expectations models to the contagion issue, one can think
of enhancing the two-market model to a multi-market model. In this way, it might be
possible to distinguish the exact spread of a crisis across di¤erent countries. Finally it will
be interesting to determine the exact triggers of changing behavior. In this chapter we
have mainly focused on the behavior of market participants, and matched turning points
in an ad-hoc fashion with economic events. Knowing that behavior of agents changes
resulting from certain shocks is one, the next step is to determine why it changes.
In this and the previous chapter, we have developed and estimated heterogeneous
agents type models aimed at explaining the returns in nancial markets. The general
framework, though, is applicable much broader. The next chapter, therefore, introduces
the notion of boundedly rational volatility traders. By modelling the behavior of volatility
traders, we are able to develop a volatility process based on heterogeneous agents.
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CHAPTER 7
Heterogeneous Volatility Traders: GARCH and Option Prices
7.1 Introduction
The notion of heterogeneous beliefs has been, in both the literature and the previous
chapters, applied in order to explain movements of prices in nancial markets. The basic
structure of two di¤erent processes with varying weights based on a positive feedback
rule, however, is applicable on a much broader scale. This chapter argues that di¤erent
types of traders are also actively involved in trading volatility. Although this might not
necessarily be the case in the stock market, it is the case when one turns to the option
market. Being the only unobserved variable in an option pricing model, volatility plays
a pivotal role in the determination of the value of an option. Hence, option strategies
could be a direct consequence of expectations about future volatility. If di¤erent trader
types have di¤erent expectations about the future volatility of the underlying asset, this
may induce trade and cause volatility to change.
Volatility is priced and traded in the options market. If market participants have
diverging views about future volatility of e.g. a stock index, they engage in directional
volatility bets, for example through the use of option strategies. If they believe that
markets become more volatile, they buy at-the-money puts and calls (a long straddle),
since the value usually increases with a rise in volatility. If they believe that volatility
is overpriced in the market, they short a straddle. Volatility trading creates uncertainty
about the fair valueof volatility. Di¤ering expectations about future volatility implies
that volatility is not constant and that volatility itself becomes volatile. In recent years,
stochastic volatility models are successfully used for the purpose of option valuation. The
0This chapter is partly based on Frijns, B., T. Lehnert, and R.C.J. Zwinkels (2007). Behavioral
Heterogeneity in the Options Market, NiCE Workingpaper. Part of the chapter is written while staying
at the University of Technology Sydney. Discussions with Carl Chiarella, Tony He, and David Goldbaum
are greatly acknowledged.
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volatility of volatility was found to be particularly important for the pricing performance
of the model (Christo¤ersen and Jacobs, 2004).
To evaluate whether di¤erent trader types are present, we again turn to the hetero-
geneous agents model literature, which argues that due to the presence of boundedly
rational agents, expectations about future values may di¤er. In line with this literature
we assume that two di¤erent trader types are active in trading volatility, where some
traders (termed fundamentalists) trade on the long-run mean reversion of the conditional
volatility to the unconditional volatility and other trader (called chartists) trade on short-
run persistence in the volatility process. The notion of heterogeneous expectations for
volatility traders comes naturally as volatility itself is not an observable variable in the
market. Therefore, it would be a larger surprise if individuals form their expectations on
this invisible variable in a homogeneous manner than in a heterogeneous.
Traders may change their strategy based on the performance of their strategy com-
pared to the performance of the strategy of the other traders. These models, that explain
the excess volatility observed in nancial markets, are based on the idea that di¤erent
trader types, through their actions, a¤ect the conditional volatility of the price process.
Indeed Avromov et al. (2006) show that the existence of both types of traders cannot only
explain the di¤erences in daily volatility, but can also explain the asymmetry observed
in daily volatility.
The GARCH methodology, by Engle (1982) and Bollerslev (1986), has been pivotal
in modelling volatility ever since its introduction. It has proven its value in a number
of elds, such as Value-at-Risk determination, pricing options, and describing time series
characteristics in a broad sense. Numerous additions and modications to the original
models have been proposed in the past decades with varying degrees of success. One of
the points of critique to the original model is its impossibility to take structural changes
into account (see Diebold, 1986; Lamoureux and Lastrapes, 1990). The high persistence
in the volatility process (i.e., the sum of the  and  coe¢ cients in the original model,
which is often found to be close to, but smaller than, one), is said to be caused by
the misspecication induced by this lack of exibility. In reaction to this critique, several
authors have proposed to introduce time variation in the GARCH coe¢ cients. This time
variation is often implemented by introducing a Markov switching process (see Schwert,
1989; Hamilton and Susmel, 1994; Cai, 1994).
Interestingly, when combining the strategies of fundamentalists and chartists, we nd
that the model reduces to a GARCH(1; 1) model with time-varying coe¢ cients, where
the time-variation is due to changes in the proportion of fundamentalists and chartists
present in the market. This time variation introduces another interesting feature, namely
allowing the volatility process to be locally unstable while guaranteeing global stability.
When chartist traders dominate the market their persistence may cause the volatility
process to become unstable. However, when the proportion of fundamentalist traders
increases, their presence ensures that the volatility process remains stable in the long run.
In this manner, the process can switch between stable and unstable phases, providing an
economic interpretation to the notion of volatility clustering observed in nancial markets.
As such, the proposed approach to volatility trading provides a behavioral foundation to
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the celebrated GARCH literature, with time varying coe¢ cients.
The proposed behavioral volatility trading model is empirically veried using two dif-
ferent methodologies. In the rst part of the chapter, the model is estimated for the
time series of thirty individual stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average. The estima-
tion results indicate that the behavioral volatility model as described above outperforms
the standard GARCH model in terms of both the in- and out-of-sample t. This re-
sult is robust for the information advantage the switching mechanism has over a normal
GARCH.
The second part of the chapter takes these results one step further. Being the only
unobserved variable in an option pricing model, volatility plays a pivotal role in the
determination of the value of an option. The workhorse of option pricing, the Black
and Scholes (1987) model, states that the variance of the underlying asset is all that is
needed to price a European option. Ever since the introduction of this model, numerous
modications have been suggested, especially in order to explain the so-called volatility
smile. Among these modications is the GARCH option pricing model by Duan (1995).
By using a GARCH-based forecast of the volatility instead of a static volatility measure,
the whole volatility surface can be formed, and options priced more e¢ ciently.
The second way the behavioral volatility model is validated, is by implementing it into
the GARCH option pricing methodology of Duan (1995). As the model performs better
in a time series setup, it might also be able to outperform the standardGARCH in a more
complex situation, option pricing. Two earlier attempts have been made to incorporate
elements from heterogeneous agents models into the option pricing literature. Guo (1998)
assumes that option investors hold heterogeneous expectations about the parameters of
the lognormal process of the underlying asset price. Estimation results for S&P500 index
call options indicate that there are two groups: bulls and bears. Ziegler (2002) models two
types of agents who di¤er in their initial beliefs on the dividend process and investigates
the e¤ect on option prices.
When empirically testing the model on option prices we nd evidence that supports
the presence of both types of traders. Over time, the fractions of fundamentalist and
chartist traders change and we nd evidence that the model outperforms a standard
EGARCH(1; 1) in terms of pricing performance, both in-sample and out-of-sample.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 introduces the
general framework of the heterogeneous volatility traders. Section 7.3 looks into the time
series estimation of the model, and contains Subsections on the econometric model, data
and methodology, results, and robustness checks. Section 7.4 deals with the pricing of
options using the model, and contains subsections on the specic econometric framework,
data and methodology, and the results. The fth and nal section concludes.
7.2 General Framework
Let St be the value of an underlying asset at time t, and D be the expected cash dividend
payments over the lifetime of the option. In a Gaussian discrete-time economy the (log)
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return of the asset at time t, rt is assumed to follow the following dynamics
rt = ln

St
St 1

+ dt = t +
p
ht"t (7.1)
"tj
t  N(0; 1) under probability measure P
where dt is the dividend yield, t is the (conditional) mean of rt, ht is the conditional
volatility of the asset and "t is a standard normal random variable. It is on the process
of ht that we focus in this chapter and it is assumed that the forecast of ht comprises of
two di¤erent elements.
Let hFt+1 be the prediction of the conditional volatility for fundamentalists. These
fundamentalists are assumed to trade on the basis of mean reversion, where they ex-
pect the conditional volatility mean-reverting to the unconditional volatility. Their best
prediction for the volatility process is
hFt+1 = ht + (ht   h) (7.2)
where h is the long-run unconditional volatility and  measures the speed of mean rever-
sion. Since volatility needs to remain positive with probability one,  is bounded between
[ 1; 0]. When ! 0 the process becomes very persistent and little mean reversion takes
place. When  !  1 the process reverts back to the unconditional volatility almost
immediately.
The chartists do not believe in mean reversion, but trade on recently observed shocks
in the market. Given the current level of volatility, they use recently observed shocks to
predict the future level of conditional volatility. Given that conditional volatility behaves
di¤erently in the presence of positive or negative shocks, we allow for an asymmetric
impact of these shocks, see Glosten et al, (1993).
hCt+1 = ht + 1
p
ht"
+
t
2
+ 2
p
ht"
 
t
2
(7.3)
where hCt+1 is the volatility prediction of the chartists, "
+
t ("
 
t ) is the past positive (neg-
ative) shock in the volatility process and 1 (2) measures the extent to which positive
(negative) shocks are incorporated into the forecast.
Because the market is dened in such a way that only these two types of traders
are present, and both trade directly upon their expectations, the conditional volatility
that is observed in the market ht+1 is a combination of the predictions of chartists and
fundamentalists and the fraction at which each trader type is represented in the market.
Since both strategies involve no particular skill or information from traders, traders can
switch to either strategy at any point in time without incurring transaction costs. Let
wt be the fraction of fundamentalists present in the market. Then a natural choice for
wt is a rule that considers the protability or pricing error of following a fundamentalist
strategy1. As earlier, we dene wt as a multinomial logit switching rule, as rst introduced
by Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998). The switching rule is given by
1An example for the denition of wt is the prots fundamentalists make relative to the chartist on an
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wt =

1 + e(f;t 1 c;t 1)
 1
(7.4)
where  measures the sensitivity of market participants (fundamentalists or chartists) to
their respective pricing errors and is expected to be between zero and innity. Forecasting
errors of fundamentalists and chartists are given by f;t and c;t, respectively2. The
switching in this chapter is conditional on the forecast error of fundamentalists versus
chartists. Because it is modelled as a forecast error in this case instead of forecast prots
in previous chapters, it can be seen as negative cognitive dissonance, instead of positive.
The advantage is that this measure is somewhat more parsimonious compared to the
prot measure (demand times return) in the previous chapters, while still retaining the
same characteristics (i.e., the forecasting error is directly related to prot).
With the given weights and the di¤erent trading strategies, we can now establish the
total process for the conditional volatility. Since the conditional volatility is a consequence
of the proportion of market participants following each strategy, it is computed as a
weighted average of the fundamentalist and the chartist volatility prediction,
ht+1 = wth
F
t+1 + (1  wt)hCt+1 (7.5)
Equation (7.5) denes the process for the conditional volatility and shows that this is a
weighted average of the conditional volatility predictions of chartists and fundamentalists.
Substituting (7.2) and (7.3) into (7.5) yields
ht+1 =  wth+ (1 + wt)ht + (1  wt)1
p
ht"
+
t
2
+ (1  wt)2
p
ht"
 
t
2
(7.6)
or
ht+1 = ht + tht + 1;t
p
ht"
+
t
2
+ 2;t
p
ht"
 
t
2
(7.7)
where ht =  wth, t = (1 + wt), 1;t = (1   wt)1 and 2;t = (1   wt)2. Equation
(7.7) shows that the proposed model essentially reduces to a GJR GARCH(1; 1) model,
by Glosten et al. (1993), with time varying coe¢ cients. The time variation in these
coe¢ cients is driven by the forecasting errors of fundamentalists relative to those of
chartists.
Apart from this time variation, there are several interesting features about the model.
Firstly, since the model reduces to a standard GJR   GARCH, we can provide an
economic interpretation of the GARCH model. Up till now the GARCH model has
option strategy that involves straddles. When e.g. fundamentalists expect volatility to increase they will
go long in a straddle and vice versa. If their strategy works and pays o¤ well relative to the strategy of
the chartists, more traders may be inclined to follow this fundamental strategy and hence the proportion
of fundamentalists will increase. If their strategy does not work and performs poorly relative to chartists,
more traders may be inclined to follow a chartist strategy in the future.
2The exact functional form of the forecasting errors i;t is omitted here, as it di¤ers between the two
empirical applications later in the chapter.
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mainly been motivated by the empirical observation of time variation in conditional
volatility. Our model provides an economic interpretation of the source of time variation
in volatility and of GARCH e¤ects. The model shows that the mean reversion of the
conditional volatility is driven by the presence of fundamentalists, and that persistence in
volatility is driven by the presence of the chartists. When very few chartists are present
in the market, mean reversion would occur at a faster rate than when many chartists are
present. Also, the impact of news shocks on the conditional volatility is solely driven by
the presence of chartists, who expect recent past news to be informative about the future
level of volatility. The GARCH e¤ect and ARCH e¤ect can therefore be explained by
the presence of these two types of traders in the market.
A second interesting feature of the model concerns the stability conditions of Equation
(7.7). Under normal circumstances, fundamentalists follow a strategy that ensures that
the conditional volatility remains bounded. However, the chartist strategy is an unstable
strategy, i.e. unless 1 and 2 are both zero, the volatility predicted by chartists will
not remain bounded. However, the fact that both types of traders are present and wt
uctuates over time allows the volatility process in Equation (7.7) to be locally unstable,
while guaranteeing stability of the GARCH process in the long run. Whether Equation
(7.7) is stable in the long run depends on the parameter values for , 1 and 2 and is
an issue that will be addressed in the empirical section.
A third feature about the model is the time varying unconditional volatility. This
time variation in unconditional volatility is not caused by slow-moving change in the
underlying unconditional volatility (as suggested by Engle and Lee, 1999), but is also
driven by the proportion of fundamentalists or chartists present. When only chartists
are present, the unconditional volatility does not exist, simply because chartists do not
believe in an unconditional volatility.
The model presented above represents the most simplistic form of fundamentalist and
chartist behavior. There are several extensions possible to the strategies for both types of
traders. Firstly, we can extend the fundamentalist strategy by allowing for dynamics in
the unconditional volatility. Such types of model follow from Engle and Lee (1999) and
are often referred to as two-component GARCH models. Allowing for such additional
dynamics can be done straightforwardly, and would imply that Equation (7.4) takes the
form of a GJR   GARCH(2; 2). Secondly, chartists may also consider other stochastic
variables, such as trading volumes, number of transactions, etc. The stochastic variables
can be added to the model.
The general framework of volatility traders put forward in this section is empirically
validated in the following two sections. In Section 7.3 the model is tested in a time-series
setting, while Section 7.4 integrates it into an option pricing setup.
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7.3 Volatility with Fundamentalists and Chartists
7.3.1 The Econometric Model
In order to estimate the general framework set out above in a time-series setup, we rewrite
the model somewhat for practical purposes. Furthermore, three additional elements are
added to the model. First, the switching function introduced in Equation (7.4) implies
that fundamentalists and chartists are evenly distributed when their prots are equal.
There is no ex-ante reason to assume this is the case. Traders might have an unconditional
preference for one or the other. Another way of interpreting this, is the existence of costs of
forming expectations. Second, we introduce structure on the conditional mean of returns
t by including ve lags and day-of-the-week dummies in order to remove all information
from the level of the error term. Finally the expectation formation rules are evaluated
ex-post by comparing forecasts with the actually observed volatility in the market. As
a proximate determinant for the actual market volatility, we use the realized volatility.
This is a suitable measure since realized volatility converges to the actual volatility as the
sampling frequency goes to innity, see Andersen et al. (2001). Agents are thus actually
targeting market circumstances. The resulting econometric model reads
rt = +
5X
i=1
irt i +
4X
i=1
iDi +
p
ht"t (7.8)
ht = wt(! + ht 1) + (1  wt)

1
p
ht 1"+t 1
2
+ 2
p
ht 1" t 1
2
in which Di are day-of-the-week dummies, and
wt =
1
1 + exp


 
ff;t   cc;t
 (7.9)
c;t =
1 pht 2"+t 22 + 2 pht 2" t 22  RVt 1
f;t = j! + ht 2  RVt 1j
where RVt is the realized volatility in period t. This is basically equivalent to Equation
(7.7) as ht = wt! and t = wtht. As comes clear from the variance equation in Equation
(7.8), the weight wt, which introduces the time variation in the distribution of agents, is
distributed over the fundamentalists and chartists. Weight wt is bounded between zero
and one, and centred around one half when c = f . The intuition goes as follows. The
 terms measure the absolute distance between the fundamentalist and chartist forecast,
and the realized volatility3, i.e. the absolute forecasting error of the agents. Therefore,
the switching rule works as a positive feedback rule when  > 0. If in a given period the
3Volatility measure are converted to yearly volatility in the -functions.
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forecasting error of fundamentalists is larger than of chartists (so if f > c), wt goes
down. In other words, if the volatility in the market is reacting more (less) to the noise
from the level than to the previous periods volatility, the fundamentalists receive less
(more) weight in the next period. As such, volatility clusters or stable periods can be
reinforced not only by the persistence in the GARCH process, but also by the increase
or decrease in weight on the di¤erent groups active in the market.
Finally, the c and f parameters measure the relative overall importance of the
two groups4; they serve as centring the wt function. When c = f 6= 0, weights are
centred around 1
2
. In other words, with c = f , agents will be equally distributed across
strategies. There is no ex-ante reason to believe, however, that this should be the case.
Therefore, by introducing asymmetry between the -functions in the switching process,
more exibility is added. If c > f , the error of the chartists vis-à-vis the realized
volatility will be discounted heavier, such that wt will be centred above 12 (but below one,
obviously), and fundamentalists will dominate, on average.
7.3.2 Data and Methodology
The model outlined above is estimated using daily data from 30 individual stocks in the
Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). The sample covers January 1996 to April 2007,
which corresponds to 2820 trading days. Prices are taken from Datastream; the realized
volatility measures RVt are own constructs, but the raw data are extracted from Circa.
When forming RVt, there is a trade-o¤ between accuracy (the intra-day squared returns
are equal to the actual volatility when the frequency goes to innity, see Andersen et
al. ,2002), and micro-structure noise at high frequencies (bid-ask bounce and the like).
We have chosen to use ve-minute returns, as we believe this poses a good intermediate
position, and it is common in the literature.
Returns are calculated by rt = log(pclose) log(popen). We step aside from the standard
daily log-changes in the return index as return measure because of RVt. The RVt mea-
sure only takes into account the volatility during trading hours, thus excluding overnight
trades, because it is constructed using tick-data. Therefore, in order to match the price
data with the RVt data, one can either use a mark-up on the trading-hour-RVt5, or focus
on behavior during trading hours only. The latter is chosen, as it does not make any as-
sumptions on the relation between volatility during trading hours and non-trading hours.
Tables 7.1 and 7.2 provide descriptive statistics for the return and realized volatility
measures.
The model is estimated using quasi maximum likelihood. As a result of the non-
linear structure of the switching mechanism, estimation results of this type of setup have
proven to be (highly) sensitive to starting values of the coe¢ cients, as the optimization
procedure tends to get stuck in a local minimum, see Winker and Gilli (2001, 2004). In
order to circumvent this problem, the model was rst estimated with constant weights
4In the estimation procedure, c is normalized to one such that Equation (7.9) simplies to wt =
1
1+exp[(f;t c;t)]
5Thus assuming a constant correlation between trading-hours volatility and overnight volatility.
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Table 7.1: Descriptive Statistics Returns
AA AIG AXP BA CAT C DD DIS GE GME
Mean 0.034 0.005 -0.018 -0.022 0.021 0.031 -0.019 -0.018 -0.018 0.122
Max 8.338 10.44 12.06 10.74 7.850 13.01 9.465 11.80 8.380 8.279
Min -13.29 -10.71 -9.882 -10.28 -9.970 -15.86 -10.56 -9.304 -11.12 -7.974
St.Dev. 1.908 1.619 1.828 1.730 1.799 1.824 1.658 1.750 1.590 1.860
Skew -0.421 -0.092 0.013 -0.009 -0.110 -0.281 -0.275 -0.045 -0.257 -0.131
Kurt 5.566 6.739 6.103 6.095 5.050 8.605 6.155 5.690 6.769 4.561
Q-ac 3.731 3.688 0.339 1.362 0.089 9.297 0.002 1.685 0.070 0.032
Q-ac2 21.14 91.83 79.62 150.1 72.94 320.9 80.82 70.28 101.4 93.57
HD HON HPQ IBM INTC JNJ JPM KO MCD MMM
Mean 0.008 0.012 -0.075 -0.034 0.051 -0.028 -0.034 -0.074 -0.077 -0.013
Max 11.30 19.84 12.99 10.37 12.06 7.411 16.36 11.16 11.43 7.045
Min -12.13 -14.91 -15.89 -12.21 -20.49 -7.711 -24.43 -9.175 -14.28 -8.380
St.Dev. 1.861 1.957 2.300 1.702 2.360 1.313 1.970 1.410 1.621 1.398
Skew -0.176 0.209 -0.185 -0.107 -0.279 -0.181 -0.949 -0.104 -0.108 -0.131
Kurt 5.985 11.38 6.190 7.103 6.857 5.301 16.71 7.378 9.042 5.830
Q-ac 0.879 0.002 1.159 9.242 20.57 0.855 6.586 0.342 1.624 0.022
Q-ac2 89.04 94.89 12.09 58.26 69.46 113.4 268.6 41.73 46.22 33.11
MO MRK MSFT PFE PG T UTX VZ WMT XOM
Mean 0.013 -0.053 -0.022 0.010 -0.130 -0.015 0.022 -0.021 0.017 -0.022
Max 14.71 11.17 8.907 8.829 9.237 6.881 16.46 6.312 8.719 6.800
Min -12.03 -9.347 -11.01 -10.34 -10.52 -10.75 -7.339 -8.545 -12.92 -11.61
St.Dev. 1.772 1.591 1.863 1.735 1.416 1.740 1.621 1.571 1.743 1.359
Skew 0.503 0.142 -0.199 -0.126 0.011 -0.213 0.468 -0.494 -0.226 -0.340
Kurt 11.67 6.879 5.272 5.277 8.353 5.240 8.918 5.801 6.444 7.800
Q-ac 1.362 0.525 10.16 0.957 23.18 0.410 0.356 0.335 3.051 2.536
Q-ac2 88.31 39.37 164.5 43.97 235.1 67.23 19.29 65.80 53.63 12.28
Notes: Table presents discriptive statistics of DJIA individual
stock returns. Q ac and Q ac2 represent the Q statistic for au-
tocorrelation in the returns and squared returns, respectively. The
companies represented by the tickers are given in the Appendix.
(i.e., wi;t = 1=2) to obtain starting values for the setup with switching mechanism. The
starting values for  and  were obtained by an extensive grid-search over the parameter
space, using the maximum likelihood as selection criterion. In the end, results appeared
to be relatively insensitive for changes in starting values, which is an indication for the
robustness of our results.
7.3.3 Results
The results section is split up into three parts. First of all the (in-sample) estimation re-
sults are presented, including a comparison of the model with the standard GJR-GARCH
setup. Second, in order to gain some more insights into the working of the model, a close-
up of one of the stocks is presented. The third sub-section looks at out-of-sample results.
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Table 7.2: Descriptive Statistics Realized Volatilities
AA AIG AXP BA CAT C DD DIS GE GME
Mean 0.273 0.224 0.257 0.256 0.260 0.263 0.249 0.270 0.228 0.253
Max 0.955 1.058 1.131 1.451 0.886 1.570 0.865 1.886 1.319 1.038
Min 0.044 0.018 0.045 0.047 0.056 0.013 0.068 0.059 0.024 0.020
St.Dev. 0.109 0.104 0.140 0.114 0.106 0.139 0.109 0.131 0.116 0.104
Skew 1.572 1.645 1.524 1.924 1.492 1.660 1.313 2.160 1.959 1.790
Kurt 6.682 8.788 7.173 11.75 6.701 10.30 5.702 15.58 10.95 8.702
Q-ac 1299 1519 1679 1319 1294 1679 1610 1577 1551 875.2
HD HON HPQ IBM INTC JNJ JPM KO MCD MMM
Mean 0.270 0.269 0.321 0.231 0.333 0.202 0.254 0.215 0.250 0.213
Max 1.398 1.520 1.909 1.357 3.787 1.023 2.078 0.795 1.068 0.971
Min 0.029 0.019 0.064 0.016 0.017 0.021 0.027 0.028 0.066 0.049
St.Dev. 0.127 0.132 0.156 0.115 0.183 0.097 0.144 0.097 0.104 0.093
Skew 2.103 2.371 1.948 1.657 4.079 1.694 2.639 1.188 1.755 1.589
Kurt 11.49 13.72 11.44 8.881 55.51 10.32 19.87 5.633 9.573 7.524
Q-ac 1441 1268 1319 1564 992.6 1508 1725 1756 1142 1365
MO MRK MSFT PFE PG T UTX VZ WMT XOM
Mean 0.241 0.227 0.266 0.246 0.212 0.265 0.237 0.227 0.262 0.202
Max 1.646 1.195 3.303 1.102 1.392 1.117 1.252 0.904 1.488 1.017
Min 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.056 0.022 0.056 0.062 0.004 0.062 0.026
St.Dev. 0.132 0.098 0.152 0.104 0.105 0.122 0.110 0.119 0.129 0.088
Skew 2.752 2.630 4.427 1.567 1.946 1.618 1.813 1.652 1.371 2.038
Kurt 19.65 16.36 66.05 7.944 12.55 7.975 10.12 6.809 7.591 11.45
Q-ac 922.7 856.2 828.6 1221 1649 1425 1501 1055 1632 942.4
Notes: Table shows descriptive statistics of the realized volatilities
of DJIA individual stocks. Companies represented by the tickers
are given in the Appendix.
In-sample Estimation Results
Table 7.3 describes the estimation results of empirical model formed by Equations (7.8)
and (7.9) estimated for the thirty DJIA stocks.
The estimated coe¢ cients !, , 1, and 2 are basically directly comparable to the
standard GARCH coe¢ cients as known from the literature, but note that they should be
divided by two to compare to standard coe¢ cients because wi;t is approximately one half
on average. The intercept or unconditional volatility ! is usually not signicantly di¤erent
from zero. We nd evidence of the leverage e¤ect since 1 < 2 and the signicance of
2 is larger than of 1, thus negative shocks induce a larger positive e¤ect on volatility
than positive shocks. The  coe¢ cient is close to two and highly signicant.
Concerning the switching function, we nd that the sensitivity parameter  is positive
for all stocks. This implies that there is indeed a positive feedback rule, i.e., the element of
the GARCH equation that is closest to the actual volatility in period t, will receive more
weight in period t+1. Furthermore,  is highly signicant for all stocks, which serves as
a rst indication of the fact that adding this exibility to the GARCH is benecial.
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Table 7.3: Estimation Results
!  1 2   LL(sw) LL(nosw) 2 M LL
Mean 0.001 1.922 0.027 0.132 1.493 1.226 7585.2 7551.9 66.54
(0.297) (78.36) (1.202) (5.822) (9.402) (7.298)
Max 0.008 2.075 0.146 0.313 3.200 2.281 8516.4 8486.6 151.3
(2.946) (221.2) (5.395) (12.27) (20.45) (24.49)
Min -0.005 1.793 -0.061 0.025 0.188 0.694 4944.8 4929.7 6.364
(-8.788) (31.94) (-5.287) (0.963) (2.474) (2.100)
StDev 0.002 0.072 0.041 0.071 0.679 0.351 744.2 740.5 32.72
(2.338) (44.39) (2.522) (2.618) (4.117) (4.224)
Skew 0.618 0.192 0.285 0.440 0.379 0.953 -2.190 -2.182 0.551
(-2.284) (1.411) (-0.766) (0.205) (0.956) (2.743)
Kurt 4.511 2.372 4.023 3.174 2.738 4.177 8.190 8.149 3.617
(9.056) (5.019) (3.515) (3.056) (3.719) (11.19)
PerSig 23.33 100.0 50.00 93.33 100.0 20.00a 100.0
Notes: Table presents the distributional characteristics of esti-
mation results of the model given by Equations (7.8) and (7.9),
over the individual DJIA stocks; t-values given in parentheses.
LL(sw) denotes the likelihood of the switching case; LL(nosw)
of the static case (estimated coe¢ cients of the non-switching case
are not reported). PerSig is the percentage of signicant results;
a: signicantly di¤erent from one.
The symmetry parameter  is equal to 1.2 on average. As it is larger than one,
it implies that wi;t is centred round a point lower than one half; in other words, the
fundamentalists receive unconditionally less weight than chartists. However,  is not
signicantly di¤erent from one on average, and for 80% of the individual stocks. Thus
there is no unconditional preference for either one of the groups in the market.
The likelihoods of the switching (sw) and no-switching (nosw) setup and their di¤er-
ence are given in the nal three columns of Table 7.3. The benecial e¤ect of adding
the switching is again illustrated by the fact that the likelihood ratio test (i.e., the nal
column) favours the exible over the static model in 100% of the cases.
As a second test of the in-sample performance of the model, the following equation is
estimated
log(RVt) = +  log(ht) + "t (7.10)
where ht is the (in-sample) volatility as described by the model. If ht is an unbiased
and e¢ cient measure of the actual volatility (i.e., RVt),  = 0 and  = 1. Because of
the auto-correlation and heteroskedasticity in RVt, Equation (7.10) is estimated with a
Newey-West adjustment to the variance-covariance matrix. Normality of "t is assured by
the log-normality of RVt, see Andersen et al. (2003). Results are again confronted with
those of the static model, and presented in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4 conrms the results from Table 7.3. The  estimates are closer to zero and
less signicant on average for the switching case compared to the static case. Likewise,
the  estimates are closer to one and more signicant for the dynamic setup on average,
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Table 7.4: Fit Results
No Switching Switching
  R2   R2
Mean -0.737 0.932 0.516 -0.291 0.983 0.598
(-2.814) (29.63) (-1.805) (47.67)
Maximum 0.578 1.078 0.655 0.945 1.112 0.723
(2.287) (43.00) (4.788) (58.33)
Minimum -2.409 0.732 0.239 -1.746 0.793 0.372
(-7.824) (12.61) (-10.22) (25.12)
Std. Dev. 0.744 0.088 0.100 0.637 0.075 0.087
(2.899) (6.972) (3.680) (9.99)
Skewness -0.324 -0.435 -0.807 -0.439 -0.596 -0.805
(-0.336) (-0.242) (-0.541) (-0.885)
Kurtosis 2.405 2.677 3.298 2.617 2.847 3.369
(1.985) (2.725) (2.499) (2.713)
Perc.Sig. 56.70 50.00 56.70 53.30
Notes: Table presents the distributional characteristics of the esti-
mation results of the model given by Equation (7.10), over the 30
individual DJIA stocks. T-values given in parentheses. Perc.Sig.
is the percentage of signicant results.
and the adjusted R2 is larger. Therefore, the volatility process formed by the model is a
more e¢ cient description of the actual volatility compared to a standard GARCH model.
Overall, it can be concluded from these rst results that the behavioral volatility model
is performing benecially (in-sample) relative to the GARCH model.
Close-up: the case of 3M
Figure 7.1 illustrates the behavior of the model for the case of one typical stock, 3M. The
top-left plot displays the weight wi;t and the volatility ht. Changes in weight coincide
with changes in volatility. This can be explained by the fact that as volatility itself is
volatile, the element that describes volatility best is also more likely to change through
time. Furthermore, it can be seen that wi;t is, on average, just below one half.
The upper right plot displays the two elements. Striking is the fact that the volatility
introduced by the fundamentalists is much larger than the chartists. In general the two
parts appear to move together. Note that the numbers are inated by a factor two
because of the pre-multiplication of the elements by wi;t.
The lower left plot displays the e¤ect that introducing the switching process has on
the volatility process. Clearly the introduction of wi;t, adds much more exibility to
the volatility process. This comes forward especially around period 2500, where the
volatility from the model is much higher than of the standard GARCH. Lower right
plot, nally, shows the relation between the di¤erence of the two errors, and the weight.
Because of the positive  the relation is positive in the plot (i.e., a higher error gives a
lower weight). Furthermore, because of the non-linear switching function there is a slight
S-shaped relation between the errors and wi;t.
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Figure 7.1: The Case of 3M
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Out-of-Sample Results
Next to the in-sample performance of the proposed model, the out-of-sample properties
are considered. This is done by applying the following methodology. First, the model
is estimated for the rst 2000 periods, a one-period forecast is made, the model is re-
estimated for 2001 periods, a one-period forecast is made, etcetera. We put  = 1 since
results from Table 7.3 indicate that the added value is limited for the majority of stocks.
Table 7.5 reports the one-period mean absolute forecast error (MAE) of volatility6 gen-
erated by the standard GARCH and our behavioral volatility model.
Table 7.5: Forecasting Errors
MAE (no sw) MAE (sw) Di¤erence t-val di¤
Mean 7.280E-05 6.170E-05 1.100E-05 9.987
Maximum 1.930E-04 1.720E-04 3.830E-05 18.749
Minimum 3.360E-05 2.900E-05 -8.510E-07 -1.058
Std. Dev. 3.740E-05 3.140E-05 9.880E-06 5.291
Skewness 1.508 1.739 1.261 -0.508
Kurtosis 5.072 6.450 4.206 2.707
Perc.Sig. 89.3
Notes: Table presents the mean absolute forecasting error (MAE)
for both the static (no sw) and switching (sw) case, and their
di¤erence. Perc.Sig. is the percentage of signicant results.
The mean absolute errors in Table 7.5 indicate that the dynamic model outperforms
the static one at this one-period forecasting exercise. On average, the t-value is highly
signicant; signicant in 89.3%. The out-of-sample t results conrm results from the
literature that the GARCH model is not totally convincing in terms of forecasting power.
Table 7.6 presents the t results estimated by the equation log(RVt) = + log(Et 1ht)+
"t. Again, a value of  = 0 and  = 1 implies an unbiased and e¢ cient forecast of the
actual volatility. Table 7.6 shows that the switching model improves the results some-
what;  is closer to zero,  is closer to one, and the R2 is higher (all on average) for the
switching case.
7.3.4 Robustness
It might be the case that our proposed model outperforms the standard model as a result
of the fact that it has an information advantage. By using RVt as a benchmark to the
switching rule, more (exogenous) information is incorporated into the volatility process.
As the volatility described by the model is benchmarked against the realized volatility in
the tests, this could a¤ect the results. In order to tackle this issue, the tests performed
above are executed again, but then including RVt itself as an (exogenous) explanatory
variable to the chartist forecasting rule. As such, the information disadvantage of the
static model is eliminated. The model becomes
6The stocks Verizon (VZ) and Exxon Mobile (XOM) are not included in the analysis because of lack
of data.
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Table 7.6: Fit Forecasts
No Switching Switching
  R2   R2
Mean -4.343 0.557 0.136 -3.785 0.613 0.174
(-6.462) (7.391) (-6.287) (9.205)
Maximum -0.993 0.930 0.426 -0.342 1.000 0.472
(-2.121) (16.23) (-0.892) (21.43)
Minimum -6.210 0.361 0.054 -6.871 0.271 0.064
(-11.63) (4.355) (-14.69) (4.639)
Std. Dev. 1.237 0.132 0.085 1.573 0.172 0.095
(2.654) (2.714) (3.282) (3.595)
Skewness 0.536 0.664 2.078 0.269 0.288 1.342
(-0.416) (1.851) (-0.643) (1.485)
Kurtosis 3.072 3.299 7.072 2.633 2.765 4.828
(2.226) (6.260) (3.419) (5.774)
Perc.Sig. 100.0 96.4 89.3 89.3
Notes: Table shows the distributional statistics of the estimation
results of Equation (7.10) applied to the forecasted volatility for
both the switching and no-switching case. T-values are given in
parentheses. Perc.Sig. is the percentage of signicant results.
rt = +
5X
i=1
irt i +
4X
i=1
iDi +
p
ht"t (7.11)
ht = wt(! + ht 1) + (1  wt)

1
p
ht 1"+t 1
2
+ 2
p
ht 1" t 1
2
+ 3RVt 1

in which
wt =
1
1 + exp [ (f;t   c;t)] (7.12)
c;t =
1 pht 2"+t 22 + 2 pht 2" t 22 + 3RVt 2  RVt 1
f;t = j! + ht 2  RVt 1j
Tables 7.7 and 7.8 present the results from the (in-sample) estimation of the model
laid out by Equations (7.11) and (7.12). First of all, 3 is signicant for the large ma-
jority of stocks, indicating the importance of this variable. The coe¢ cients , 1 and
2 are considerably smaller than before. The switching parameter  remains positive
and signicant on average and for 60% of the individual stocks. Switching improves the
likelihood for half of the stocks. This pattern is continued in Table 7.8; the switching
improves matters considerably though not as much as in Table 7.4.
Tables 7.9 and 7.10 nally, present the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the
augmented model. Consistent with all previous results, it appears that the switching
setup is able to outperform the static setup, so also without information advantage.
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Table 7.7: Estimation Results with Exogenous RV
!  1 2 3  LL(sw) LL(nosw) 2LL
Mean 0.006 1.536 0.002 0.121 0.388 0.575 7591.2 7587.9 6.659
(1.504) (30.63) (0.302) (3.829) (5.141) (2.710)
Max 0.087 1.935 0.098 0.289 1.240 4.458 8527.6 8526.9 37.13
(10.43) (174.2) (5.325) (12.38) (12.45) (8.513)
Min -0.005 0.171 -0.077 -0.086 -0.002 -15.12 4959.5 4958.7 0.056
(-4.128) (1.506) (-2.839) (-2.071) (-0.372) (-2.496)
StDev 0.017 0.384 0.046 0.084 0.296 3.281 745.04 744.84 8.876
(3.122) (31.81) (2.024) (2.846) (3.246) (2.882)
Skew 4.241 -1.887 0.130 -0.089 0.950 -3.785 -2.169 -2.162 1.959
(0.937) (3.308) (0.365) (0.803) (0.607) (0.493)
Kurt 21.33 6.772 1.946 2.875 3.654 18.89 8.114 8.094 6.453
(4.314) (15.10) (2.505) (4.420) (2.981) (2.347)
PerSig 46.70 96.70 40.00 76.70 86.70 56.70 50.00
Notes: Table presents the distributional statistics of the estima-
tion results of the model given by Equations (7.11) and (7.12)
over the individual DJIA stocks; t-values are given in parentheses.
LL(sw) and LL(nosw) represent the likelihood of the switching
and no-switching case, respectively. PerSig denotes the percentage
of signicant results.
Table 7.8: Fit Results with Exogenous RV
No Switching Switching
  R2   R2
Mean -0.359 0.974 0.610 -0.285 0.983 0.610
(-2.338) (52.99) (-1.961) (55.40)
Maximum 1.075 1.134 0.748 1.007 1.126 0.750
(6.556) (87.40) (4.227) (90.32)
Minimum -1.942 0.770 0.350 -1.822 0.784 0.348
(-10.89) (23.88) (-8.650) (24.19)
Std. Dev. 0.754 0.087 0.097 0.664 0.077 0.096
(4.478) (15.10) (4.036) (15.39)
Skewness -0.232 -0.353 -0.804 -0.193 -0.361 -0.807
(-0.181) (-0.031) (-0.166) (-0.092)
Kurtosis 2.628 2.793 3.293 2.581 2.923 3.415
(2.120) (2.672) (1.724) (2.896)
Perc.Sig. 56.70 63.33 66.70 70.00
Notes: Table presents the distributional statistics of the estima-
tion results of the model given by Equation (7.10) applied to the
volatility with exogenous RV, over the individual DJIA stocks.
T-values are given in parentheses. Perc.Sig. is the percentage of
signicant results.
7.4 Option Pricing with Heterogeneous Expectations
7.4.1 Data and Methodology
The previous section has shown that the behavioral volatility trading model is capable of
outperforming a regular GARCH model in both in- and out-of-sample tests. From Black
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Table 7.9: Forecast Errors with Exogenous RV
MAE (no sw) MAE (sw) Di¤erence t-value di¤=0
Mean 6.29E-05 6.14E-05 1.49E-06 1.915
Maximum 1.81E-04 1.81E-04 1.06E-05 13.598
Minimum 2.53E-05 2.55E-05 -2.34E-06 -4.758
Std. Dev. 3.52E-05 3.42E-05 2.76E-06 3.925
Skewness 1.526 1.686 1.587 0.656
Kurtosis 5.575 6.335 5.573 4.019
Perc.Sig. 50.00
Notes: Table presents the mean absolute forecasting error (MAE)
of the model with exogenous RV for static (no sw), switching
(sw), and their di¤erence. Perc.Sig. denotes the percentage of
signicant di¤erences.
Table 7.10: Fit Results Forecasts with Exogenous RV
No Switching Switching
  R2   R2
Mean -4.343 0.557 0.136 -3.785 0.613 0.174
(-6.462) (7.391) (-6.287) (9.205)
Maximum -0.993 0.930 0.426 -0.342 1.000 0.472
(-2.121) (16.23) (-0.892) (21.43)
Minimum -6.210 0.361 0.054 -6.871 0.271 0.064
(-11.63) (4.355) (-14.69) (4.639)
Std. Dev. 1.237 0.132 0.085 1.573 0.172 0.095
(2.654) (2.714) (3.282) (3.595)
Skewness 0.536 0.664 2.078 0.269 0.288 1.342
(-0.416) (1.851) (-0.643) (1.485)
Kurtosis 3.072 3.299 7.072 2.633 2.765 4.828
(2.226) (6.260) (3.419) (5.774)
Perc.Sig. 100.0 96.40 89.30 89.30
Notes: Table presents distributional statistics of the model given
by Equation (7.10) applied to the forecasted volatility with RV,
over the individual DJIA stocks. Perc.Sig. is the percentage of
signicant results.
and Scholes it is known that the only unknown variable in the option pricing model is the
volatility. Hence trading in options is essentially trading on the expectations about the
future volatility of the underlying asset. Therefore, the next logical step is to empirically
verify the behavioral volatility trading model in an option pricing setup. This is done
using the GARCH option pricing methodology introduced by Duan (1995), and modied
in Lehnert (2003).
In a nutshell, the option pricing procedure boils down the following. First of all,
the dividend adjusted value for the underlying asset is determined for a certain day; in
our case, that is the DAX30 on January 1st 2000. Next, a set of options is observed
with di¤erent times to maturity and di¤erent strikes and therefore di¤erent prices for
that same day. Using Monte Carlo simulations, the behavioral volatility trading model
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generates volatility forecasts for all the di¤erent expiration dates. In other words, it starts
o¤ from the observed dividend-adjusted underlying of today, and iterates forward until
expiration. Next, option prices are calculated by plugging forecasts into the standard
Black and Scholes formula, and compared with the empirically observed option prices.
The optimization procedure then consists of minimizing the root-mean-squared pricing
error of the total set of options per day by altering the coe¢ cients of the model. The
equilibrium set of coe¢ cients is subsequently used as starting values for the optimization
procedure for the next day. This whole procedure is repeated for each trading day in the
data set; in our case this is each trading day in 2000.
The option data comprise of daily closing DAX 30 index options and futures prices for
a one year period from January 2000 until December 2000. The raw data set is directly
obtained from the EUREX, European Futures and Options Exchange. The market for
DAX index options and futures is the most active index options and futures market in
Europe.
Options with less than one week and more than 25 weeks until maturity and options
with a price of less than two Euro are omitted in order to avoid liquidity-related biases
and because of less useful information on volatilities. We lter the available option
prices and include all options that are actively traded, inside or outside the 10% absolute
moneyness interval. In practice, in volatile periods deep out-of-the money options are
highly informative if they are actively traded. As a result, each day we use a minimum
of three and a maximum of four di¤erent maturities for the calibration; see Table 7.11.
Table 7.11: Number of Observations
Trading Days to Expiration
<21 [21,63] >63
Moneyness Total Median Total Median Total Median Total
< 0.92 909 3 634 3 1712 7 3255
[0.92,0.96) 2918 9 1017 5 728 3 4663
[0.96,1.00) 2034 7 1816 7 1074 4 4924
[1.00,1.04) 753 7 818 3 2791 10 4362
> 1.04 1444 6 1030 5 1728 7 4202
Total 8058 32 5315 23 8033 31 21406
Notes: Table gives the number of observations distributed over
moneyness (vertical) and trading days to expiration (horizontal)
for the total sample of days and the median day.
The DAX index calculation is based on the assumption that the cash dividend pay-
ments are reinvested. Therefore, when calculating option prices, theoretically the index
level does not have to be adjusted for the fact that the stock price drops on the ex-
dividend date. However, the cash dividend payments are taxed and the reinvestment
does not fully compensate for the decrease in the stock price. Therefore, in the conver-
sion from e.g. futures prices to the implied spot rate, one empirically observes a di¤erent
implied dividend adjusted underlying for di¤erent maturities. For this reason, we work
with the adjusted underlying index level implied out from futures or option market prices.
In particular the following procedure is used for one particular day to price options on
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the following trading day.
First, we compute the implied interest rates and implied dividend adjusted index rates
from the observed put and call option prices. We are using a modied put-call parity
regression proposed by Shimko (1993). The put-call parity for European options reads
ci;j   pi;j = [St   PV (Dj)] Xie rj(Tj t) (7.13)
where ci;j and pi;j are the observed call and put closing prices, respectively, with exercise
prices Xi and time to maturity (Tj   t), PV (Dj) denotes the present value of dividends
to be paid from time t until the maturity of the options contract at time Tj and rj is the
continuously compounded interest rate that matches the maturity of the option contract.
We are observing options with di¤erent strikes and di¤erent maturities, such that we can
infer a value for the implied dividend adjusted index for di¤erent maturities, St PV (Dj),
and the continuously compounded interest rate for di¤erent maturities, rj. Since closing
prices are used for the estimation, one alternative is to use implied index levels from DAX
index futures prices assuming that both markets are closely integrated.
The next step is to simulate the observed underlying until expiration of the di¤erent
options. In order to evaluate options, the physical process has to be transformed to
a risk-neutral process. We make use of the Local Risk Neutral Valuation Relationship
(LRNVR) developed in Duan (1995). Under the LRNVR the conditional variance remains
unchanged, but under the pricing measure Q the conditional expectation of rt is equal to
the risk free rate rf
EQ [exp(rt)j
t 1] = exp(rf ) (7.14)
The risk-neutral Gaussian process reads:
rt = ln

St   PVt(Dj)
St 1   PVt 1(Dj)

= rf   1
2
2t +
p
ht"t (7.15)
"tj
t 1  N(0; 1) under risk-neutralized probability measure Q
Equation (7.15) is not necessarily normal, but to include the Black-Scholes model as
a special case it is typically assumed that it is a Gaussian random variable. The locally
risk-neutral valuation relationship ensures that under the risk neutral measure Q, the
volatility process satises
V arQ [rtj
t 1] = V arP [rtj
t 1] = ht (7.16)
in which ht is the behavioral volatility trading model. A European call option with
exercise price X and time to maturity T has at time t price equal to
ct = exp( rT )EQt [max(St  X; 0)j
t 1] (7.17)
in which St is the by our model forecasted value of the underlying asset at expiration. For
this kind of derivative valuation models with a high degree of path dependency, compu-
tationally demanding Monte Carlo simulations are commonly used for valuing derivative
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securities. We use the recently proposed simulation adjustment method, the empirical
martingale simulation (EMS) of Duan and Simonato (1998), which has been shown to
substantially accelerate the convergence of Monte Carlo price estimates and to reduce
the so called simulation error.
The modeling of the expectations of conditional volatility of fundamentalists (and
chartists) in an EGARCH setting is motivated by the empirical data tting. In the
empirical setting applying a standardGARCH framework resulted in numerous violations
of parameters in their permissible parameter space. The EGARCH setting resolves these
issues as it imposes no restrictions on the parameter space, see Nelson (1991).
Parameters of the model are calibrated by minimizing the root mean squared pricing
error between the market prices ci;j and the theoretical option prices bci;j, where N is the
total number of call options evaluated, the subscript i refers to the n di¤erent maturities
and subscript j to the mi di¤erent strike prices in a particular maturity series i.
RMSE =
vuut 1
N
min
nX
i=1
miX
j=1
(bci;j   ci;j)2 (7.18)
Given reasonable starting values, European call options are priced with exercise price
Xi and maturity Tj. Using the Newton-Raphson optimization method, the parameter
estimates are obtained that minimize the loss function.
Finally, having estimated the parameters in-sample, we turn to out-of-sample valu-
ation performance and evaluate how well each days estimated models value the traded
options at the end of the following day. The problem is, however, that the put-call par-
ity, used to infer the dividend-adjusted underlying, is obviously not yet observed. The
futures market, however, is open before the option market. We therefore turn to the fu-
tures market in order to determine the dividend adjusted underlying for the out-of-sample
tests.
The futures market is the most liquid market and the options and the futures market
are closely integrated, therefore it can also be assumed that the futures price is more
informative for option pricing than just using the value of the index. For every observed
futures closing price we can derive the implied underlying index level and evaluate the
option. Given a futures price Fj with time to maturity Tj spot futures parity is used to
determine St   PV (Dj) from
St   PV (Dj) = Fje rjTj (7.19)
where PV (Dj) denotes the present value of dividends to be paid from time t until the
maturity of the options contract at time Tj and rj is the continuously compounded interest
rate (the interpolated EURIBOR rate) that matches the maturity of the futures contract
(or time to expiration of the option). If a given option price observation corresponds to
an option that expires at the time of delivery of a futures contract, then the price of the
futures contract can be used to determine the quantity St   PV (Dj) directly.
The maturities of DAX index options do not always correspond to the delivery dates
of the futures contracts. In particular for index options the two following months are
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always expiration months, but not necessarily a delivery month for the futures contract.
When an option expires on a date other than the delivery date of the futures contract,
then the quantity St   PV (Dj) is computed from various futures contracts. Let F1 be
the futures price for a contract with the shortest maturity, T1 and F2 and F3 are the
futures prices for contracts with the second and third closest delivery months, T2 and T3
respectively. Then the expected future rate of dividend payment d can be computed via
spot-futures parity by
d =
r3T3   r2T2   log(F3=F2)
(T3   T2) (7.20)
Hence, the quantity St PV (Dj) = Ste dT associated with the option that expires at
time T in the future can be computed by
Ste
 dT = F1e( (r1 d)T1 dT ) (7.21)
This method allows us to perfectly match the observed option price and the underly-
ing dividend adjusted spot rate. Given the parameter estimates and the implied dividend
adjusted underlying the option prices can be calculated and compared to the observed
option prices of traded index options.
The exact functional form of the volatility traders model as introduced in Section 7.2 is
also adapted somewhat to this particular methodology. The expectation formation rules
of fundamentalists and chartists remain the same; the switching function, however, cannot
be a function of the realized volatility because this is not observable in the simulation
setting. Therefore, agents measure the performance of the two rules by taking the absolute
percentage forecasting error versus the by the model generated volatility
i;t =
 ln(hit 1)  ln(ht 1)ln(ht 1)
 (7.22)
7.4.2 Results
This section presents the empirical results of the option pricing application of the hetero-
geneous agents model for the second moment. First, one specic path from the Monte
Carlo simulations is presented in order to gain somewhat more feeling on the behavior
of the proposed model. Second we focus on both the estimation results and the stability
of the estimates through time. Finally, we examine the pricing errors of the model, both
in-sample and out-of-sample. The estimation exercises are conducted in a setting with
and without switching. This allows us to examine the direct e¤ect of introducing more
exibility in the model; in other words, it allows us to see the advantage of the behavioral
model over a standard GARCH.
Figure 7.2 presents a close-up of one simulation path out of 10,000 in the Monte Carlo
setup; it uses the (optimized) coe¢ cients from a random day, May 5th in this case. A
number of observations can be made. As one would expect, the volatility ht lies between
the expectations of the fundamentalists hFt and chartists h
C
t . The distance between the
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Figure 7.2: Simulation Path
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Notes: Figure displays an example of one simulation path for May
5, with =-0.087; 1=-0.365; 2=0.337; and =40.450. HF is
the fundamentalist forecast; HC chartist forecast; H the volatility
process; and w the weight.
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three is governed by the weight wt. Weights uctuate continuously around the benchmark
of one half with a minimum of 0.14 and maximum of 0.81. The nature of the two groups is
clearly illustrated by the course of the volatility process. High spikes in volatility always
coincide with low weights; i.e., a relatively high volatility is caused by the fact that the
market is dominated by chartists. The most clear example of this can be seen around
observation number 40 where wt reaches its minimum and ht its maximum. The reverse
is true as well; when fundamentalist make up over 80% of the market around period 70,
volatility drops towards its long-run value. Therefore, fundamentalists are stabilizing,
and chartists destabilizing. None of the groups gets driven out of the market, and both
groups experience periods of dominance.
Table 7.12: Parameter Estimates
 1 2 
Pricing error
in-sample
Pricing error
out-of-sample
Panel A
Mean -0.04 -0.33 0.30 3.72 9.12
SD 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.69 5.03
Min -0.07 -0.53 0.19 2.29 2.39
Max -0.01 -0.20 0.41 5.44 24.77
1st Quartile -0.05 -0.37 0.27 3.18 5.16
3rd Quartile -0.03 -0.28 0.33 4.19 11.47
Panel B
Mean -0.05 -0.29 0.28 59.04 2.80 8.63
SD 0.02 0.05 0.04 18.24 0.81 5.20
Min -0.09 -0.44 0.18 23.48 1.56 1.99
Max -0.01 -0.18 0.36 118.52 5.27 24.40
1st Quartile -0.06 -0.32 0.26 46.65 2.23 4.30
3rd Quartile -0.04 -0.26 0.31 70.43 3.35 11.42
Notes: Table presents the distributional characteristics of the pa-
rameter estimates of the model, over the trading days in the sam-
ple, and the in- and out-of-sample pricing errors generated by the
model for both the static (no switching, Panel A) and dynamic
(switching, Panel B) case.
Table 7.12 presents the estimation results of the option pricing application of the
heterogeneous agents model; the distributional characteristics of the estimates over time
are depicted. Overall, it can be observed that all coe¢ cients have the sign and magnitude
as hypothesized by the model. Both fundamentalists and chartists appear to be active on
the market; their individual e¤ects on the variance process are as expected (stabilizing
and destabilizing, respectively). Also, we nd signicant evidence of switching between
the two rules.
Focusing on the static setup rst (Panel A); the mean-reversion parameter  is nega-
tive throughout the sample, implying that fundamentalists consistently apply a stabilizing
expectation formation rule. They therefore introduce a mean reverting dynamics into the
variance process, as they expect the variance to return to the long run volatility. The
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absolute magnitude of the mean estimate of  indicates that fundamentalists expect on
average 4% of the excess volatility to disappear in the next period. The average estimated
local volatility, i.e. the starting value for the volatility dynamics, is estimated to be equal
to 27% (annualized), which is very much in line with the time series volatility of the DAX
index in that period.
Parameter estimates for the chartist expectation formation rule in the model, 1 and
2, have the expected sign as well. The results for this asymmetric setup imply that
there is a clear leverage e¤ect: positive shocks in the level result in a reduction of the
variance 1 < 0; negative shocks in the level result in an increase of the variance, 2 > 0.
Therefore, negative shocks in the level have a destabilizing e¤ect to the variance process
because of the chartistsexpectation formation rule.
The results for the switching setup, in Panel B, are generally consistent with the
static setup. The di¤erence, the sensitivity of choice parameter , is positive throughout
the sample. This implies that the switching mechanism functions as a positive feedback
rule. In other words, the positive sign of the coe¢ cient indicates that agents switch
towards the group with the smallest forecasting error. The magnitude of  is conditional
on the functional form of the  function (in this case, a loss function consisting of the
percentage forecasting error). Therefore, it is not possible to make any statements about
the sensitivity to prot di¤erences of traders in the option market at this time. We will,
however, be able to say something about the evolution of individuals behavior over time
in the sensitivity analysis below.
As additional empirical evidence for the model, we examined both the in-sample and
out-of-sample pricing errors. The results for the models with and without switching are
depicted in the nal two columns of Table 7.12. Results suggest that the assumption that
agents always switch to the more protable forecasting rule is very much supported by
the data. Comparing Panel A to B reveals that the most sophisticated model outperforms
the benchmark with on average e 0.92 for the in-sample and e 0.49 for the out-of-sample
pricing error. In other words, next to introducing a more intuitive appeal to volatility
models, the heterogeneous agents setup for the second moment also proves to be more
e¤ective in explaining and forecasting option prices.
To our best knowledge, a heterogeneous agents model has never been applied to
the options market. We can, however, compare the results with related literature to a
certain extent. First of all, the signs and magnitudes of the chartist expectation formation
function are directly comparable to the standardEGARCH-results, due to Nelson (1991).
The relative impact of positive versus negative shocks corroborates previous ndings;
the typical results for the leverage e¤ect indicate that the relative e¤ect of negative
shocks on the variance process is larger than the positive shocks. Second, the results are
directly in line with previous ndings on estimates of heterogeneous agents models for
alternative markets. Boswijk et al. (2007) nd signicant evidence of the coexistence
of chartists and fundamentalist for the S&P500 from 1870 to 2006. Our results on the
switching mechanism, however, are stronger compared to Boswijk et al. (2007); evidence
for switching is limited given their estimate of the switching parameter. This implies that
traders in the options market are more prone to change their strategy in response to a
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Figure 7.3: Parameter Estimates over Time
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over the sample.
di¤erence in prots compared to traders in the S&P500 or foreign exchange market.
Given that the model is estimated for di¤erent maturities and levels of moneyness for
each day of the year, we can examine the stability of the estimated coe¢ cients during
the estimation process. By following the evolution of the estimated coe¢ cients, it will
be possible to say something about the conditional behavior of heterogeneous traders.
Figure 7.3 depicts the development of the coe¢ cient estimates over time.
Figure 7.3 displays the development of the two expectation formation functions, fun-
damentalists and chartists, and the intensity of choice parameter. Overall, the parameters
of the fundamentalist and chartist expectation formation functions are relatively stable;
, 1 and 2 move in a relatively small band within the region they are expected.
At around two-thirds of the sample , 1 and 2 start moving towards zero, while
 becomes larger and more volatile. This evolution of the parameters can be directly
explained by the logic of the underlying heterogeneous agents model. Apparently, the
volatility in the underlying is relatively constant in this middle period, which can be
seen from the fact that the coe¢ cients of the expectation formation functions go to zero.
Both groups form their expectation as the most recently observed volatility, plus some
correction term; as the correction term goes to zero, agents expect a constant volatility.
As both fundamentalists and chartists expect small innovations to the volatility process,
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the prot di¤erence between the two strategies as well as the forecasting error itself will
be small. As the forecasting errors are small, large shifts in  will not induce large shifts
in the distribution of weights over strategies. This is exactly why the estimate of  shows
large shifts in this period.
7.5 Conclusions
In this chapter we introduced heterogeneous volatility traders. Although volatility itself
is obviously not a nancial product as stocks or exchange rates, volatility traders do exist
as one thinks of them as trading in options, the VIX index, etcetera. As such, volatility
traders are market participants forming expectations on the future level of the volatility
of the underlying asset, which is equivalent to forming expectations on prices of the
derivative. As volatility itself is an unobserved variable, the methods of forecasting it will
diverge from trader to trader; hence, heterogeneity in volatility trading. Heterogeneity
is introduced by dening a group of fundamentalists, who expect the volatility to mean-
revert to a long-run unconditional volatility, and a group of chartists, who respond to
(unexpected) news. As in the previous chapters, traders are again able to change their
strategy based on the cognitive di¤erence they experience. As it turns out, the model
reduces to an ARCH-type process with time-varying coe¢ cients.
The empirical verication of the model is carried out in two steps. First of all, we
estimate the model in a time-series setting and compare the outcomes with a standard
GARCH model. Results indicate that the behavioral volatility trading model is comfort-
ably outperforming the benchmark in both an in-sample and out-of-sample setting. This
is the result of the increased exibility induced by the switching rule in the behavioral
model.
Being the only unobserved variable in an option pricing model, volatility plays a
pivotal role in the determination of the value of an option. Therefore, the second step
consists of using the proposed model to price options. In an application of the model to
DAX index options, we nd evidence that di¤erent types of traders are actively involved
in trading volatility. Hence, we nd evidence that observed option prices are the result
of heterogeneity in expectations about future volatility.
Extensions to the current results are both possible and necessary. The current data
set only comprises of call-options for a limited time span. More data will obviously
yield more condence in the results. The estimation procedure as it is now estimates the
model daily; using the data as a panel, so using both the time-series as the cross-sectional
variation, would make it possible to construct standard errors around the estimates.
It would also be interesting to experiment with alternative specications of the model.
Think of alternative prot functions, as is common in the heterogeneous agents literature.
Also, the expectation formation functions are exible to incorporate numerous di¤erent
specications, including ones with exogenous information.
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7.A Appendix to Chapter 7
Ticker Company Ticker Company
AA Alcoa Inc. JNJ Johnson & Johnson
AIG American International Group Inc. JPM JPMorgan Chase & Co.
AXP American Express Co. KO Coca-Cola Co.
BA Boeing Co. MCD McDonalds Corp.
CAT Caterpillar Inc. MMM 3M Co.
C Citigroup Inc. MO Altria Group Inc.
DD E.we. DuPont de Nemours & Co. MRK Merck & Co. Inc.
DIS Walt Disney Co. MSFT Microsoft Corp.
GE General Electric Co. PFE Pzer Inc.
GME General Motors Corp. PG Procter & Gamble Co.
HD Home Depot Inc. T AT&T Inc.
HON Honeywell International Inc. UTX United Technologies Corp.
HPQ Hewlett-Packard Co. VZ Verizon Communications Inc.
IBM International Business Machines Corp. WMT Wal-Mart Stores Inc.
INTC Intel Corp. XOM Exxon Mobil Corp.
Notes: Table presents the ticker symbols and companies repre-
sented by the tickers.
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusions and Suggestions
8.1 The Bottom Line
Financial markets remain an important source of inspiration for scientic research. Based
on new theoretical insights and empirical results, the vast literature on nancial market
dynamics has evolved through the years in terms of markets, methodology, data, but also
from rationality and e¢ ciency to behavioral inuences.
In this dissertation we have followed the evolution of the nance literature from purely
fundamental based rational expectations models towards a behavioral model that embeds
di¤ering views on market dynamics in a framework incorporating human traits. This is
done using a rich array of methodological approaches applied to a number of di¤erent
markets. It is rst shown that there are indeed issues with the classical rational view
on nancial markets; there is need for a new paradigm. An alternative approach is
suggested, based on the notions of bounded rationality, and the subsequent heterogeneity
of market participants. Based on an analysis of actual expectations we conclude that
heterogeneity of beliefs and switching of agents between these beliefs is a real and viable
alternative. First using simulation techniques and later using estimation techniques for a
number of di¤erent markets, the heterogeneous expectations approach is further validated
empirically.
The pith of the matter lies on the analysis of disaggregated survey expectations, and
the subsequent estimation of heterogeneous agents models. The survey data allows us
to give a clear image on actual behavior of market participants. As such, it serves as a
strong building block for the heterogeneous agents literature. The empirical verication
of heterogeneous agents models is a particular novelty in the current thesis. Strangely
enough, the literature is almost completely based on simulation techniques while the
models basically reduce to a higher order polynomial, albeit non-linear; we try to ll this
void.
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Chapter 2 starts o¤ from the classical monetary model of exchange rate determina-
tion. The logic of the model implies that if the level of the exchange rate is determined
by macro-economic fundamentals, such as the relative money supply, production, and
interest rates, then the statistical features of the exchange rate should also be generated
by these variables. Foreign exchange rates are known to exhibit a number of (statistical)
stylized facts, such as heavy tails and volatility clusters. Combining these insights yields
the hypothesis that macro-economic fundamentals are distributed with heavy tails and
contain volatility clusters, and that these dynamics in the fundamentals are the source
of dynamics in the exchange rate itself. The rst part of the hypothesis is accepted in
Chapter 2; we show that the distribution of fundamentals has a tail index that is close to
that of exchange rate returns and that fundamentals test positively for ARCH - e¤ects.
The second part of the hypothesis, however, is rejected. An extreme value in (one of the)
fundamentals does not coincide with an extreme exchange rate return; also, the volatility
in fundamentals is not related to volatility in the exchange rate. Hence our conclusion,
there is not only a disconnect puzzle in the level of the exchange rate, but also in the
higher moments.
The empirical rejection of the monetary model in Chapter 2 is one in a long list
of rejections led by the seminal work of Meese and Rogo¤ (1983), which has generated
a number of new approaches to exchange rate determination and nancial markets in
general. In Chapter 3 we try to nd empirical support for one of them, the heterogeneous
agents approach. Because of the invisibility of expectations in the standard data sets
(like prices), we obtain a survey data set of individual expectations of large nancial
institutions, which are obviously actual market participants. Surveys have been used more
often in the nancial economic literature (see Jongen et al (2008) for an overview), but the
disaggregation to the individual level in this particular set is of special interest. A number
of conclusions can be drawn from Chapter 3. First of all, extreme value analysis indicates
that the distribution of beliefs of market participants has heavy tails; participants hold
extremely diverging believes. Di¤erences in expectations between market participants
are not generated by a normal process and can therefore not be attributed to noise or
measurement error. One of the sources of these (extreme) di¤erences is shown to be the
fact that market participants attach di¤erent weights to di¤erent theoretical forecasting
constructs. In particular, certain participants attach more weight to fundamental values
(i.e., PPP, monetary model) while others attach more weight to technical analysis. In
an extension, we also nd that these particular weights attached to fundamentalist and
chartist strategies are time varying and conditional on the distance between the exchange
rate and the fundamental rate. The larger the misalignment, the stronger the feeling that
the exchange rate has to mean-revert to its fundamental, hence the larger the weight
attached to fundamental values. Finally, market uncertainty is also shown to be a driver
of dispersion of beliefs. The higher the volatility in the market, the more uncertainty
surrounding the future exchange rate, thus the larger the dispersion between participants.
Based on these results we conclude that the heterogeneous agents approach, with its
distinction between fundamentalists, chartists, and switching believes, is an interesting
and relevant alley to explore.
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Chapter 4 takes the results from the previous two chapters as input; it studies whether
the introduction of heterogeneous agents is able to yield an explanation for the disconnect
puzzle in higher moments. For this end, we take the heterogeneous agents model for the
exchange rate developed in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006) and study the relation
between the statistical properties of the fundamental and those of the market exchange
rate in a simulation setup. In other words, we study the exchange rate that is generated
by the model using time series techniques. In order to incorporate the dynamics of the
fundamental as found in Chapter 2, we replace the standard fundamental exchange rate
(a random walk) with one that reects the dynamics as found in Chapter 2 (an ARCH(1)
process). The results indicate that the model is indeed able to generate the disconnection
between the fundamental and exchange rates. The reason for the disconnection is the
existence of chartists. If the market would only be populated by fundamentalists, the
market price would always be equal to the fundamental price. The existence of chartists,
however, who do not condition their expectation on the fundamental price, induces the
market price to drift away from the fundamental. Therefore, the statistical features
are disconnected as well. It is the behavior of chartists that introduces heavy tails and
volatility clusters in the exchange rate returns; their extrapolating behavior induces these
dynamics. Therefore, both the fundamental price and the market price exhibit heavy tails
and volatility clusters, but because their sources are di¤erent they do not coincide.
The simulation setup of Chapter 4 shows promising results in favour of the hetero-
geneous agents model. The drawback of simulations, however, is that the model is not
directly confronted with real life data. In order to tackle this issue, we estimate the model
using the methodology proposed by Boswijk et al. (2007) in Chapter 5. The model is
estimated for eight EMS exchange rates over the period 1979 - 1998. This choice is based
on the following consideration. Fundamentalists base their expectation on the fundamen-
tal exchange rate. In the international nancial literature, however, there is no consensus
over what exactly could be considered as a credible fundamental value for the exchange
rate. Therefore, the EMS o¤ers an interesting alternative in the form of a central parity,
with a certain bandwidth surrounding it that allows volatility (which is not the case in a
purely xed exchange rate regime). Because of the target zone, we altered the functional
form of the expectation formation rules to take the bands into account. The results indi-
cate that the fundamentalist/chartist distinction is relevant for the sample at hand; both
strategies are found to be signicantly present. The direct evidence for switching between
the rules, signicance of the switching parameter, however, is limited. Indirectly though,
switching does improve the overall t of the model, and the signicance of the individual
rules. Also, Teräsvirta (1994) states the signicance of the expectation formation rules
is a su¢ cient condition due to the functional form of the switching function. Therefore,
we do conclude that agents switch between groups. Results also show that the model is
able to outperform a random walk in out-of-sample forecasting.
Chapter 6 continues in the similar line of thought, but applied to equity indices. For
this end, we develop a model with a boundedly rational, but representative fund manager.
The manger has three types of information at its disposal, fundamental, technical, and
international, and is allowed to adapt their relative importance to market circumstances.
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Also, the model spans two equity markets. Fundamental and technical information be-
haves conform the usual rules; international information is bases on price changes in the
foreign market. The model is used to study the notion of contagion during the Asian
crisis. The weight attached to the international information source is a measure of co-
movement between the equity markets; as this weight increases during a crisis in one
market which causes the second market to crash as well, there is contagion. The model is
estimated on daily data for the Thai and Hong Kong stock exchanges from 1981 to 2006.
The results indicate that all three forecasting rules are applied in both markets. In this
case, signicant switching parameters are found. As such, the dynamic model appears to
be appropriate. In terms of contagion, we nd that the crisis spills from the Thai to the
Hong Kong market. The Asian crisis is triggered by the fact that there is an increased
focus on fundamentalism in Thailand (the market was highly overvalued). The large
drop in the Thai market is exported to the Hong Kong market by means of increased
international focus in Hong Kong; the crisis in the Hang Seng is further aggravated by
technical analysts.
The seventh chapter, nally, takes the heterogeneous agents approach and places it
in a di¤erent perspective. We introduce volatility traders, who trade and thus form
expectation on (changes in) volatility. The prices of several nancial products nowadays
depend solely on the volatility of some underlying asset; think in this respect of options,
swaps, and a VIX index. Agents trading these assets form expectations on future volatility
and trade upon these expectations. As such, they might a¤ect the level of volatility. Since
volatility is an unobservable variable, it is not a stringent assumption to state that agents
have di¤ering views on the future level of volatility. One group, fundamentalists, is
assumed to expect the current level of volatility to return to the unconditional long-run
volatility. The second group, chartists, views the volatility process as simply being the
squared return from the underlying asset. Again, based on forecasting performance, the
volatility traders are able to switch between groups. It is shown that the model reduces
to a GARCH with time varying coe¢ cients based on changing weights. The model is
empirically validated using two distinct methodologies. Firstly we perform a time-series
analysis on the thirty individual stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average and compare
the in-sample and out-of-sample performance of the behavioral volatility trading model
with the standard GARCH model. In both cases, the proposed model outperforms
the GARCH model. Secondly we use the model to price DAX index options using
the GARCH option pricing methodology by Duan (1995). Again using the standard
GARCH model as a benchmark, it turns out that the behavioral model outperforms the
standard in terms of in- and out-of-sample pricing errors.
8.2 What the Future Holds
The conclusions of the individual chapters outlined above corroborate the current stance
of the literature. The monetary model performs doubtfully in an empirical setting; a
promising alternative is the heterogeneous agents literature. The exchange rate is dis-
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connected from the underlying fundamental values in terms of the level, variance, and
extreme changes. One of the assumptions behind the monetary model, rationality and ho-
mogeneity of agents is falsied. Expectations of market participants are not rational, and
not homogeneous. This does not necessarily imply that the market in total is not rational,
though. However, modelling the heterogeneity of agents in an asset pricing model does
result in simulated prices that resemble the empirically observed price processes. Also
the estimation of heterogeneous agents models gives signicant results and an improved
t in the foreign exchange, equity, and options markets. Therefore, the heterogeneous
agents approach is a strong and viable alternative. The added value of this thesis clearly
lies in providing a strong empirical basis for heterogeneous agents models, especially in
terms of fundamentalists and chartists, and in providing empirical evidence by directly
estimating heterogeneous agents models for a number of di¤erent nancial markets.
Let me dwell somewhat more in detail upon the estimation of heterogeneous agents
models. Obviously, the di¢ culty in the estimation process lies in the non-linear structure
of the switching function. The shape of the multinomial logit function is conditional on
the intensity of choice parameter (), which is to be estimated. The absolute magnitude
of the intensity of choice, however, depends on the functional form of the cognitive dis-
sonance measure . As such, it is impossible to form a reasonable ex-ante expectation
on the value of , apart from its sign. Also, the multinomial switching function has
an S-shape (see gure 5.2);  regulates the slope of the middle part. With  = 0, the
function represents a straight line at 1
2
. As  increases, though, the S-shape becomes
stronger, steeper in the middle part, until the weights jump from zero to one exactly at a
prot di¤erence of zero as  !11. The middle part of the spectrum, however, is broad
and large changes in  induces only small variation in weights w and thus the behavior
of agents. Teräsvirta (1994) applies a similar type of switching function to a smooth
transition autoregressive (STAR) model and marks that even relatively large changes in
 only have a minor e¤ect on the shape of w, especially when  is large. The result is that
the intensity of choice parameter in such a setup is usually estimated with relatively large
standard errors, and will thus generally appear to be non-signicant according to regular
measures. Teräsvirta (1994) thus concludes that the signicance of the individual rules
is a su¢ cient condition to draw conclusions about switching models. Nevertheless, the
need for a more structural solution remains. For example, a type of bootstrap analysis of
the behavior of standard errors belongs to the possibilities. Also, the magnitude of the
prots could be normalized to a certain limited range such that the order of magnitude
of  can be controlled. Second advantage of normalization is the fact that the magnitude
of  becomes comparable across cross-sections.
A second issue surrounding the switching function is the fact that it renders the
model highly sensitive to both starting- and parameter values; this is something that
numerous papers on heterogeneous agents models illustrate in a simulation setup, see
e.g. De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2005, 2006). In terms of estimation this implies that the
results will be highly dependent on the starting values of coe¢ cients in the optimization
procedure. Winker and Gilli (2001, 2004) introduce a specic procedure for the estimation
1Or  !  1, depending on the exact functional form of the cognitive dissonance measure .
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of heterogeneous agents models because the probability of converging towards a local
instead of global maximum is substantial. Because of these two issues surrounding the
switching function, i.e. large standard errors of  and local maxima, the probability
surface of the optimization procedure is not smooth and also relatively at around the
(global) maximum.
Previous authors have circumvented the issues surrounding the switching function by
replacing it with a statistical construct, like a Markov switching rule (Vigfusson, 1997).
We have chosen not to do so, however, because although easier to estimate, it comes at
the cost of loss of economic interpretation; the switching function based on the relative
performance of rules provides a very intuitive measure of behavior. In order to assure
ourselves of a global maximum in the optimization procedures, we always performed an
extensive grid-search over all parameter dimensions in order to nd the proper starting
values for the coe¢ cients. The problem with the large standard errors in estimation is
reected in the fact that the signicance of  is generally relatively low in the presented
results. In order to verify the added value of the switching rule, the model is always
estimated with and without the possibility for agents to switch. Results consistently
indicate that the extra exibility signicantly increases the general t of the model and
the individual signicance of the expectation formation rules of the agents (i.e., other
parameters in the model gain signicance). So, even though the intensity of choice
parameter itself is not statistically signicant, the switching of agents between rules is.
The general tendency also appears to be that the signicance of  increases as the
signicance of the coe¢ cients in the expectation formation rules increases; this is most
clearly illustrated in the time-series analysis in Chapter 7, where the coe¢ cients of the
volatility traders are highly signicant and the intensity of choice as well. This makes
sense intuitively, because if the two rules are clearly identied and thus provide clear and
distinct alternatives to the investor, the choice process itself also becomes relevant. If the
expectations of the two groups are relatively equal, their prots will also be relatively
equal and there is not much to be gained by changing strategy. As indicated before,
the absolute magnitude of  is conditional on the functional form of ; more generally,
within a multinominal logit equation the absolute size is conditional on the order of mag-
nitude of the number it is multiplied with. When writing the switching function in the
form of Equation (5.8), in which weights are a direct function of the prot di¤erence,
the magnitude of the intensity of choice  will have a tendency to inate if the prot
di¤erence becomes small (i.e., when individual forecasting functions are not clearly iden-
tied). Teräsvirta (1994) observes that the standard error of  will be particularly large
with relatively large (absolute) values of ; therefore, low signicance of the individual
forecasting rules will result in low signicance of the switching parameter.
Directly related to the signicance of the individual expectation formation rules is,
obviously, the functional form of these rules. In other words, ex-ante choices have to be
made concerning the exact behavior of fundamentalists and chartists. The distinction
between fundamentalism and chartism is a very fundamental one, as it combines stabi-
lizing with destabilizing dynamics. The classication, however, is also very broad; there
are numerous possible functional forms for both groups that di¤er in complexity and
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cognitive demands on the agents. Future research should incorporate di¤erent types of
fundamentalism and chartism. The baseline model is exible enough to incorporate all
di¤erent kinds of expectation formation; if the applied expectation formation rule is not
realistic, the switching rule will make sure that the unrealistic behavior gets driven out
of the market. As such, switching serves as a controlling device to the econometrician.
Leading in the search to realistic functional forms could be studies on survey expectations,
as presented in Chapter 3, but also studies involving laboratory experiments with human
subjects. Hommes et al. (2005) show, in an experimental setting, that participants tend
to use very simple heuristics with an emphasis on technical rules.
The question concerning the fundamentalists especially revolves around the choice of
the fundamental rate itself; what is the appropriate fundamental price? Especially in
exchange rate economics this is a highly relevant question; De Grauwe and Kaltwasser
(2007) introduce uncertainty surrounding the exact level of the fundamental price in a
heterogeneous agents model and show that it has profound e¤ect on the behavior of the
market exchange rate. Chartists base their expectations on past prices, which are observ-
able, but the functional form of the expectation formation is debatable. Standard within
the heterogeneous agents literature is to model chartism as an AR(1)-process, which is
the most simple form of technical analysis one can think of. Because this introduces
trend-chasing behavior, though, it does the trick in simulation analyses. In empirical
studies, however, the choice of an AR(1) process feels rather counter-intuitive because
returns from nancial markets are known not to exhibit any form of autocorrelation2.
Also, it is known that traders apply very sophisticated types of technical analyses. This
should also be applied in the heterogeneous agents models.
Recent studies in this respect also include learning agents. Learning models, usually
based on least-squares learning as introduced by Evans and Honkapohja (2001), do not
only let agents switch between fundamentalism and chartism, but also let the expectation
formation functions themselves evolve through time, see De Grauwe and Markiewicz
(2007) and Goldbaum (2005, 2006). The combination between switching and learning
provides a very rich source of dynamics. The literature on this combination, though, is
still in its infancy. Also here, it would be interesting to attempt to bring these type of
models to the data. Obviously though, if only switching already proves to be di¢ cult,
including learning will be particularly challenging.
Another point where the model can gain on realism, is the market microstructure.
As already mentioned in Chapter 1, the exact organization of the market, where traders
place their orders, is of inuence on the price formation process. The norm so far is to
assume the existence of a Walrasian auctioneer, who equalizes demand and supply of the
fundamentalists and chartists and comes up with an equilibrium price level. In short,
the price is a weighted average of individual expectations. The Walrasian auctioneer,
however, is a theoretical construct and does not apply to real markets. Stock exchanges,
for example, almost all work with double auction markets. The combination of the e¤ect
2Several studies have reported that simulated returns, using a form of AR(1)-process for chartists, do
not contain signicant autocorrelation, see e.g. Westerho¤ (2006). The question is, however, whether
this process will be identied in an empirical setting.
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of heterogeneous agents and the microstructure can yield interesting insights into nancial
markets. Chiarella and Iori (2002) study this combination in a simulation setting; there
are no empirical studies that do so, to our best knowledge.
The behavioral nance literature has laid bare several behavioral anomalies. What
often remains unclear, though, is how these individual anomalies at the micro level af-
fect results at the macro level. As such, the heterogeneous agents literature provides
a suitable platform for investigation since it incorporates both extreme abstraction lev-
els. The current thesis has already illustrated the e¤ect of status qua bias and cognitive
dissonance. Other behavioral biases can also be incorporated. We are thinking of an in-
tegration with, for example, the notion of irrational exuberance, by Shiller (2005) or the
sentiment literature, see Barberis et al. (1998). The level of rationality can be regulated
by the complexity of the expectation formation rule, while behavioral issues can easily
be incorporated in the switching rule.
The strength of the heterogeneous agents model, we believe, lies in the combination
of two processes, but especially in the switching between them. The switching function
provides a very parsimonious and economically intuitive mechanism to incorporate ex-
ibility in behavior of market participants in our case, but can be interpreted in a much
more general manner. Chapter 7 illustrates that the switching rule can basically serve
as a time-varying parameter in a totally di¤erent kind of model and add signicantly to
the results. In our view this is applicable in an even wider spectrum; basically it can
be applied in any situation in which the loading of a variable in a model is conditional
on a certain measure. Even a return to macroeconomic fundamentals is granted here;
Bacchetta and Wincoop (2004) introduce the so-called scapegoat model. They claim that
exchange rates are driven by economic fundamentals, but that the impact of the di¤er-
ent fundamentals varies over time. This can readily be incorporated with the switching
mechanism and the heterogeneous agents approach put forward in this thesis. As such,
the circle is complete.
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Verwachtingen spelen een zeer grote rol in het dagelijks leven van mensen. Praktisch
elk besluitvormingsproces bevat een onderdeel gericht op het vormen van verwachtingen
over hoe de toekomstige omgeving eruit ziet en hoe de huidige beslissing daar in past en
invloed op heeft. Binnen de economische wetenschap is deze focus op verwachtingen zeer
expliciet aanwezig. De meest gangbare denitie van economie stelt dat het het gedrag
van mensen bestudeert in zake de aanwending van schaarse, alternatief aanwendbare mid-
delen ten einde een doel te bereiken. Met andere woorden, mensen maken beslissingen
over de allocatie van middelen (nu) om een bepaald doel te bereiken in de toekomst. Er
dienen dus verwachtingen gevormd te worden. In de nanciële economie is het belang
van verwachtingen nog groter. Praktisch elk nancieel product wordt gewaardeerd aan
de hand van een model waarin de prijs gelijk is aan de contante waarde van alle toekom-
stige kasstromen. Zo is de prijs van een aandeel gelijk aan de contante waarde van alle
toekomstige dividend uitkeringen. Uiteraard bestaat er onzekerheid over de toekomstige
winstgevendheid van ondernemingen, dus ook over toekomstige dividenden. Kortom,
wederom dienen er verwachtingen gevormd te worden.
De klassieke economische theorie neemt van oudsher aan dat verwachtingen worden
gevormd op een volledig rationele manier. Met andere woorden, economische actoren
hebben beschikking over volledige informatie en zij weten exact hoe deze informatie in
de prijs verwerkt dient te worden. Binnen de nanciële economie wordt dit de E¢ -
ciënte Markt Hypothese (EMH) genoemd; alle informatie is op elk moment verwerkt in
de geldende (markt)prijs. Deze denkwijze heeft een aantal voordelen; het is intuïtief
zeer behapbaar, mathematisch (relatief) eenvoudig toe te passen, en empirisch zijn er
nauwelijks alternatieven.
De afgelopen decennia is er veel onderzoek gedaan naar de validiteit van de aanname
van rationele verwachtingen en is er gerede twijfel ontstaan over de realiteitswaarde.
Theoretisch is er bijvoorbeeld aangetoond dat als de gehele populatie van handelaren
dezelfde (rationele) verwachting heeft over de toekomstige prijs, er nooit daadwerkelijk
handel zal plaatsvinden. Het is tenslotte onmogelijk een tegenpartij te vinden die een
andere mening is toegedaan over eventueel te behalen rendementen, waardoor nanciële
producten nooit verhandeld zullen worden. Dit is moeilijk te spiegelen aan de huidige
volumes in nanciële markten. Daarnaast is aan de hand van surveys direct onderzocht in
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hoeverre de verwachtingen van marktparticipanten voldoen aan de rationele verwachtin-
gen hypothese. Het resultaat laat zich raden: in vrijwel alle studies wordt aangetoond
dat individuele marktparticipanten een afwijking hebben in hun verwachting en niet alle
informatie e¢ ciënt verdisconteren in de prijsverwachting. Op marktniveau manifesteren
verwerpingen van de EMH zich in de vorm van zogenaamde anomaliën. Zo is het bijvoor-
beeld duidelijk geworden dat nanciële markten excessief veel variabiliteit vertonen, en
dit doen in specieke perioden. Ook zijn er tijdens het jaar bepaalde perioden waarin
meer dan normaal rendement te behalen is, zoals rond de jaarwisseling, de zomerperi-
ode, en verschillende feestdagen. Kortom, de rationele verwachtingen hypothese is aan
herziening toe.
Als alternatief voor de (neo-)klassieke volledig rationele homo economicus, werd in
het begin van de jaren 80 van de vorige eeuw de beperkt rationele economische agent
geïntroduceerd. Deze benadering gaat niet meer uit van alleswetende actoren, maar
van mensen met beperkte cognitieve vaardigheden. Niet de volledige informatieset en
het e¤ect ervan is bekend, maar slechts een onderdeel. Daarnaast werden er invloeden
vanuit de psychologie geïntroduceerd, zodat een meer realistisch mensbeeld ontstaat in
de economische wetenschap.
Een van de gevolgen van het introduceren van de beperkt rationele agent, is dat er
ruimte ontstaat voor verschillen tussen individuen. Er is tenslotte slechts één manier om
volledig rationeel te zijn, terwijl er oneindig veel manieren bestaan om beperkt rationeel
te handelen. Er kunnen verschillende onderdelen van alle relevante informatie gebruikt
worden en verschillende individuen zijn in verschillende mate gevoelig voor psychologis-
che en emotionele factoren. In termen van het vormen van verwachtingen zijn er ook
verschillende nieuwe, beperkt rationele, modellen ontwikkeld. Zo kennen we bijvoorbeeld
adaptieve, extrapolatieve, en regressieve verwachtingen. Een specieke onderverdeling
binnen de beperkt rationele verwachtingen, is de distinctie tussen fundamentalisten en
chartisten. De eerste groep baseert verwachtingen op fundamenteel economisch onder-
zoek terwijl de tweede groep kijkt naar patronen in (historische) prijzen, ofwel technische
analyse.
De stroming in de nanciëel economische literatuur die zich bezighoudt met deze
tweedeling tussen fundamentalisten en chartisten, is de heterogene agenten literatuur.
Marktprijzen worden gevormd door de interactie tussen deze twee verschillende groepen.
Het gedrag van markthandelaren wordt op micro-niveau gemodelleerd, wat resulteert in
een prijs op macro-niveau, wat weer invloed heeft op het micro-gedrag in de volgende pe-
riode. Het combineert dus de klassieke onderverdeling tussen micro- en macro-economie.
Een tweede interessant aspect dat is geïntroduceerd in deze literatuur, is de exibiliteit
van handelaren om van strategie te veranderen. Als fundamentalisten in een bepaalde
periode een hogere winst halen dan chartisten, trekt dit handelaren aan, waardoor er in
de volgende periode meer handelaren gebruik zullen maken van de fundamentele manier
van verwachtingen vormen. Op deze manier ontstaat er een zeer interessant niet-lineair
model dat in staat is verschillende anomalieën in de markt te verklaren.
De heterogene agenten literatuur heeft zich vooralsnog vooral beziggehouden met
theoretische verhandelingen over het gedrag van dergelijke modellen. In deze dissertatie
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proberen we hier een empirisch vervolg aan te geven. Met andere woorden, we proberen de
heterogene agenten modellen te testen met behulp van geobserveerde prijsdata in nan-
ciële markten. Dit wordt gedaan gebruik makend van verschillende nanciële markten,
verschillende technieken, en verschillende invalshoeken. Dit proefschrift is opgebouwd aan
de hand van de literatuur zoals hierboven beschreven. In eerste instantie wordt aange-
toond dat er daadwerkelijk behoefte is aan een alternatief voor rationele verwachtingen.
Vervolgens wordt laten zien dat de heterogene agenten literatuur een zeer interessant en
relevant alternatief biedt. Tenslotte wordt aangetoond dat heterogene agenten modellen
ook daadwerkelijk empirische zeggingskracht hebben.
Na het inleidende Hoofdstuk 1 bekijkt Hoofdstuk 2 in hoeverre het klassieke monetaire
model in staat is om een relatie te leggen tussen de variabiliteit in de reële economie, en
die in de wisselkoers. Het monetaire model legt, theoretisch, een direct verband tussen
bewegingen van aan de ene kant de geldhoeveelheid, productie, en rente, en aan de andere
kant de wisselkoers. Als dit geldt voor het niveau van de genoemde variabelen, zou dit ook
zo moeten zijn voor de variabiliteit ervan. Hoofdstuk 2 laat zien dat macro-economische
variabelen ook extreme waarden en variabiliteits-klusters vertonen, zoals we ze kennen
van nanciële markten, maar dat deze niet zijn gerelateerd aan die van de bijbehorende
wisselkoersen. Dit is, wederom, een verwerping van het monetaire model, een model dat
zijn wortels heeft in de rationele verwachtingen traditie.
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt in hoeverre de heterogene verwachtingen hypothese, en met
name de onderverdeling in fundamentalisten en chartisten, reëel is. Het doet dit met
behulp van een unieke survey dataset met individuele wisselkoers verwachtingen van
nanciële instellingen in Londen. We laten zien dat survey respondenten inderdaad sig-
nicant van elkaar verschillen; sterker nog, verwachtingen blijken extreem van elkaar te
verschillen. De notie van homogene verwachtingen blijkt dus niet op te gaan. Vervol-
gens wordt aangetoond dat verschillen in verwachtingen zijn gebaseerd op het feit dat
respondenten verschillende gewichten geven aan fundamentele- en technische-analyses.
Met andere woorden, het idee van heterogene agenten op basis van fundamentalisten en
chartisten blijkt empirisch houdbaar. Ook wordt laten zien dat deze gewichten veranderen
door de tijd.
In Hoofdstuk 4 wordt een relatie gelegd tussen de resultaten uit Hoofdstuk 2 en 3. Met
behulp van een heterogene agenten model wordt in een simulatie-analyse aangetoond dat
een dergelijk model in staat is een verklaring te geven voor het feit dat de extreme waarden
en volatiliteitsclusters van de macro-economische fundamenten niet zijn gerelateerd aan
die van de wisselkoers. In het geval de marktprijs niet gelijk is aan de fundamentele prijs,
zijn het de technische analysten die de markt domineren. Gezien het feit dat chartisten
geen gebruik maken van fundamentele analyse, worden kenmerken van deze fundamenten
ook niet doorgegeven aan de daadwerkelijke marktprijs. Dit verklaart de disconnectie
tussen de marktprijs en de fundamentele prijs, in zowel niveau, variabiliteit, als extreme
waarden.
Hoofdstuk 5 maakt wederom gebruik van het heterogene agenten model zoals geïntro-
duceerd in Hoofdstuk 4, maar het doet dit niet in een simulatie setting. Het voordeel van
een simulatie is dat het de kenmerken van het gebruikte model bijzonder goed blootlegt.
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Nadeel, echter, is dat het model niet daadwerkelijk wordt geconfronteerd met empirische
data. In dit hoofdstuk schatten wij het heterogene agenten model voor een achttal wis-
selkoersen tijdens de EMS periode. Deze periode is speciek gekozen omdat het een
duidelijk zichtbare "fundamentele koers", de spilkoers van het regime, biedt. Resultaten
wijzen uit dat er daadwerkelijk verschillende typen agenten aktief zijn op de wisslkoers-
markt; er zijn zowel fundamentalisten als twee verschillende typen chartisten. Het directe
bewijs voor het wisselen tussen groepen is niet overweldigend, maar indirect blijkt toch
dat het introduceren van de mogelijkheid tot wisselen de t van het model signicant
verbetert. Tenslotte laten we zien dat het model de toevalswandeling verslaat in termen
van voorspelfout.
Hoofdstuk 6 gaat verder op de lijn zoals ingezet in Hoofdstuk 5, en breidt dit verder
uit. Ten eerste wordt in Hoofdstuk 6 gekeken naar aandelen in plaats van wisselkoersen.
Ten tweede introduceren we een aantal nanciële markten naast elkaar in het model, in
tegenstelling tot een enkele markt in Hoofdstuk 5. Ook wordt er een expliciete relatie
gelegd tussen de twee markten. Tenslotte wordt de markt in het model niet bevolkt door
heterogene agenten met verschillende voorspelregels, maar door een representatieve agent
die een gewogen gemiddelde gebruikt van verschillende regels. Het model wordt simultaan
geschat voor de Thaise en Hong Kong aandelen indices ten tijde van de Azië crisis om
te zien of het heterogene agenten model de besmetting van de crisis van Thailand naar
Hong Kong oppikt. Resultaten laten wederom zien dat de representatieve agent gebruik
maakt van verschillende voorspelregels, en dat het gewicht dat gegeven wordt aan deze
regels verandert door de tijd op basis van prestaties in het verleden. De besmetting van
de crisis van Thailand naar Hong Kong is dan ook het resultaat van het gestegen gewicht
dat gegeven wordt aan internationale informatie.
De toepassing van het basis idee achter het heterogene agenten model wordt een stuk
breder getrokken in Hoofdstuk 7. Hoofdstuk 7 introduceert volatiliteits-handelaren, die
in beginsel handelen in producten waarvan de prijs enkel afhangt van de variabiliteit
van een bepaalde onderliggende waarde. Denk hierbij aan opties, de VIX index, etc.
Er worden wederom twee typen agenten geïntroduceerd; een groep die verwachtingen
conditioneert op het verschil tussen de huidige volatiliteit en de onconditionele volatiliteit
en een groep die zich alleen richt op (assymmetrische) exogene schokken. Het model
reduceert tot een asymmetrisch GARCH model met tijdsvariërende coe¢ cienten, waarbij
de tijdsvariatie wordt veroorzaakt door het wisselen van agenten tussen de twee groepen.
Het model wordt geschat d.m.v. twee verschillende empirische methoden. Ten eerste
wordt het model geschat in een tijdserie omgeving voor de 30 Dow Jones Industrial
Average aandelen. De geschatte conditionele volatiliteit presteert signicant beter dan
een standaard GARCH model in zowel in-sample als out-of-sample testen. Ten tweede
wordt het model gebruikt voor het waarderen van DAX index opties, gebruik makend
van de GARCH optie waardering methodologie. Ook hier presteert het model in alle
opzichten beter dan een standaard model.
Hoofdstuk 8 vat samen, concludeert, en geeft richting aan potentieel toekomstig onder-
zoek. Hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 7 hebben duidelijk bewijs geleverd dat de klassieke ho-
mogene rationele verwachtingen hypothese niet opgaat en dat de heterogene verwachtin-
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gen hypothese met fundamentalisten en technische analysten een zeer reëel alternatief
biedt. Zowel theoretisch, als in een simulatie, als empirisch lijkt het voorgestelde model
beter te presteren dan de standaard. Voor de toekomst dient er nog aanzienlijk meer
werk verricht te worden wat betreft de techniek van het schatten van de niet-lineaire
heterogene agenten modellen. Het standaard raamwerk kan echter wel in een aanzienlijk
breder spectrum worden toegepast en biedt een rijke en veelbelovende toekomst.
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